“Roosevelt”53 pages
- p. 5 …Imprint
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of…
- p. 138 …1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face…
- p. 141 …changed our requirements
for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,-
ooo,ooo be appropriated…
- p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16
- p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President
Roosevelt revealed…
- p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio
address on 3 September: “This Nation…
- p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
- p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of
W a r and the…
- p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 174 …cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
- p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been
motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
- p. 199 …On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
- p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
- p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the
U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
- p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
- p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs
of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
- p. 287 …evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t…
- p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a…
- p. 301 …In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not…
- p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major
military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief of…
- p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
- p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
- p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
- p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2…
- p. 352 …Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could…
- p. 366 …raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of…
- p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the
summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
- p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed
to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
- p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
- p. 465 …for effective
resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in
February that the general…
- p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
- p. 499 …Apparently
President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition,
although it is not possible…
- p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to
China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
- p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime…
- p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on
8 April General Marshall and Harry…
- p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in-
formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
- p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
- p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
- p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably…
- p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
- p. 753 …This book shows the
close relations between Roosevelt and
the Committee T o Defend America by…
- p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72…
- p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of…
- p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force…
- p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt,
zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941;
memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
- p. 779 …Elliott
Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic
Bridge, pp. 27-29.
117. Ltr., Sec. of…
- p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to…
- p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the…
- p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac-
Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg.
#5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
- p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of…
- p. 857 …See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment…
- p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512
Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344
Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 2 - 7 4
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
I . Immediately after the fall of Cor-
regidor, for instance, General MacArthur
argued for development of a second
front in the Pacific which, in addition to
affording a necessary protection for Aus-
tralia and India, would assist the U.S.S.R.
by forcing a Japanese withdrawal from
Siberia. (CM-IN-2333 [5-8-421, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, #176, 8 May 1942.)
2 . CM-IN-0469 (62-42), MacArthur
to C/S, #217, 2 June 1942; CM-IN-2264,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #913, 8 June 1942.
MacArthur argued that now was a pro-
pitious moment to rush forces from the
Indian and Atlantic oceans for temporary
action against the Japanese. (CM-IN-
6409, MacArthur to C/S, #199, 23 M a y
1942.) Without such additional striking
forces and greater security of commu-
nications, he opposed a landing on Tulagi
which had been suggested by the Navy.
(CM-IN-8352 [5-29-421, GHQ SWPA
to C/S, #840, 28 May 1942.)
3. Memo for Gen. Twining from Col.
Frank Everest, Office of G-3, WDGS,
2 3 June 1942; draft memo for C/AS
from Col. O.A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans,
25 June 1942. General Marshall was
inclined to support General MacArthur’s
proposals. His staff was working on the
logistics for an operation similar to one
proposed by MacArthur, and he was
preparing to urge the Navy to move two
or three carriers into Australian waters
and to suggest to the British that they
move two or three of their carriers from
the Indian Ocean, all to be available for
operations against New Britain and
New Ireland. (Msg. #204, Marshall to
CinC/SWPA, 10 June 1942.) A later
development of this plan was that the
British units should operate against
Timor with the support of army aircraft
based in northwestern Australia. This
action was to be co-ordinated with an
operation in the South Pacific against
Tulagi by an American task force includ-
ing at least two carriers and supported
by land-based aviation from northeast
Australia, the New Hebrides, and New
Caledonia. (CM-OUT-5704 [6-23-421,
Marshall to CinC SWPA, # q 7 , 23 June
1942.) General MacArthur informed
General Marshall that air strength in the
Southwest Pacific was insufficient for
support of operations both to the north-
east and to the northwest. (CM-IN-7976
[6-24-42], GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
4. CM-OUT-5704 (6-23-42), Mar-
shall to CinC/SWPA, #277, 2 3 June 1942;
memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. T.T.
Handy, AC/S, OPD, 24 June 1942, in
OPD 381 SWPA. See also other sources
cited in preceding note.
5 . Sources in n. 3 ; CM-OUT4596
(6-26-42), Marshall to CinC/SWPA,
8289, 26 June 1942; CM-OUT-7366 (6-
28-42), Marshall to MacArthur, #300, 28
June 1942; CM-OUT-~SOI (6-29-42),
Marshall to CinC/SWPA, #306, 29 June
1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar-
shall, 26 June 1942, and for C/S from
CinC US. Fleet, 26 June 1942, both in
OPD 381 SWPA. MacArthur expressed
a fear that the Navy’s proposals would
reduce the Army’s functions to sub-
sidiary ones and implied that army forces
would be used largely for garrisoning
the islands. (CM-IN9329 [6-28-42],
MacArthur to Marshall, #254, 28 June
6. CM-lN-7976 (6-24-42), GHQ
SWPA to AGWAR, #248, 24 June 1942.
7. Directive quoted in W a r Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. The agree-
ment was a compromise between the
MacArthur view that the campaign
should be co-ordinated under his com-
mand and the view of the Navy that
the entire operation should be directly
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but with
Admiral Ghormley in immediate com-
mand. There was still some hope that
British carriers might be available, but
in view of the desperate situation in the
Middle East, this was considered uncer-
tain. (CM-IN-0088 [ 7-1-42], MacArthur
to C/S, #261, I July 1942; CM-OUT-
0677 [7-3-42 I , Marshall to MacArthur,
#394, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-1306 [7-4-421,
MacArthur to C/S, #GI,4 July 1942.)
8. Directive quoted in War Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. It is interest-
ing to note that after their first confer-
ence on the proposed offensive, both
‘‘Genera MacArrhur and Admiral
#248, 24 June 1942.)
1942.)