“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 3 3 - 4 7
17. Ltr., A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; JCCSs-
10, Annex No. 2,
18. Narrative of Operations, America1
Division at Guadalcanal, 28 May 1943;
ltr., C/S to Adm. King, 20 Jan. 1942,
Loading of Transports; unused memo for
T A G from WPD, 19 Jan. 1942, Defense
of New Caledonia. General Patch
reached New Caledonia on 7 March, one
week in advance of the arrival of his
force. (Memo for T A G from WPD, 7
Mar. 1942, Notification to the Command-
ing General, POPPY of the Sailing of
His Force.)
19. CM-OUT-5181, Marshall to Ne-
cal #so, 26 Apr. 1942; msg., MacArthur
to AGWAR #NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942.
20. Ltr., T A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; History,
67th Fighter Sq.
21. Msg., MacArthur to AGWAR,
#NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-4299,
May 1942.
GHQ SWPA to TAG, #AG 752, 16
2 2 . JCCSs-10, Annex No. 2 .
23. Incl. I , in ltr., CinC U.S. Fleet to
24. Ibid.
C G AAF, 13 May 1942.
25. CM-m-4290. GHQ SWPA to
T A G , # A G 752, 16 May 1942.
26. Cominch File A 16-3 ( o o I ~ ~ ) ,1 2
Mar. 1942, incl. I , in R&R, AFROM to
Tactical Sec., 17 Mar. 1942.
27. History, 68th Fighter Sq.; msg.,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, unnumbered,
16 Mar. 1942.
28. Report, in Joint Board Estimate of
U.S. Over-all Production Requirements,
I I Sept. 1941,Sec. IV.
29. JCS 23, 14 Mar. 1942.
30. Ibid.
31. JCS 23, Annex "A."
32. JCS 23.
33. Memo for Adm, King from C/S,
17 Mar. 1 % ~ .
34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7 Apr. 1942.
35. Memo, n.s. and n.d., in JPS 21/7,
18 Apr. 1942.
36. Ibid.
37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing
7'8
Officer, First Special Aviation Project,
The Doolittle Air Raid on Japan, dtd.
2 2 June 1942, p. 2 ; Lt. Col. Samuel L.A.
Marshall, Tokyo Raid manuscript, p. 2 .
38. CM-OUT-464, Marshall to AM-
MISCA, 12 Apr. 1942.
39. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 12; ltr., Lt.
Col. Doolittle to Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold,
2 8 Mar. 1942.
40. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 16.
41. Cooper report, as cited in n. 37,
p. 4.
42. 1st ind. (CO Enterprise, Serial
088, 2 3 Apr. 1942), CO Carriers, Pacific
Fleet (CO T.F. 16) to CinCPac Fleet;
General Doolittle's Report on Japanese
Raid, dtd. 5 June 1942, in AAG K-543.
43. USSBS, Military Analysis Div.,
Japanese Air Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS
Intr. 479, Capt. M. Genda, 28-29 Nov.
'945-
44. USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae,
6 Dec. 1945; Answers t o Military Anal-
ysis Div. Questionnaire 16, Lt. Cols. T.
Shimatani and K. Tanaka, 17 Jan. 1946.
45. Tokyo Raid ms., p. jo.
46. USSBS Memo #Nav 1 1 , 16 Oct.
'9451 p. 40.
47. USSBS, Japanese Air Power, pp.
9-10.
48. USSBS, Summary Report (Pacific
W a r ) , pp. 3-4; USSBS, Japanese Air
Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS, Campaigns of
the Pacific W a r , p . 4; USSBS, Intr. 192,
Capt. T. Ohmae, 30 Oct. 1945, p. 2 ;
USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae, 6
Dec. 1945, pp. 2-3.
49. USSBS Intr. 524, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 1 2 Dec. 1945, p. 10.
so. USSBS Intr. 447, Lt. Gen. Kawa-
be, 26 Nov. 1945; 498, Fleet Adm. Osami
Nagano, 30 Nov. 1945; 467, Comdr.
Tadashi Yamamoto and Capt. Toshikazu
Ohmae, 20 Nov. 1945, p. 10; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 4-5.
5 1 . USSBS Intr. 498, Fleet Adm. 0.
Nagano, p. 5.
52. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Fukudome, p. 37; 467, Comdr. T. Yama-
mot0 and Capt. T. Ohmae, p. 10.
53. ON1 Combat Narratives, The
Battle of the Coral Sea, pp. 1-2; Navy