“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 2 0 - 3 2
60. See sources in n. 59.
61. History, 19th Bomb. Gp.
45. Richardson Report #5.
46. Brett report, Sum. H.
47. lbid.; GO 5 and 10, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 4 and 19 May 1942; Opns.
Instructions 3 and 7, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 20 and 28 May 1942,
48. G O 2 and 13, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 2 7 Apr. and 31 May 1942.
49. Brett report, Sum. H; Circular
Ltr. 42-13, Hq. US. Army Air Services,
19 May 1942, in AFSHO files; Circular
Ltr., 42-1, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 27
Apr. 1942, in Brett report.
5 0 . History, 4th Air Depot Gp.; Cir-
cular Ltr. 42-1, as cited in n. 49.
51. History, Air Service Command in
SIYPA; GO 4, Hq. U.S. Army Air
Services, I I May 1942; ltr., Sperry Gyro-
scope Co. to AAF Civilian Personnel, 1 5
May 1942; interview with Milton J.
Getker, 28 July 1943.
5 2 . History, ASC in SWPA, pp. 5 ff.
53. Ibid.; History, 4th A 9 Gp.
54. The Air Transport Command in
the Southwest Pacific, 7 Dec. 1941-1
Aug. 1944, pp. 12-15; ltr., AFA[TlC to
C G AAF, 17 June 1942; ltr., Arnold to
C G ASC, attached to R&R, AFDAS to
AFATC, 6 June 1942.
5 5 . ATC in the Southwest Pacific, pp.
32, 61-62.
56. Board of Economic Warfare, De-
velopments in the W a r Economies of
Australia and New Zealand during May
1942, 2 5 June 1942.
57. Fn this first important action of
the P-39’s in the SWPA, three enemy
aircraft were claimed by the American
pilots, and four P-39’s were lost. This
was a heavy loss, especially in view of
the loss of S I P-39’s in the flight of the
unit from Australia to Port Moresby.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.; msg. f15,
Scanlon to Allied Air Forces, 5 May
1942; Hq. Allied Air Forces, Operations
Report, 29/30 Apr. 1942.)
58. Histories, 3d and 27th Gps.; T h e
Marauder, a Book of the zznd Bomb
Group (Sydney, 1944).
59. Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Bomb. Gp.; interview
with Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 2
I . USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation 503,
Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec.
‘9457 p. 37.
2. AWPD/I, Tab 8, (Joint Board)
Estimate of US. Over-all Production
Requirements, J.B. No. 355 (Serial 707)~
1 1 Sept. 1941, Sec. 11, Pt. 111, App. 11.
3 . Memo for W P D from S/AS, 9
Dec. 1941.
4. JCCSS-10, Annex No. 2 , Defense of
Island Bases between Hawaii and Aus-
tralia, 1 3 Jan. 1942.
5 . JCCSS-10, 12 Jan. 1942.
6. JCCSS-10, Annex No. z.
7. History, 67th Fighter Sq.; History,
68th Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1942;
memo for Col. Vanaman from AC/AS,
AWPD, zo Jan. 1942.
8. JCCSs-9, 1 1 Jan. 1942.
9. Memo for Col. Vanaman from
AC/AS, AWPD, 2 0 Jan. 1942.
10. Memo for AC Member, JUSSC
from C/AS, 14 Feb. 1942.
I I . Directive memo for AC/AS,
AWPD from S/AS, 2 3 Feb. 1942.
12. Ltr., A G O to Gen. Arnold, 2 0
Jan. 1942.
1 3 . Ibid.
14. CCS 41, 16 Feb. 1942; R&R,
OCAC Operations to Asst. Exec. for
Technical Plans and Coordination, 6
Mar. 1942.
1 5 . R&R, OCAC Operations, as in n.
14; CCS 41, 16 Feb. ’942; History, 67th
Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1943; His-
tory, 68th Fighter Sq.
16. USSBS htr. 516, Maj. Gen. Tat-
suhiko Takashima, 29 Nov. 1945; JCCSS-
9, 1 1 Jan. 1942. The Japanese Basic Plan
for the conduct of the Pacific war ac-
tually listed the conquest of New Cale-
donia, Fiji, and Samoa as necessary, but
these were to follow after the acquisition
of Midway. (USSBS [Pacific], Naval
Analysis Div., T h e Campaigns of the
Pacific War, p. 3.)
7’7