The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 1 4 - 2 0
Gps.; msg. #57, Ulio to C G USAFIA, 16
Mar. 1942; interview with Maj. John
Davies, 9 Dec. 1942.
28. History, 38th Bomb. Gp.; msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 24 Apr. 1942.
29. From the RAAF Intelligence
Summaries, it would appear that almost
all of these Catalinas and Hudsons which
were not lost in combat were lost either
in accidents or completely worn out
from overwork.
30. RAAF Intel. Sums.
3 1 . History, V Fighter Command;
George Henry Johnston, T h e Toughest
Fighting in the World (New York,
1943). pp. 1 3 , 5 2 ; Osmar White, Green
Amour (New York, 1945), pp. 56, 72,
76.
32. The two major bases for opera-
tions against the Japanese in the North-
eastern Area were Townsville and Port
Moresby. At Townsville, there were at
least four operational fields at this time:
Garbutt, Anti1 Plains, Reid River, and
Charters Towers. Others were to be con-
structed up the Cape York Peninsula, the
most important being Iron Range. At
Port Moresby, there were three being
used: Seven Mile, which was the major
field; Three Mile and Ten Mile, both
of which were little more than emer-
gency fields. In wet weather, for ex-
ample, pursuit operations had to be trans-
ferred from Three Mile to Seven Mile.
(Histories, 35th and 36th Sqs.) Plans
were under way for the construction of
four more fields near Port Moresby, and
all would be operational by October.
3 3 . RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th Over-
seas; G O 18, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 6
June 1942.
34. ON1 Combat Narratives, Early
Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro
Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel. Sums.; 435th
Overseas; USSBS Memo fNav 1 1 , 16
Oct. 1945. T h e Joint Army-Navy Assess-
ment Committee listed only three ships
as having been sunk: one cargo vessel by
joint Army-Navy efforts, and one con-
verted light cruiser and one converted
minesweeper by carrier planes.
35. Msg. $625, Wainwright to WD,
28 Mar. 1942.
7 16
36. H e reported that before leaving
Corregidor he had prepared plans for
an air attack to be staged from Australia
through Mindanao against points in the
Philippines, and General Sutherland later
stated that MacArthur “originated the
idea” of this attack. (Msg. #56, Mac-
Arthur to Marshall, 3 1 Mar. 1942; inter-
view with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Suther-
land by Walter D. Edmonds, 4 June
37. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 13th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas; Obert and
Brown statements.
38. Histories, 27th and 3d Gps.; 12th
and 90th Sqs.; 435th Overseas.
39. Msg., Marshall to MacArthur,
#I097, 4 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-3458 (4-19-
42), USAFFE to Marshall, #AC 365, 19
Apr. 1942; CCS 10th Mtg., 7 Mar. 1942;
JCS 5th Mtg., 9 Mar. 1942; CCS 12th
Mtg., 17 Mar. 1942; USSBS, Employment
of Forces.
40. USSBS, Employment of Forces.
See discussion of modifications of orig-
inal directive in JWPC 87/1, z Oct. 1943.
41. G O I , Hq. SWPA, 18 Apr. 1941.
MacArthur believed that none of his
forces was adequate to carry out his
directive. Without a carrier, he said, his
naval forces would be limited only to
minor operations; except for less than
two divisions of Australian infantry, his
ground forces were inadequately trained;
and because of a lack of organization and
training, his air forces would require at
least four months of intensive effort to
reach a satisfactory condition. (Msg.
#538, MacArthur to Marshall, I May
42. G O I (with Annex I ) , Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. 1942.
43. Interview with Lt. Col. C.D.
Kauffman, Signal Sec., FEASC, 1 2 Aug.
1944; Lt. Gen. George Brett report, Air
Operations in Australia, Summary Q,
in AFSHO files; GO I and 4, Hq. Allied
Air Forces, 20 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
memo for C/S, W D from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report #f, 9
July 1942-
4. Richardson Report #5; GO 6, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, X I May 1942; Brett
report, as in n. 43.
‘945.)
1942.)