“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 1 4 - 2 0
Gps.; msg. #57, Ulio to C G USAFIA, 16
Mar. 1942; interview with Maj. John
Davies, 9 Dec. 1942.
28. History, 38th Bomb. Gp.; msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 24 Apr. 1942.
29. From the RAAF Intelligence
Summaries, it would appear that almost
all of these Catalinas and Hudsons which
were not lost in combat were lost either
in accidents or completely worn out
from overwork.
30. RAAF Intel. Sums.
3 1 . History, V Fighter Command;
George Henry Johnston, T h e Toughest
Fighting in the World (New York,
1943). pp. 1 3 , 5 2 ; Osmar White, Green
Amour (New York, 1945), pp. 56, 72,
76.
32. The two major bases for opera-
tions against the Japanese in the North-
eastern Area were Townsville and Port
Moresby. At Townsville, there were at
least four operational fields at this time:
Garbutt, Anti1 Plains, Reid River, and
Charters Towers. Others were to be con-
structed up the Cape York Peninsula, the
most important being Iron Range. At
Port Moresby, there were three being
used: Seven Mile, which was the major
field; Three Mile and Ten Mile, both
of which were little more than emer-
gency fields. In wet weather, for ex-
ample, pursuit operations had to be trans-
ferred from Three Mile to Seven Mile.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.) Plans
were under way for the construction of
four more fields near Port Moresby, and
all would be operational by October.
3 3 . RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th Over-
seas; G O 18, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 6
June 1942.
34. ON1 Combat Narratives, Early
Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro
Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th
Overseas; USSBS Memo fNav 1 1 , 16
Oct. 1945. T h e Joint Army-Navy Assess-
ment Committee listed only three ships
as having been sunk: one cargo vessel by
joint Army-Navy efforts, and one con-
verted light cruiser and one converted
minesweeper by carrier planes.
35. Msg. $625, Wainwright to WD,
28 Mar. 1942.
7 16
36. H e reported that before leaving
Corregidor he had prepared plans for
an air attack to be staged from Australia
through Mindanao against points in the
Philippines, and General Sutherland later
stated that MacArthur “originated the
idea” of this attack. (Msg. #56, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, 3 1 Mar. 1942; inter-
view with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Suther-
land by Walter D. Edmonds, 4 June
37. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 13th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas; Obert and
Brown statements.
38. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 12th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas.
39. Msg., Marshall to MacArthur,
#I097, 4 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-3458 (4-19-
42), USAFFE to Marshall, #AC 365, 19
Apr. 1942; CCS 10th Mtg., 7 Mar. 1942;
JCS 5th Mtg., 9 Mar. 1942; CCS 12th
Mtg., 17 Mar. 1942; USSBS, Employment
of Forces.
40. USSBS, Employment of Forces.
See discussion of modifications of orig-
inal directive in JWPC 87/1, z Oct. 1943.
41. G O I , Hq. SWPA, 18 Apr. 1941.
MacArthur believed that none of his
forces was adequate to carry out his
directive. Without a carrier, he said, his
naval forces would be limited only to
minor operations; except for less than
two divisions of Australian infantry, his
ground forces were inadequately trained;
and because of a lack of organization and
training, his air forces would require at
least four months of intensive effort to
reach a satisfactory condition. (Msg.
#538, MacArthur to Marshall, I May
42. G O I (with Annex I ) , Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. 1942.
43. Interview with Lt. Col. C.D.
Kauffman, Signal Sec., FEASC, 1 2 Aug.
1944; Lt. Gen. George Brett report, Air
Operations in Australia, Summary Q,
in AFSHO files; GO I and 4, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
memo for C/S, W D from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report #f, 9
July 1942-
4. Richardson Report #5; GO 6, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, X I May 1942; Brett
report, as in n. 43.
‘945.)
1942.)