“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 2 0 - 3 2
60. See sources in n. 59.
61. History, 19th Bomb. Gp.
45. Richardson Report #5.
46. Brett report, Sum. H.
47. lbid.; GO 5 and 10, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 4 and 19 May 1942; Opns.
Instructions 3 and 7, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 20 and 28 May 1942,
48. G O 2 and 13, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 2 7 Apr. and 31 May 1942.
49. Brett report, Sum. H; Circular
Ltr. 42-13, Hq. US. Army Air Services,
19 May 1942, in AFSHO files; Circular
Ltr., 42-1, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 27
Apr. 1942, in Brett report.
5 0 . History, 4th Air Depot Gp.; Cir-
cular Ltr. 42-1, as cited in n. 49.
51. History, Air Service Command in
SIYPA; GO 4, Hq. U.S. Army Air
Services, I I May 1942; ltr., Sperry Gyro-
scope Co. to AAF Civilian Personnel, 1 5
May 1942; interview with Milton J.
Getker, 28 July 1943.
5 2 . History, ASC in SWPA, pp. 5 ff.
53. Ibid.; History, 4th A 9 Gp.
54. The Air Transport Command in
the Southwest Pacific, 7 Dec. 1941-1
Aug. 1944, pp. 12-15; ltr., AFA[TlC to
C G AAF, 17 June 1942; ltr., Arnold to
C G ASC, attached to R&R, AFDAS to
AFATC, 6 June 1942.
5 5 . ATC in the Southwest Pacific, pp.
32, 61-62.
56. Board of Economic Warfare, De-
velopments in the W a r Economies of
Australia and New Zealand during May
1942, 2 5 June 1942.
57. Fn this first important action of
the P-39’s in the SWPA, three enemy
aircraft were claimed by the American
pilots, and four P-39’s were lost. This
was a heavy loss, especially in view of
the loss of S I P-39’s in the flight of the
unit from Australia to Port Moresby.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.; msg. f15,
Scanlon to Allied Air Forces, 5 May
1942; Hq. Allied Air Forces, Operations
Report, 29/30 Apr. 1942.)
58. Histories, 3d and 27th Gps.; T h e
Marauder, a Book of the zznd Bomb
Group (Sydney, 1944).
59. Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Bomb. Gp.; interview
with Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 2
I . USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation 503,
Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec.
‘9457 p. 37.
2. AWPD/I, Tab 8, (Joint Board)
Estimate of US. Over-all Production
Requirements, J.B. No. 355 (Serial 707)~
1 1 Sept. 1941, Sec. 11, Pt. 111, App. 11.
3 . Memo for W P D from S/AS, 9
Dec. 1941.
4. JCCSS-10, Annex No. 2 , Defense of
Island Bases between Hawaii and Aus-
tralia, 1 3 Jan. 1942.
5 . JCCSS-10, 12 Jan. 1942.
6. JCCSS-10, Annex No. z.
7. History, 67th Fighter Sq.; History,
68th Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1942;
memo for Col. Vanaman from AC/AS,
AWPD, zo Jan. 1942.
8. JCCSs-9, 1 1 Jan. 1942.
9. Memo for Col. Vanaman from
AC/AS, AWPD, 2 0 Jan. 1942.
10. Memo for AC Member, JUSSC
from C/AS, 14 Feb. 1942.
I I . Directive memo for AC/AS,
AWPD from S/AS, 2 3 Feb. 1942.
12. Ltr., A G O to Gen. Arnold, 2 0
Jan. 1942.
1 3 . Ibid.
14. CCS 41, 16 Feb. 1942; R&R,
OCAC Operations to Asst. Exec. for
Technical Plans and Coordination, 6
Mar. 1942.
1 5 . R&R, OCAC Operations, as in n.
14; CCS 41, 16 Feb. ’942; History, 67th
Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1943; His-
tory, 68th Fighter Sq.
16. USSBS htr. 516, Maj. Gen. Tat-
suhiko Takashima, 29 Nov. 1945; JCCSS-
9, 1 1 Jan. 1942. The Japanese Basic Plan
for the conduct of the Pacific war ac-
tually listed the conquest of New Cale-
donia, Fiji, and Samoa as necessary, but
these were to follow after the acquisition
of Midway. (USSBS [Pacific], Naval
Analysis Div., T h e Campaigns of the
Pacific War, p. 3.)
7’7