“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 2 0 - 3 2
60. See sources in n. 59.
61. History, 19th Bomb. Gp.
45. Richardson Report #5.
46. Brett report, Sum. H.
47. lbid.; GO 5 and 10, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 4 and 19 May 1942; Opns.
Instructions 3 and 7, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 20 and 28 May 1942,
48. G O 2 and 13, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 2 7 Apr. and 31 May 1942.
49. Brett report, Sum. H; Circular
Ltr. 42-13, Hq. US. Army Air Services,
19 May 1942, in AFSHO files; Circular
Ltr., 42-1, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 27
Apr. 1942, in Brett report.
5 0 . History, 4th Air Depot Gp.; Cir-
cular Ltr. 42-1, as cited in n. 49.
51. History, Air Service Command in
SIYPA; GO 4, Hq. U.S. Army Air
Services, I I May 1942; ltr., Sperry Gyro-
scope Co. to AAF Civilian Personnel, 1 5
May 1942; interview with Milton J.
Getker, 28 July 1943.
5 2 . History, ASC in SWPA, pp. 5 ff.
53. Ibid.; History, 4th A 9 Gp.
54. The Air Transport Command in
the Southwest Pacific, 7 Dec. 1941-1
Aug. 1944, pp. 12-15; ltr., AFA[TlC to
C G AAF, 17 June 1942; ltr., Arnold to
C G ASC, attached to R&R, AFDAS to
AFATC, 6 June 1942.
5 5 . ATC in the Southwest Pacific, pp.
32, 61-62.
56. Board of Economic Warfare, De-
velopments in the W a r Economies of
Australia and New Zealand during May
1942, 2 5 June 1942.
57. Fn this first important action of
the P-39’s in the SWPA, three enemy
aircraft were claimed by the American
pilots, and four P-39’s were lost. This
was a heavy loss, especially in view of
the loss of S I P-39’s in the flight of the
unit from Australia to Port Moresby.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.; msg. f15,
Scanlon to Allied Air Forces, 5 May
1942; Hq. Allied Air Forces, Operations
Report, 29/30 Apr. 1942.)
58. Histories, 3d and 27th Gps.; T h e
Marauder, a Book of the zznd Bomb
Group (Sydney, 1944).
59. Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Bomb. Gp.; interview
with Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 2
I . USSBS (Pacific) Interrogation 503,
Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, 9 Dec.
‘9457 p. 37.
2. AWPD/I, Tab 8, (Joint Board)
Estimate of US. Over-all Production
Requirements, J.B. No. 355 (Serial 707)~
1 1 Sept. 1941, Sec. 11, Pt. 111, App. 11.
3 . Memo for W P D from S/AS, 9
Dec. 1941.
4. JCCSS-10, Annex No. 2 , Defense of
Island Bases between Hawaii and Aus-
tralia, 1 3 Jan. 1942.
5 . JCCSS-10, 12 Jan. 1942.
6. JCCSS-10, Annex No. z.
7. History, 67th Fighter Sq.; History,
68th Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1942;
memo for Col. Vanaman from AC/AS,
AWPD, zo Jan. 1942.
8. JCCSs-9, 1 1 Jan. 1942.
9. Memo for Col. Vanaman from
AC/AS, AWPD, 2 0 Jan. 1942.
10. Memo for AC Member, JUSSC
from C/AS, 14 Feb. 1942.
I I . Directive memo for AC/AS,
AWPD from S/AS, 2 3 Feb. 1942.
12. Ltr., A G O to Gen. Arnold, 2 0
Jan. 1942.
1 3 . Ibid.
14. CCS 41, 16 Feb. 1942; R&R,
OCAC Operations to Asst. Exec. for
Technical Plans and Coordination, 6
Mar. 1942.
1 5 . R&R, OCAC Operations, as in n.
14; CCS 41, 16 Feb. ’942; History, 67th
Fighter Sq., Actv. to 3 1 Dec. 1943; His-
tory, 68th Fighter Sq.
16. USSBS htr. 516, Maj. Gen. Tat-
suhiko Takashima, 29 Nov. 1945; JCCSS-
9, 1 1 Jan. 1942. The Japanese Basic Plan
for the conduct of the Pacific war ac-
tually listed the conquest of New Cale-
donia, Fiji, and Samoa as necessary, but
these were to follow after the acquisition
of Midway. (USSBS [Pacific], Naval
Analysis Div., T h e Campaigns of the
Pacific War, p. 3.)
7’7