“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 5 5 - 6 2
85. History, Second Air Force, 7 Dec.
1941-31 Dec. 1942, I, 160; CM-OUT-
6011 ( 2 8 May 1942). Marshall to CG
Haw. Dept., f3975, 28 May 1942; CM-
OUT-3526 ( 1 5 June 1942), Marshall to
CG Haw. Dept., #4307, 15 June 1942. By
LO May General Marshall informed
Emmons that two heavy and one medi-
um bombardment squadrons en route to
South Pacific bases would be held in
Hawaii. (CM-OUT-4119, Marshall to
Emmons, 20 May 1942.)
86. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942, as cited in n. 82; CM-IN-
go01 (31 May 1942)~Emmons to CSA,
87. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942; memo for G-3 Seventh AF
from CG VIF Bomber Command, 6
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, p. 14.
88. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 5 .
89. Memo for G-3 Seventh AF from
CG VII Bomber Command, 6 June 1942.
90. Seventh Air Force and the Battle
of Midway, 3-6 June, cited in Operations
of the Seventh Air Force, p. 15; ONI,
Battle of Midway, p. 6.
91. USSBS Intr. 65 (Sup.), Capt. Y.
Watanabe, 14 Nov. 1945, p. 6; 530, Rear
Adm. Akira Soji, 2 3 Dec. 1945, p. 2 .
92. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
13 June 1942; ONI, Battle of Midway,
P. 7.
93. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 8;
interview with Lt. Col. Ira L. Kimes,
USMC, 3 1 Aug. 1942.
94. See statement of Maj. Gen.
George C. Kenney, in Critique of Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 3, 2 1 Apr.
1942, Doc. 151, in Fourth Air Force Hist.
Study 111-2, Defense Plans and Opera-
tions, Vol. V; ltr., CG Fourth AF to CG
WDC, 1 2 Mar. 1942, Transfer of the
Bomber Command to Naval Control,
Doc. 196, ibid.
95. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wata-
nabe, 27 Dec. 1945, pp. 1g-20; and Capt.
Y. Toyama, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 68. The
evidence for this hit is not conclusive.
96. USSBS Fntr. 252, Capt. Y. Toyama,
p. 4; ONF, Battle of Midway, p. 9.
$429, 3 1 May 1942.
7 2 0
97. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945; ONI, Battle of
Midway, pp. 16-17; USSBS, Campaigns
of the Pacific W a r , p. 59.
98. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 26;
USSBS, C m p a i g n s of the Pacific W a r ,
P. 63.
99. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945, p. 1 5 ; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 59,
63-64.
100. USSBS Intr. 65, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe; ONI, Battle of Midway, pp. 44-
50.
1 0 1 . CM-IN-4180 (13 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June
1942; msg., Emmons to C/S USA, 1 2
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, pp. I ~ Z O .
102. CM-IN-4180 ( 1 3 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June 1942;
interview with Maj. Gen. O.A. Ander-
son, 18 Mar. 1945; interview with Maj.
Gen. Willis H. Hale, 19 Apr. 1946.
1 0 3 . Interview with Lt. Col. Ira L.
Kimes, p. 1 1 ; ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG
AAF, 1 3 June 1942.
104. Ltr., Gen. Hale, CG VII Bomber
Command to CG Hq. Haw. Dept. thru
CG Seventh AF, 3 June 1942, cited in
Operations of Seventh Air Force, p. 2 1 ;
Hale interview.
105. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Michiso
Tsutsumi, 26 Dec. 1945, pp. 26, 30.
106. USSBS Intr. 530, Vice Adm. R.
Kusaka, 3 0 Dec. 1945, p. 43. A similar
result was attributed to the Marine dive
bombers, whose pilots achieved very few
hits. (USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific
W a r , p. 60.)
107. Cited in memo for CG AAF
from Col. J.R. Deane, Report of Battle
of Midway, 4 Aug. 1942.
108. Zbid.
109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of
Midway, incl. in R&R, AFDMR to
AFCAS, 15 Aug. 1942.
1 1 0 . Ibid.
I I I . R&R, AFAEP to AFDMR, 14
112. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Aug. 1942.
Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945.