“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 1 4 - 2 0
Gps.; msg. #57, Ulio to C G USAFIA, 16
Mar. 1942; interview with Maj. John
Davies, 9 Dec. 1942.
28. History, 38th Bomb. Gp.; msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 24 Apr. 1942.
29. From the RAAF Intelligence
Summaries, it would appear that almost
all of these Catalinas and Hudsons which
were not lost in combat were lost either
in accidents or completely worn out
from overwork.
30. RAAF Intel. Sums.
3 1 . History, V Fighter Command;
George Henry Johnston, T h e Toughest
Fighting in the World (New York,
1943). pp. 1 3 , 5 2 ; Osmar White, Green
Amour (New York, 1945), pp. 56, 72,
76.
32. The two major bases for opera-
tions against the Japanese in the North-
eastern Area were Townsville and Port
Moresby. At Townsville, there were at
least four operational fields at this time:
Garbutt, Anti1 Plains, Reid River, and
Charters Towers. Others were to be con-
structed up the Cape York Peninsula, the
most important being Iron Range. At
Port Moresby, there were three being
used: Seven Mile, which was the major
field; Three Mile and Ten Mile, both
of which were little more than emer-
gency fields. In wet weather, for ex-
ample, pursuit operations had to be trans-
ferred from Three Mile to Seven Mile.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.) Plans
were under way for the construction of
four more fields near Port Moresby, and
all would be operational by October.
3 3 . RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th Over-
seas; G O 18, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 6
June 1942.
34. ON1 Combat Narratives, Early
Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro
Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th
Overseas; USSBS Memo fNav 1 1 , 16
Oct. 1945. T h e Joint Army-Navy Assess-
ment Committee listed only three ships
as having been sunk: one cargo vessel by
joint Army-Navy efforts, and one con-
verted light cruiser and one converted
minesweeper by carrier planes.
35. Msg. $625, Wainwright to WD,
28 Mar. 1942.
7 16
36. H e reported that before leaving
Corregidor he had prepared plans for
an air attack to be staged from Australia
through Mindanao against points in the
Philippines, and General Sutherland later
stated that MacArthur “originated the
idea” of this attack. (Msg. #56, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, 3 1 Mar. 1942; inter-
view with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Suther-
land by Walter D. Edmonds, 4 June
37. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 13th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas; Obert and
Brown statements.
38. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 12th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas.
39. Msg., Marshall to MacArthur,
#I097, 4 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-3458 (4-19-
42), USAFFE to Marshall, #AC 365, 19
Apr. 1942; CCS 10th Mtg., 7 Mar. 1942;
JCS 5th Mtg., 9 Mar. 1942; CCS 12th
Mtg., 17 Mar. 1942; USSBS, Employment
of Forces.
40. USSBS, Employment of Forces.
See discussion of modifications of orig-
inal directive in JWPC 87/1, z Oct. 1943.
41. G O I , Hq. SWPA, 18 Apr. 1941.
MacArthur believed that none of his
forces was adequate to carry out his
directive. Without a carrier, he said, his
naval forces would be limited only to
minor operations; except for less than
two divisions of Australian infantry, his
ground forces were inadequately trained;
and because of a lack of organization and
training, his air forces would require at
least four months of intensive effort to
reach a satisfactory condition. (Msg.
#538, MacArthur to Marshall, I May
42. G O I (with Annex I ) , Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. 1942.
43. Interview with Lt. Col. C.D.
Kauffman, Signal Sec., FEASC, 1 2 Aug.
1944; Lt. Gen. George Brett report, Air
Operations in Australia, Summary Q,
in AFSHO files; GO I and 4, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
memo for C/S, W D from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report #f, 9
July 1942-
4. Richardson Report #5; GO 6, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, X I May 1942; Brett
report, as in n. 43.
‘945.)
1942.)