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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 537 …of Air Staff, Plans, Col. Orvil A. Anderson, had in preparation a study of the possibility…
  • p. 757 …Cole O d l e Anderson, CaPt. Ball, Capt. Moss, and himself. The im- portance of…
  • p. 770 …AFSHO files. 9. Lt. Col. O.A. Anderson, AWPD, Air Forces Estimate of the Situation, 1…
  • p. 797 …for C/AS from Col. O.A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans, 25 June 1942. General Marshall…
  • p. 812 …for Col. George from Maj. S.E. Anderson, Research Regarding Bomber-Fighter Combats in Europe, 1…
  • p. 818 …AC/S, OPD from Col. O.A. Anderson, 10 July 1942. 197. Key Plan for the…
  • p. 840 …5 1 2 Andaman Is., 500, 503 Anderson, Col. 0. A., 472 Andes, 639 Andres, Pvt…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 2 - 7 4
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
I . Immediately after the fall of Cor-
regidor, for instance, General MacArthur
argued for development of a second
front in the Pacific which, in addition to
affording a necessary protection for Aus-
tralia and India, would assist the U.S.S.R.
by forcing a Japanese withdrawal from
Siberia. (CM-IN-2333 [5-8-421, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, #176, 8 May 1942.)
2 . CM-IN-0469 (62-42), MacArthur
to C/S, #217, 2 June 1942; CM-IN-2264,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #913, 8 June 1942.
MacArthur argued that now was a pro-
pitious moment to rush forces from the
Indian and Atlantic oceans for temporary
action against the Japanese. (CM-IN-
6409, MacArthur to C/S, #199, 23 M a y
1942.) Without such additional striking
forces and greater security of commu-
nications, he opposed a landing on Tulagi
which had been suggested by the Navy.
(CM-IN-8352 [5-29-421, GHQ SWPA
to C/S, #840, 28 May 1942.)
3. Memo for Gen. Twining from Col.
Frank Everest, Office of G-3, WDGS,
2 3 June 1942; draft memo for C/AS
from Col. O.A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans,
25 June 1942. General Marshall was
inclined to support General MacArthur’s
proposals. His staff was working on the
logistics for an operation similar to one
proposed by MacArthur, and he was
preparing to urge the Navy to move two
or three carriers into Australian waters
and to suggest to the British that they
move two or three of their carriers from
the Indian Ocean, all to be available for
operations against New Britain and
New Ireland. (Msg. #204, Marshall to
CinC/SWPA, 10 June 1942.) A later
development of this plan was that the
British units should operate against
Timor with the support of army aircraft
based in northwestern Australia. This
action was to be co-ordinated with an
operation in the South Pacific against
Tulagi by an American task force includ-
ing at least two carriers and supported
by land-based aviation from northeast
Australia, the New Hebrides, and New
Caledonia. (CM-OUT-5704 [6-23-421,
Marshall to CinC SWPA, # q 7 , 23 June
1942.) General MacArthur informed
General Marshall that air strength in the
Southwest Pacific was insufficient for
support of operations both to the north-
east and to the northwest. (CM-IN-7976
[6-24-42], GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
4. CM-OUT-5704 (6-23-42), Mar-
shall to CinC/SWPA, #277, 2 3 June 1942;
memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. T.T.
Handy, AC/S, OPD, 24 June 1942, in
OPD 381 SWPA. See also other sources
cited in preceding note.
5 . Sources in n. 3 ; CM-OUT4596
(6-26-42), Marshall to CinC/SWPA,
8289, 26 June 1942; CM-OUT-7366 (6-
28-42), Marshall to MacArthur, #300, 28
June 1942; CM-OUT-~SOI (6-29-42),
Marshall to CinC/SWPA, #306, 29 June
1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar-
shall, 26 June 1942, and for C/S from
CinC US. Fleet, 26 June 1942, both in
OPD 381 SWPA. MacArthur expressed
a fear that the Navy’s proposals would
reduce the Army’s functions to sub-
sidiary ones and implied that army forces
would be used largely for garrisoning
the islands. (CM-IN9329 [6-28-42],
MacArthur to Marshall, #254, 28 June
6. CM-lN-7976 (6-24-42), GHQ
SWPA to AGWAR, #248, 24 June 1942.
7. Directive quoted in W a r Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. The agree-
ment was a compromise between the
MacArthur view that the campaign
should be co-ordinated under his com-
mand and the view of the Navy that
the entire operation should be directly
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but with
Admiral Ghormley in immediate com-
mand. There was still some hope that
British carriers might be available, but
in view of the desperate situation in the
Middle East, this was considered uncer-
tain. (CM-IN-0088 [ 7-1-42], MacArthur
to C/S, #261, I July 1942; CM-OUT-
0677 [7-3-42 I , Marshall to MacArthur,
#394, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-1306 [7-4-421,
MacArthur to C/S, #GI,4 July 1942.)
8. Directive quoted in War Diary of
ComSoPac for 4 July 1942. It is interest-
ing to note that after their first confer-
ence on the proposed offensive, both
‘‘Genera MacArrhur and Admiral
#248, 24 June 1942.)
1942.)

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