“Headquarters”60+ pages
- p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for
writing and publishing a seven…
- p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl
Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
- p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a
historian in accordance with the President…
- p. 10 …After returning
to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the
pressure of a…
- p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
- p. 12 …But, in developing a system
of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu-
ments” received…
- p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended
for its support upon men…
- p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF
Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
- p. 15 …close
of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per-
sonnel for the…
- p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air
Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
- p. 19 …Air Service Command,
USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF.
Finally there remains something to be told…
- p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of
Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel
Paul has…
- p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
- p. 45 …and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the…
- p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters.
The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
- p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New
York, was acting as a major…
- p. 205 …The
approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment
squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
- p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron
of the 28th Composite Group took up…
- p. 210 …Defense
Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the
Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
- p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically
into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam
Field, and the…
- p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons
with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about
a…
- p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron,
and the…
- p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of
heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
- p. 226 …during
a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16
November the military air…
- p. 230 …The watchers were
instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to
headquarters of the…
- p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
- p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, are also i n…
- p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
- p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported
to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
- p. 257 …The Summary of Activi-
ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General
Brereton…
- p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter-
ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft
approaching from…
- p. 270 …with a tele-
phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could
be greatly…
- p. 272 …O n another
occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone
that its A…
- p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he
29th of December…
- p. 281 …mission.” lo*
General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin.
Though the aim of all operations…
- p. 288 …the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the…
- p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of
such a staff in the event…
- p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’
responsibility for air force training was limited to…
- p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite…
- p. 312 …Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long…
- p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct
of the war went far…
- p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
- p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western…
- p. 378 …The headquarters was
established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
- p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters
of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
- p. 405 …into the bases.‘38
Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other
interested AAF agencies…
- p. 425 …was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders…
- p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of
Bandoeng in…
- p. 434 …the United
States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in
January became chiefly…
- p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first…
- p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash-
ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
- p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own
headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect.
T…
- p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb-
ruary, at which time…
- p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines
When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra-
lia…
- p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
- p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need
for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
- p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron,
the 68th, which was…
- p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these
were…
- p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
- p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 2 - 7 4
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
I . Immediately after the fall of Cor-
regidor, for instance, General MacArthur
argued for development of a second
front in the Pacific which, in addition to
affording a necessary protection for Aus-
tralia and India, would assist the U.S.S.R.
by forcing a Japanese withdrawal from
Siberia. (CM-IN-2333 [5-8-421, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, #176, 8 May 1942.)
2 . CM-IN-0469 (62-42), MacArthur
to C/S, #217, 2 June 1942; CM-IN-2264,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #913, 8 June 1942.
MacArthur argued that now was a pro-
pitious moment to rush forces from the
Indian and Atlantic oceans for temporary
action against the Japanese. (CM-IN-
6409, MacArthur to C/S, #199, 23 M a y
1942.) Without such additional striking
forces and greater security of commu-
nications, he opposed a landing on Tulagi
which had been suggested by the Navy.
(CM-IN-8352 [5-29-421, GHQ SWPA
to C/S, #840, 28 May 1942.)
3. Memo for Gen. Twining from Col.
Frank Everest, Office of G-3, WDGS,
2 3 June 1942; draft memo for C/AS
from Col. O.A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans,
25 June 1942. General Marshall was
inclined to support General MacArthur’s
proposals. His staff was working on the
logistics for an operation similar to one
proposed by MacArthur, and he was
preparing to urge the Navy to move two
or three carriers into Australian waters
and to suggest to the British that they
move two or three of their carriers from
the Indian Ocean, all to be available for
operations against New Britain and
New Ireland. (Msg. #204, Marshall to
CinC/SWPA, 10 June 1942.) A later
development of this plan was that the
British units should operate against
Timor with the support of army aircraft
based in northwestern Australia. This
action was to be co-ordinated with an
operation in the South Pacific against
Tulagi by an American task force includ-
ing at least two carriers and supported
by land-based aviation from northeast
Australia, the New Hebrides, and New
Caledonia. (CM-OUT-5704 [6-23-421,
Marshall to CinC SWPA, # q 7 , 23 June
1942.) General MacArthur informed
General Marshall that air strength in the
Southwest Pacific was insufficient for
support of operations both to the north-
east and to the northwest. (CM-IN-7976
[6-24-42], GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
4. CM-OUT-5704 (6-23-42), Mar-
shall to CinC/SWPA, #277, 2 3 June 1942;
memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. T.T.
Handy, AC/S, OPD, 24 June 1942, in
OPD 381 SWPA. See also other sources
cited in preceding note.
5 . Sources in n. 3 ; CM-OUT4596
(6-26-42), Marshall to CinC/SWPA,
8289, 26 June 1942; CM-OUT-7366 (6-
28-42), Marshall to MacArthur, #300, 28
June 1942; CM-OUT-~SOI (6-29-42),
Marshall to CinC/SWPA, #306, 29 June
1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar-
shall, 26 June 1942, and for C/S from
CinC US. Fleet, 26 June 1942, both in
OPD 381 SWPA. MacArthur expressed
a fear that the Navy’s proposals would
reduce the Army’s functions to sub-
sidiary ones and implied that army forces
would be used largely for garrisoning
the islands. (CM-IN9329 [6-28-42],
MacArthur to Marshall, #254, 28 June
6. CM-lN-7976 (6-24-42), GHQ
SWPA to AGWAR, #248, 24 June 1942.
7. Directive quoted in W a r Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. The agree-
ment was a compromise between the
MacArthur view that the campaign
should be co-ordinated under his com-
mand and the view of the Navy that
the entire operation should be directly
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but with
Admiral Ghormley in immediate com-
mand. There was still some hope that
British carriers might be available, but
in view of the desperate situation in the
Middle East, this was considered uncer-
tain. (CM-IN-0088 [ 7-1-42], MacArthur
to C/S, #261, I July 1942; CM-OUT-
0677 [7-3-42 I , Marshall to MacArthur,
#394, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-1306 [7-4-421,
MacArthur to C/S, #GI,4 July 1942.)
8. Directive quoted in War Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. It is interest-
ing to note that after their first confer-
ence on the proposed offensive, both
‘‘Genera MacArrhur and Admiral
#248, 24 June 1942.)
1942.)