“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 1 4 - 2 0
Gps.; msg. #57, Ulio to C G USAFIA, 16
Mar. 1942; interview with Maj. John
Davies, 9 Dec. 1942.
28. History, 38th Bomb. Gp.; msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 24 Apr. 1942.
29. From the RAAF Intelligence
Summaries, it would appear that almost
all of these Catalinas and Hudsons which
were not lost in combat were lost either
in accidents or completely worn out
from overwork.
30. RAAF Intel. Sums.
3 1 . History, V Fighter Command;
George Henry Johnston, T h e Toughest
Fighting in the World (New York,
1943). pp. 1 3 , 5 2 ; Osmar White, Green
Amour (New York, 1945), pp. 56, 72,
76.
32. The two major bases for opera-
tions against the Japanese in the North-
eastern Area were Townsville and Port
Moresby. At Townsville, there were at
least four operational fields at this time:
Garbutt, Anti1 Plains, Reid River, and
Charters Towers. Others were to be con-
structed up the Cape York Peninsula, the
most important being Iron Range. At
Port Moresby, there were three being
used: Seven Mile, which was the major
field; Three Mile and Ten Mile, both
of which were little more than emer-
gency fields. In wet weather, for ex-
ample, pursuit operations had to be trans-
ferred from Three Mile to Seven Mile.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.) Plans
were under way for the construction of
four more fields near Port Moresby, and
all would be operational by October.
3 3 . RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th Over-
seas; G O 18, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 6
June 1942.
34. ON1 Combat Narratives, Early
Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro
Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th
Overseas; USSBS Memo fNav 1 1 , 16
Oct. 1945. T h e Joint Army-Navy Assess-
ment Committee listed only three ships
as having been sunk: one cargo vessel by
joint Army-Navy efforts, and one con-
verted light cruiser and one converted
minesweeper by carrier planes.
35. Msg. $625, Wainwright to WD,
28 Mar. 1942.
7 16
36. H e reported that before leaving
Corregidor he had prepared plans for
an air attack to be staged from Australia
through Mindanao against points in the
Philippines, and General Sutherland later
stated that MacArthur “originated the
idea” of this attack. (Msg. #56, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, 3 1 Mar. 1942; inter-
view with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Suther-
land by Walter D. Edmonds, 4 June
37. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 13th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas; Obert and
Brown statements.
38. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 12th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas.
39. Msg., Marshall to MacArthur,
#I097, 4 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-3458 (4-19-
42), USAFFE to Marshall, #AC 365, 19
Apr. 1942; CCS 10th Mtg., 7 Mar. 1942;
JCS 5th Mtg., 9 Mar. 1942; CCS 12th
Mtg., 17 Mar. 1942; USSBS, Employment
of Forces.
40. USSBS, Employment of Forces.
See discussion of modifications of orig-
inal directive in JWPC 87/1, z Oct. 1943.
41. G O I , Hq. SWPA, 18 Apr. 1941.
MacArthur believed that none of his
forces was adequate to carry out his
directive. Without a carrier, he said, his
naval forces would be limited only to
minor operations; except for less than
two divisions of Australian infantry, his
ground forces were inadequately trained;
and because of a lack of organization and
training, his air forces would require at
least four months of intensive effort to
reach a satisfactory condition. (Msg.
#538, MacArthur to Marshall, I May
42. G O I (with Annex I ) , Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. 1942.
43. Interview with Lt. Col. C.D.
Kauffman, Signal Sec., FEASC, 1 2 Aug.
1944; Lt. Gen. George Brett report, Air
Operations in Australia, Summary Q,
in AFSHO files; GO I and 4, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
memo for C/S, W D from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report #f, 9
July 1942-
4. Richardson Report #5; GO 6, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, X I May 1942; Brett
report, as in n. 43.
‘945.)
1942.)