“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 4 7 - 5 4
msg., F-35 Navy, CinCPac Fleet, 19 Feb. mon, 2 5 May 1942, in memo for OPD
'942. from AC/AS, Plans, I July 1942.
54. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S. 71. USSBS Intr. 5 3 , Capt. M.
Fukudome, p. 38; USSBS, Campaigns of Yamaoka; 444, Capt. Mieno, 26 Nov.
55. AAF Historical Study No. 9, T h e 7 2 . USSBS Intr. 524, Vice Adm. S.
AAF in Australia to the Summer of 1942, Fukudome; 5 0 3 , Vice Adm. S. Fuku-
p. 118; USSBS Intr. 475, Comdr. Masa- dome, pp. 38-39; USSBS, Campaigns of
take Okumiya, 29 Nov. 1945. the Pacific W a r , p. 58.
56. Summary of Operations of the 7 3 . USSBS Intr. 192, Capt. T. Ohmae,
435th Bomb. Squadron, in App. G., His- 3 0 Oct. 1945; 65, Capt. Y. Watanabe,
tory, 435th Bomb. Sq. 15 Oct. 1945; 252, Capt. Y. Toyama, I
57. ONI, Battle of the Coral Sea, p. Nov. 1945.
9; USSBS Intr. 5 3 , Capt. M. Yamaoka, 74. USSBS Intr. 524, Vice Adm. S.
I9 OCt. 1945. Fukudome.
58. USSBS Intr. 5 3 , Annex A, Capt. 75. CM-IN-4577 ( 1 7 May 19421,
M. Yamaoka, 20 Oct. 1945; 46, Comdrs. Emmons to C/S, f96, 16 May 1942;
H. Sekino and Masatake Okumiya, 1 7 Fourth Air Force Historical Study IV-2,
OCt. 1945. Processing Functions and Relations with
59. History, 90th Bomb. Sq. (L), 2 5 Mask% P- 88.
Sept. 1917-31 Mar. 1944; reconnaissance 76. ON1 Combat Narratives, The
reports for 4 and 5 May, in Allied Air Battle of Midway, pp. 2-3.
July '94'. In The Campaigns Of the Richardson to C/S, #423, 3 1 May 1942.
Pacific W a r , page 5 2 , it is stated that no
contact with the enemy force occurred 78. WPD Weekly Status Maps* AG
until 6 May. 061 (4 Sept. 1945). At the end of April
these figures were given as 3 1 heavy
60. History, 3d Bomb. GP.9 1 July bombers, 9 light bombers, 178 pursuit
1919-31 Mar. 1944. planes, and 34 miscellaneous. (Incl. [ JCS
61. ONI, Battle of the Coral Sea, pp. 481, Annex to Report by JUSSC, 29 APT.
14-16. 1942.) The OPD Status Map of 3 0 April
62. USSBS Intr. 46, Comdn. H. I942 listed 3 2 heavies, 1 5 mediums, 9
&kin0 and M. Okumiya; USSBS, cam- light bombers, 1 8 2 pursuit, 2nd 27 mis-
cellaneous.paigns of the Pacific War, p. 52.
63. USSBS Intr. 53, Capt. M. Yamaoka. 79. Growth Of Heavy and Medium
Bombardment Units in the Seventh Air
Force, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Aug. 1944, p. 1 1 .
64. USSBS Intr. 46.
65. USSBS, Campaigns O f the P a c i f i c 80. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H.C. Davidson to
war, p. 53. C G Seventh AF, 24 Mar. 1942, cited in
66. USSBS Intr. 65 (Sup.), Capt. Operations of Seventh Air Force, 7 Dec.
Yasuji Watanabe, 14 Nov. 1945; CM- 1941-13 Nov. 1943, p. 1 3 .
IN-3622 ( 1 3 May I942)1 A k A d ~ rto 81. Ltr., Col. James A. Mollison, C/S
C/S, #AG 719, 1 3 May 1942. Seventh AF to C G AAF, 8 Apr. 19423
67. CM-IN-36~2, Melbourne to C/S, cited ibid., p. 13.
$719, 1 3 May 1942. 82. Ltr., Gen. Davidson, C G Seventh
68. Ibid. AF to CG AAF, 1 3 June 1942, cited
69. rnterview with Col. Richard H. ibid., PP. I3-W CM-1N-3881 ('4 May
Carmichael and members of the 19th '943). Emmons to CG AAF, $ 5 3 9 '4
Bomb. Gp., 5 Dec. 1942; interview with May 1942*
Lt. Col. Dill Ellis by author, 2 1 Feb.
1946. 84. CM-IN-5813 ( 2 1 May 1942).
70. Ltr., Gen. Royce to Gen. Har- Fielder to A/CS, G z , f 1 9 1 , 2 1 R,Iay 1942.
the Pacific W a r , p. 3 . '945.
Forces Operations Report% 4 Apr* to 3 1 77. CM-IN-8825 ( 3 1 May 1942)~
83. JPS 21/7, 18 Apr. 1942.
7'9