“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 3 3 - 4 7
17. Ltr., A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; JCCSs-
10, Annex No. 2,
18. Narrative of Operations, America1
Division at Guadalcanal, 28 May 1943;
ltr., C/S to Adm. King, 20 Jan. 1942,
Loading of Transports; unused memo for
T A G from WPD, 19 Jan. 1942, Defense
of New Caledonia. General Patch
reached New Caledonia on 7 March, one
week in advance of the arrival of his
force. (Memo for T A G from WPD, 7
Mar. 1942, Notification to the Command-
ing General, POPPY of the Sailing of
His Force.)
19. CM-OUT-5181, Marshall to Ne-
cal #so, 26 Apr. 1942; msg., MacArthur
to AGWAR #NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942.
20. Ltr., T A G to Gen. Patch, A G 381
(1-22-42) MSC-E, 2 2 Jan. 1942; History,
67th Fighter Sq.
21. Msg., MacArthur to AGWAR,
#NR 139, 27 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-4299,
May 1942.
GHQ SWPA to TAG, #AG 752, 16
2 2 . JCCSs-10, Annex No. 2 .
23. Incl. I , in ltr., CinC U.S. Fleet to
24. Ibid.
C G AAF, 13 May 1942.
25. CM-m-4290. GHQ SWPA to
T A G , # A G 752, 16 May 1942.
26. Cominch File A 16-3 ( o o I ~ ~ ) ,1 2
Mar. 1942, incl. I , in R&R, AFROM to
Tactical Sec., 17 Mar. 1942.
27. History, 68th Fighter Sq.; msg.,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, unnumbered,
16 Mar. 1942.
28. Report, in Joint Board Estimate of
U.S. Over-all Production Requirements,
I I Sept. 1941,Sec. IV.
29. JCS 23, 14 Mar. 1942.
30. Ibid.
31. JCS 23, Annex "A."
32. JCS 23.
33. Memo for Adm, King from C/S,
17 Mar. 1 % ~ .
34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7 Apr. 1942.
35. Memo, n.s. and n.d., in JPS 21/7,
18 Apr. 1942.
36. Ibid.
37. Col. Merian C. Cooper, Briefing
7'8
Officer, First Special Aviation Project,
The Doolittle Air Raid on Japan, dtd.
2 2 June 1942, p. 2 ; Lt. Col. Samuel L.A.
Marshall, Tokyo Raid manuscript, p. 2 .
38. CM-OUT-464, Marshall to AM-
MISCA, 12 Apr. 1942.
39. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 12; ltr., Lt.
Col. Doolittle to Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold,
2 8 Mar. 1942.
40. Tokyo Raid ms., p. 16.
41. Cooper report, as cited in n. 37,
p. 4.
42. 1st ind. (CO Enterprise, Serial
088, 2 3 Apr. 1942), CO Carriers, Pacific
Fleet (CO T.F. 16) to CinCPac Fleet;
General Doolittle's Report on Japanese
Raid, dtd. 5 June 1942, in AAG K-543.
43. USSBS, Military Analysis Div.,
Japanese Air Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS
Intr. 479, Capt. M. Genda, 28-29 Nov.
'945-
44. USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae,
6 Dec. 1945; Answers t o Military Anal-
ysis Div. Questionnaire 16, Lt. Cols. T.
Shimatani and K. Tanaka, 17 Jan. 1946.
45. Tokyo Raid ms., p. jo.
46. USSBS Memo #Nav 1 1 , 16 Oct.
'9451 p. 40.
47. USSBS, Japanese Air Power, pp.
9-10.
48. USSBS, Summary Report (Pacific
W a r ) , pp. 3-4; USSBS, Japanese Air
Power, pp. 9-10; USSBS, Campaigns of
the Pacific W a r , p . 4; USSBS, Intr. 192,
Capt. T. Ohmae, 30 Oct. 1945, p. 2 ;
USSBS Intr. 495, Capt. T. Ohmae, 6
Dec. 1945, pp. 2-3.
49. USSBS Intr. 524, Vice Adm.
Shigeru Fukudome, 1 2 Dec. 1945, p. 10.
so. USSBS Intr. 447, Lt. Gen. Kawa-
be, 26 Nov. 1945; 498, Fleet Adm. Osami
Nagano, 30 Nov. 1945; 467, Comdr.
Tadashi Yamamoto and Capt. Toshikazu
Ohmae, 20 Nov. 1945, p. 10; USSBS,
Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 4-5.
5 1 . USSBS Intr. 498, Fleet Adm. 0.
Nagano, p. 5.
52. USSBS Intr. 503, Vice Adm. S.
Fukudome, p. 37; 467, Comdr. T. Yama-
mot0 and Capt. T. Ohmae, p. 10.
53. ON1 Combat Narratives, The
Battle of the Coral Sea, pp. 1-2; Navy