“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 0 0 - 4 0 6
Karl Truesdale, Jr., to Tom, 17 Mar.
‘942.
1 1 0 . The principal sources for the
pursuit statistics are the History, 17th
Squadron and the Digest of the Air
Phase in the Philippines, in AAG om-
800, Misc. Phil. Fisher report, Lane
interview, Gambonini diary, and the
messages from the theater provide addi-
tional documentation.
I I I . 19th Gp. Opns. Record. Early
reports of claims were quite unreliable,
particularly as they concerned shipping.
It should be pointed out that from De-
cember 1941 through 5 March 1942, in
both the Philippines and the NEI,
JANAC credits all army aircraft (US.,
British, Dutch, Australian) with no more
than three minesweepers, four passenger
or cargo vessels, and one “converted
salvage” vessel sunk, and a part in sink-
ing two other cargo vessels. A recapitula-
tion of bombers destroyed was made by
the Command and General Staff School,
dated 1 2 May 1945, in order to deter-
mine if any bombsights fell into the
hands of the enemy. This study lists the
thirty-eight planes destroyed in Java, but
breaks them down somewhat differently:
six shot down, six lost by accident,
twenty destroyed on ground by enemy
action, five destroyed upon evacuation,
and one in manner unidentified. In addi-
tion it lists six destroyed in Australia
between 28 December and 3 March.
1 1 2 . Msg., Fort Mills to AGWAR,
19 Mar. 1942; msg. #Aquila 5 , Brereton
to AGWAR, 29 Mar. 1942; Tactical
Lessons from Aircraft in Combat, 2 7
Mar. 1942, Doc. 2 2 , in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I ; interviews with Maj. Frank
P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942; Maj. Edward C.
Teats, 5 Dec. 1942 [ ? I ; Capt. H.C.
Smelser, 6 Apr. 1942; Lt. Robert A.
Trenkle, 7 Apr. 1942; Capt. E.S. Green,
6 Apr. 1942; msg. #ABDA 456, Java to
T A G , 19 Feb. 1942; msg. #ABDA 37DX,
Java to TAG, 17 Feb. 1942.
I 13. Smelser interview.
114. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; inter-
view with Maj. John Davies, 9 Dec. 1942;
msg., Adams to C G USAF, Darwin, 5
Jan. 1942.
1 1 5 . Fisher report; msg. # z from Ban-
7 ‘4
doeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942; msg. $17, Java to
T A G , 19 Feb. 1942; msg. #389, Adams to
C G USAFIA, 22 Feb. 1942; report by
Lt. Col. William Lane, Information of
Tactical Value on Japanese Navy “0”
Fighters, in AFSHO files.
NOTES TO CHAPTER
I . Msg. #4zz, sans origine to
Mar. 1942.
2 . Navy msg. #ABDA 74
USNA, Melbourne, 25 Jan. 1942; msg.
# z z , Chungking to T A G , 26 Jan. 1942;
msg. #IS, Java to AGO, 13 Feb. 1942;
msg. #483, sans origine to T A G , 4 Mar.
1942; Biennial Report, C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941-30 June 1943.
3. Msg. #z95, Melbourne to AGWAR,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #600, Wainwright to
T A G , 2 6 Mar. 1942.
4. Statements of Maj. David L. Obert
(14 May 1945), Maj. Stewart W. Robb
(30 Nov. 1944), and Maj. Ben S. Brown
( 2 5 Oct. 1944); History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; Allison Ind, Bataan, the Judgment
Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 213ff.
5 . Obert statement.
6. Msg. #205, MacArthur to T A G , 5
Feb. 1942; msg. $413, Fort Mills to AGO,
4 Mar. 1942; msg., Arnold to MacArthur,
4 Mar. 1942; GO 39 and 40, Hq.
USAFFE, 1 2 Mar. 1942; combat report
of Capt. William M. Rowe, in A-2
Library; History, 24th Pursuit Gp. The
Joint Army and Navy Assessment Com-
mittee does not confirm the sinking of
these vessels. “Bataan Diary of Major
Achille C. Tisdelle,” ed. by Louis Mor-
ton, Military Ajfairs, XI (Fall, 1947), 139-
40, makes note of the mission as follows:
“Our combination-bomber-attack-pursuit
-P-40 airforce was on a party for the
Nips in Subi [ Subic Bay] last night, each
plane carrying a hundred pound bomb,
plus smaller bombs. They got the Nips
with their pants down and sank two
freighters and one tanker. Observers on
Mount Samat stated that it was a lovely
show. Only two of the three P-40’s re-
turned. So, now we have two airplanes
only.”
7. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Robb
I r
TAG, z
to AL-