“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 3 3 - 4 7
17. Ltr., A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; JCCSs-
10, Annex No. 2,
18. Narrative of Operations, America1
Division at Guadalcanal, 28 May 1943;
ltr., C/S to Adm. King, 20 Jan. 1942,
Loading of Transports; unused memo for
T A G from WPD, 19 Jan. 1942, Defense
of New Caledonia. General Patch
reached New Caledonia on 7 March, one
week in advance of the arrival of his
force. (Memo for T A G from WPD, 7
Mar. 1942, Notification to the Command-
ing General, POPPY of the Sailing of
His Force.)
19. CM-OUT-5181, Marshall to Ne-
cal #so, 26 Apr. 1942; msg., MacArthur
to AGWAR #NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942.
20. Ltr., T A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; History,
67th Fighter Sq.
21. Msg., MacArthur to AGWAR,
#NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-4299,
May 1942.
GHQ SWPA to TAG, #AG 752, 16
2 2 . JCCSs-10, Annex No. 2 .
23. Incl. I , in ltr., CinC U.S. Fleet to
24. Ibid.
C G AAF, 13 May 1942.
25. CM-m-4290. GHQ SWPA to
T A G , # A G 752, 16 May 1942.
26. Cominch File A 16-3 ( o o I ~ ~ ) ,1 2
Mar. 1942, incl. I , in R&R, AFROM to
Tactical Sec., 17 Mar. 1942.
27. History, 68th Fighter Sq.; msg.,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, unnumbered,
16 Mar. 1942.
28. Report, in Joint Board Estimate of
U.S. Over-all Production Requirements,
I I Sept. 1941,Sec. IV.
29. JCS 23, 14 Mar. 1942.
30. Ibid.
31. JCS 23, Annex "A."
32. JCS 23.
33. Memo for Adm, King from C/S,
17 Mar. 1 % ~ .
34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7 Apr. 1942.
35. Memo, n.s. and n.d., in JPS 21/7,
18 Apr. 1942.
36. Ibid.
37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing
7'8
Officer, First Special Aviation Project,
The Doolittle Air Raid on Japan, dtd.
2 2 June 1942, p. 2 ; Lt. Col. Samuel L.A.
Marshall, Tokyo Raid manuscript, p. 2 .
38. CM-OUT-464, Marshall to AM-
MISCA, 12 Apr. 1942.
39. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 12; ltr., Lt.
Col. Doolittle to Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold,
2 8 Mar. 1942.
40. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 16.
41. Cooper report, as cited in n. 37,
p. 4.
42. 1st ind. (CO Enterprise, Serial
088, 2 3 Apr. 1942), CO Carriers, Pacific
Fleet (CO T.F. 16) to CinCPac Fleet;
General Doolittle's Report on Japanese
Raid, dtd. 5 June 1942, in AAG K-543.
43. USSBS, Military Analysis Div.,
Japanese Air Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS
Intr. 479, Capt. M. Genda, 28-29 Nov.
'945-
44. USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae,
6 Dec. 1945; Answers t o Military Anal-
ysis Div. Questionnaire 16, Lt. Cols. T.
Shimatani and K. Tanaka, 17 Jan. 1946.
45. Tokyo Raid ms., p. jo.
46. USSBS Memo #Nav 1 1 , 16 Oct.
'9451 p. 40.
47. USSBS, Japanese Air Power, pp.
9-10.
48. USSBS, Summary Report (Pacific
W a r ) , pp. 3-4; USSBS, Japanese Air
Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS, Campaigns of
the Pacific W a r , p . 4; USSBS, Intr. 192,
Capt. T. Ohmae, 30 Oct. 1945, p. 2 ;
USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae, 6
Dec. 1945, pp. 2-3.
49. USSBS Intr. 524, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 1 2 Dec. 1945, p. 10.
so. USSBS Intr. 447, Lt. Gen. Kawa-
be, 26 Nov. 1945; 498, Fleet Adm. Osami
Nagano, 30 Nov. 1945; 467, Comdr.
Tadashi Yamamoto and Capt. Toshikazu
Ohmae, 20 Nov. 1945, p. 10; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 4-5.
5 1 . USSBS Intr. 498, Fleet Adm. 0.
Nagano, p. 5.
52. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Fukudome, p. 37; 467, Comdr. T. Yama-
mot0 and Capt. T. Ohmae, p. 10.
53. ON1 Combat Narratives, The
Battle of the Coral Sea, pp. 1-2; Navy