“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 0 0 - 4 0 6
Karl Truesdale, Jr., to Tom, 17 Mar.
‘942.
1 1 0 . The principal sources for the
pursuit statistics are the History, 17th
Squadron and the Digest of the Air
Phase in the Philippines, in AAG om-
800, Misc. Phil. Fisher report, Lane
interview, Gambonini diary, and the
messages from the theater provide addi-
tional documentation.
I I I . 19th Gp. Opns. Record. Early
reports of claims were quite unreliable,
particularly as they concerned shipping.
It should be pointed out that from De-
cember 1941 through 5 March 1942, in
both the Philippines and the NEI,
JANAC credits all army aircraft (US.,
British, Dutch, Australian) with no more
than three minesweepers, four passenger
or cargo vessels, and one “converted
salvage” vessel sunk, and a part in sink-
ing two other cargo vessels. A recapitula-
tion of bombers destroyed was made by
the Command and General Staff School,
dated 1 2 May 1945, in order to deter-
mine if any bombsights fell into the
hands of the enemy. This study lists the
thirty-eight planes destroyed in Java, but
breaks them down somewhat differently:
six shot down, six lost by accident,
twenty destroyed on ground by enemy
action, five destroyed upon evacuation,
and one in manner unidentified. In addi-
tion it lists six destroyed in Australia
between 28 December and 3 March.
1 1 2 . Msg., Fort Mills to AGWAR,
19 Mar. 1942; msg. #Aquila 5 , Brereton
to AGWAR, 29 Mar. 1942; Tactical
Lessons from Aircraft in Combat, 2 7
Mar. 1942, Doc. 2 2 , in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I ; interviews with Maj. Frank
P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942; Maj. Edward C.
Teats, 5 Dec. 1942 [ ? I ; Capt. H.C.
Smelser, 6 Apr. 1942; Lt. Robert A.
Trenkle, 7 Apr. 1942; Capt. E.S. Green,
6 Apr. 1942; msg. #ABDA 456, Java to
T A G , 19 Feb. 1942; msg. #ABDA 37DX,
Java to TAG, 17 Feb. 1942.
I 13. Smelser interview.
114. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; inter-
view with Maj. John Davies, 9 Dec. 1942;
msg., Adams to C G USAF, Darwin, 5
Jan. 1942.
1 1 5 . Fisher report; msg. # z from Ban-
7 ‘4
doeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942; msg. $17, Java to
T A G , 19 Feb. 1942; msg. #389, Adams to
C G USAFIA, 22 Feb. 1942; report by
Lt. Col. William Lane, Information of
Tactical Value on Japanese Navy “0”
Fighters, in AFSHO files.
NOTES TO CHAPTER
I . Msg. #4zz, sans origine to
Mar. 1942.
2 . Navy msg. #ABDA 74
USNA, Melbourne, 25 Jan. 1942; msg.
# z z , Chungking to T A G , 26 Jan. 1942;
msg. #IS, Java to AGO, 13 Feb. 1942;
msg. #483, sans origine to T A G , 4 Mar.
1942; Biennial Report, C/S to Sec. of
War, I July 1941-30 June 1943.
3. Msg. #z95, Melbourne to AGWAR,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #600, Wainwright to
T A G , 2 6 Mar. 1942.
4. Statements of Maj. David L. Obert
(14 May 1945), Maj. Stewart W. Robb
(30 Nov. 1944), and Maj. Ben S. Brown
( 2 5 Oct. 1944); History, 24th Pursuit
Gp.; Allison Ind, Bataan, the Judgment
Seat (New York, 1944), pp. 213ff.
5 . Obert statement.
6. Msg. #205, MacArthur to T A G , 5
Feb. 1942; msg. $413, Fort Mills to AGO,
4 Mar. 1942; msg., Arnold to MacArthur,
4 Mar. 1942; GO 39 and 40, Hq.
USAFFE, 1 2 Mar. 1942; combat report
of Capt. William M. Rowe, in A-2
Library; History, 24th Pursuit Gp. The
Joint Army and Navy Assessment Com-
mittee does not confirm the sinking of
these vessels. “Bataan Diary of Major
Achille C. Tisdelle,” ed. by Louis Mor-
ton, Military Ajfairs, XI (Fall, 1947), 139-
40, makes note of the mission as follows:
“Our combination-bomber-attack-pursuit
-P-40 airforce was on a party for the
Nips in Subi [ Subic Bay] last night, each
plane carrying a hundred pound bomb,
plus smaller bombs. They got the Nips
with their pants down and sank two
freighters and one tanker. Observers on
Mount Samat stated that it was a lovely
show. Only two of the three P-40’s re-
turned. So, now we have two airplanes
only.”
7. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Robb
I r
TAG, z
to AL-