“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 5 5 - 6 2
85. History, Second Air Force, 7 Dec.
1941-31 Dec. 1942, I, 160; CM-OUT-
6011 ( 2 8 May 1942). Marshall to CG
Haw. Dept., f3975, 28 May 1942; CM-
OUT-3526 ( 1 5 June 1942), Marshall to
CG Haw. Dept., #4307, 15 June 1942. By
LO May General Marshall informed
Emmons that two heavy and one medi-
um bombardment squadrons en route to
South Pacific bases would be held in
Hawaii. (CM-OUT-4119, Marshall to
Emmons, 20 May 1942.)
86. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942, as cited in n. 82; CM-IN-
go01 (31 May 1942)~Emmons to CSA,
87. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942; memo for G-3 Seventh AF
from CG VIF Bomber Command, 6
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, p. 14.
88. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 5 .
89. Memo for G-3 Seventh AF from
CG VII Bomber Command, 6 June 1942.
90. Seventh Air Force and the Battle
of Midway, 3-6 June, cited in Operations
of the Seventh Air Force, p. 15; ONI,
Battle of Midway, p. 6.
91. USSBS Intr. 65 (Sup.), Capt. Y.
Watanabe, 14 Nov. 1945, p. 6; 530, Rear
Adm. Akira Soji, 2 3 Dec. 1945, p. 2 .
92. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
13 June 1942; ONI, Battle of Midway,
P. 7.
93. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 8;
interview with Lt. Col. Ira L. Kimes,
USMC, 3 1 Aug. 1942.
94. See statement of Maj. Gen.
George C. Kenney, in Critique of Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 3, 2 1 Apr.
1942, Doc. 151, in Fourth Air Force Hist.
Study 111-2, Defense Plans and Opera-
tions, Vol. V; ltr., CG Fourth AF to CG
WDC, 1 2 Mar. 1942, Transfer of the
Bomber Command to Naval Control,
Doc. 196, ibid.
95. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wata-
nabe, 27 Dec. 1945, pp. 1g-20; and Capt.
Y. Toyama, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 68. The
evidence for this hit is not conclusive.
96. USSBS Fntr. 252, Capt. Y. Toyama,
p. 4; ONF, Battle of Midway, p. 9.
$429, 3 1 May 1942.
7 2 0
97. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945; ONI, Battle of
Midway, pp. 16-17; USSBS, Campaigns
of the Pacific W a r , p. 59.
98. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 26;
USSBS, C m p a i g n s of the Pacific W a r ,
P. 63.
99. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945, p. 1 5 ; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 59,
63-64.
100. USSBS Intr. 65, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe; ONI, Battle of Midway, pp. 44-
50.
1 0 1 . CM-IN-4180 (13 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June
1942; msg., Emmons to C/S USA, 1 2
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, pp. I ~ Z O .
102. CM-IN-4180 ( 1 3 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June 1942;
interview with Maj. Gen. O.A. Ander-
son, 18 Mar. 1945; interview with Maj.
Gen. Willis H. Hale, 19 Apr. 1946.
1 0 3 . Interview with Lt. Col. Ira L.
Kimes, p. 1 1 ; ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG
AAF, 1 3 June 1942.
104. Ltr., Gen. Hale, CG VII Bomber
Command to CG Hq. Haw. Dept. thru
CG Seventh AF, 3 June 1942, cited in
Operations of Seventh Air Force, p. 2 1 ;
Hale interview.
105. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Michiso
Tsutsumi, 26 Dec. 1945, pp. 26, 30.
106. USSBS Intr. 530, Vice Adm. R.
Kusaka, 3 0 Dec. 1945, p. 43. A similar
result was attributed to the Marine dive
bombers, whose pilots achieved very few
hits. (USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific
W a r , p. 60.)
107. Cited in memo for CG AAF
from Col. J.R. Deane, Report of Battle
of Midway, 4 Aug. 1942.
108. Zbid.
109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of
Midway, incl. in R&R, AFDMR to
AFCAS, 15 Aug. 1942.
1 1 0 . Ibid.
I I I . R&R, AFAEP to AFDMR, 14
112. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Aug. 1942.
Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945.