“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 5 5 - 6 2
85. History, Second Air Force, 7 Dec.
1941-31 Dec. 1942, I, 160; CM-OUT-
6011 ( 2 8 May 1942). Marshall to CG
Haw. Dept., f3975, 28 May 1942; CM-
OUT-3526 ( 1 5 June 1942), Marshall to
CG Haw. Dept., #4307, 15 June 1942. By
LO May General Marshall informed
Emmons that two heavy and one medi-
um bombardment squadrons en route to
South Pacific bases would be held in
Hawaii. (CM-OUT-4119, Marshall to
Emmons, 20 May 1942.)
86. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942, as cited in n. 82; CM-IN-
go01 (31 May 1942)~Emmons to CSA,
87. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
1 3 June 1942; memo for G-3 Seventh AF
from CG VIF Bomber Command, 6
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, p. 14.
88. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 5 .
89. Memo for G-3 Seventh AF from
CG VII Bomber Command, 6 June 1942.
90. Seventh Air Force and the Battle
of Midway, 3-6 June, cited in Operations
of the Seventh Air Force, p. 15; ONI,
Battle of Midway, p. 6.
91. USSBS Intr. 65 (Sup.), Capt. Y.
Watanabe, 14 Nov. 1945, p. 6; 530, Rear
Adm. Akira Soji, 2 3 Dec. 1945, p. 2 .
92. Ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG AAF,
13 June 1942; ONI, Battle of Midway,
P. 7.
93. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 8;
interview with Lt. Col. Ira L. Kimes,
USMC, 3 1 Aug. 1942.
94. See statement of Maj. Gen.
George C. Kenney, in Critique of Joint
Army-Navy Exercise No. 3, 2 1 Apr.
1942, Doc. 151, in Fourth Air Force Hist.
Study 111-2, Defense Plans and Opera-
tions, Vol. V; ltr., CG Fourth AF to CG
WDC, 1 2 Mar. 1942, Transfer of the
Bomber Command to Naval Control,
Doc. 196, ibid.
95. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wata-
nabe, 27 Dec. 1945, pp. 1g-20; and Capt.
Y. Toyama, 14 Jan. 1946, p. 68. The
evidence for this hit is not conclusive.
96. USSBS Fntr. 252, Capt. Y. Toyama,
p. 4; ONF, Battle of Midway, p. 9.
$429, 3 1 May 1942.
7 2 0
97. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945; ONI, Battle of
Midway, pp. 16-17; USSBS, Campaigns
of the Pacific W a r , p. 59.
98. ONI, Battle of Midway, p. 26;
USSBS, C m p a i g n s of the Pacific W a r ,
P. 63.
99. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe, 27 Dec. 1945, p. 1 5 ; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 59,
63-64.
100. USSBS Intr. 65, Capt. Y. Wa-
tanabe; ONI, Battle of Midway, pp. 44-
50.
1 0 1 . CM-IN-4180 (13 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June
1942; msg., Emmons to C/S USA, 1 2
June 1942, cited in Operations of Seventh
Air Force, pp. I ~ Z O .
102. CM-IN-4180 ( 1 3 June 1942),
Emmons to C/S USA, #771, 1 3 June 1942;
interview with Maj. Gen. O.A. Ander-
son, 18 Mar. 1945; interview with Maj.
Gen. Willis H. Hale, 19 Apr. 1946.
1 0 3 . Interview with Lt. Col. Ira L.
Kimes, p. 1 1 ; ltr., Gen. Davidson to CG
AAF, 1 3 June 1942.
104. Ltr., Gen. Hale, CG VII Bomber
Command to CG Hq. Haw. Dept. thru
CG Seventh AF, 3 June 1942, cited in
Operations of Seventh Air Force, p. 2 1 ;
Hale interview.
105. USSBS Intr. 530, Capt. Michiso
Tsutsumi, 26 Dec. 1945, pp. 26, 30.
106. USSBS Intr. 530, Vice Adm. R.
Kusaka, 3 0 Dec. 1945, p. 43. A similar
result was attributed to the Marine dive
bombers, whose pilots achieved very few
hits. (USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific
W a r , p. 60.)
107. Cited in memo for CG AAF
from Col. J.R. Deane, Report of Battle
of Midway, 4 Aug. 1942.
108. Zbid.
109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of
Midway, incl. in R&R, AFDMR to
AFCAS, 15 Aug. 1942.
1 1 0 . Ibid.
I I I . R&R, AFAEP to AFDMR, 14
112. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Aug. 1942.
Fukudome, 9 Dec. 1945.