“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 4 - 8 2
Ghormley recommended that the initia-
tion of the offensive be deferred” because
of insufficient resources. (USSBS, Em-
ployment of Forces under the Southwest
Pacific Command [Feb. 19471, p. 10.)
9. Enemy statistics from Allied Air
Forces and RAAF Intelligence Sum-
maries; Allied statistics from cable status
reports. See also Histories, 49th and 35th
Fighter Gps.
10. CM-IN-2 I 14 (4-8-42), Australia
to T A G , 8 Apr. 1942; interview with
Capt. Charles L. Marburg, 3 Nov. 1942;
interview with Capt. Carey L. OBrien, 5
Dec. 1942; Lt. Gen. George Brett report,
Air Operations in Australia, Sum. J ; un-
recorded interview with Maj. M.J.
Keane, Mar. 1944; Eric Feldt, T h e Coast-
watchers (New York, 1946).
11. RAAF Intel. Sums.; History, 49th
Fighter Gp.
12. History, 49th Fighter Gp.; His-
tory, V Fighter Command.
13. Memo for C/S from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report $5, 9
July 1942; Brett report; CM-IN-7277
$811, 26 May 1942. It will be recalled
that two squadrons of the 8th Fighter
Group equipped with P-39’s had reached
Port Moresby by I May. (See chap. 11.)
14. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.;
cable status reports; Histories, 39th and
40th Sqs. and V Fighter Command. The
heaviest raid of this period damaged
water mains, burned fuel dumps, and
destroyed two P-39’s and one P-400 on
the ground.
15. See sources in n. 14 and CM-IN-
AAF, #A119, 19 July 1942. A t least
twenty P-39’s and P-400’s were destroyed
during June and eight more in July by
enemy action.
16. Osmar White, Green Amour
(New York, 1945), p. 148; msg., Brett to
NE Area, Townsville, I I May 1 9 4 2 ; msg.,
Hq. USA Townsville to Hq. USAFIA,
12 May 1942; msg., NE Area, Towns-
ville to Hq. Allied AF, 14 May 1942;
Histories, 374th Troop Carrier Gp., 3d
Bomb. Gp., 13th and 90th Bomb. as.;
(5-26-42), GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
6849 (7-20-42), GHQ SWPA to C G
CM-IN4701 (7-2-42), GHQ SWPA to
C/S, #27, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-925,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #CIS, 3 July 1942.
17. Histories, 3d and 27th Bomb.
Gps.; cable status reports.
18. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
13th Bomb. Sq.; Consolidated Statistical
Report, Materiel Command, Sec. Vl’, 30
June 1942; cable status reports.
19. R A M and Allied AF Intel. Sums.,
specifically #14, 3 July 1942, p. 6; Keane
interview; Histories, 13th and 90th Sqs.
20. Ibid.; RAAF and Allied AF Intel.
Sums. During this same period and in
these same bomber missions, Allied crews
claimed twenty enemy fighters shot
down.
2 1 . Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Gp.; interview with
Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942;
cable status reports.
2 2 . Interview with Lt. Col. W.F.
Coleman by author, 2 1 June 1946.
23. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.
24. Cable status reports; Bostrom
interview; Sec. of War’s Conference,
18 May 1942; AFDAS to AFAEP, 14
May 1942.
2 5 . See, for example, General Arnold‘s
undated memo to General Marshall in
regard to JCS 48, and AAJ? Reference
History No. I, The AAF in the South
Pacific to October 1942.
26. Enemy Order of Battle, from
RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.; other
statistics from cable status reports. It
should also be pointed out that the Jap-
anese had no four-engine bombers for
offensive missions.
27. Thus the flow of aircraft was
hardly providing the supposedly estab-
lished wastage of 20 per cent a month.
(Cable status reports; c M - o u T - 7 5 ~ ~
[629-42], Arnold to CinC/SWPA, $308,
2 9 June 1942.)
28. Lt. Col. William J. Kennard, Re-
port on Philippine and Australian Activi-
ties, 14 Nov. 1942.
29. Coleman interview; interview with
members of 19th Bomb. Gp., 5 Dec. 1942;
statement of Col. William Hipps to
author; Kennard report; Richardson and
7 2 3