“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 9 6 - 4 0 0
and Brereton should go to Australia.
(Msg., Arnold to Brett, 2 2 Feb. 1942.)
93. Memo for T A G by Eisenhower,
23 Feb. 1942, draft msg., Marshall to
Brett.
94. Msg. #DBA 28, CCS to ABDA-
COM, 25 Feb. 1942. The Dutch opposed
the change in the ABDA Command.
Wavell argued that ABDACOM should
be dissolved rather than withdrawn. The
American viewpoint was expressed in a
memorandum by General Eisenhower
that the CCS were not abandoning the
fight in the ABDA area, that Wavell
was ordered to dissolve his own head-
quarters in consideration of the fact that
the area of battle was almost exclusively
Dutch and it was consequently necessary
to place direction and control in Dutch
hands. (Msg., Lt. Gov. H.J. Van Mook
to Marshall, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg. #02076,
Wavell to Britman for CCS, 22 Feb.
1942, in CPS 19/D, 24 Feb. 1942; memo
for T A G from Eisenhower, 24 Feb. 1942,
draft msg., Marshall to U.S. MA,
Batavia.)
95. Msg. #ABDA 233, ABDACOM to
USAFIA, 7 Feb. 1942.
96. Msg., Barnes to ABDACOM, 9
Feb. 1942, Doc. 708; msg. from Lt. Wil-
liam B. Ackerman, Doc. 714; Roster of
pilots on Lungley, 19 Feb. 1942, Doc. 937,
all in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I .
97. Msg. BABDA 403, ABDACOM
to USAFIA, 17 Feb. 1942; msg., ABDA-
COM to USAFIA, 17 Feb. 1942; msg.,
Barnes to Brett, 20 Feb. 1942. There
was some confusion as to the proper
destination of this convoy since, in addi-
tion to the NEI and Burma, the defense
of Koepang and Darwin still was con-
sidered of great importance.
98. Msg., Barnes to ABDACOM, 19
Feb. 1942; msg. #CCOS 17, ABDACOM
to CCS, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg. #ozo47, sgd.
Wavell, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg., Barnes to
Brett, z j Feb. 1942; msg., Brett to
ABDACOM, 25 Feb. 1942.
99. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Gam-
bonini diary. On 26 February, six
Brewsters and six Hurricanes arrived at
Blimbing to fly with the 17th Squadron.
100. 19th Gp. Diary; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; Sum. of Activities, 2 2 Feb. 1942.
It should be noted that there has been
no confirmation from enemy sources of
the shipping claims. (See JANAC, Jap
Losses.)
101. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 49-
5 0 ; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; 19th Gp.
Opns. Record; Gambonini diary; USSBS
Naval Report, The Japanese Invasion of
the Philippines. See also USSBS Intr. p.
1 0 2 . In this naval battle, two Japanese
destroyers were damaged. T w o Allied
cruisers and three destroyers were sunk
on 27/28 February; three more destroyers
and three cruisers went down on the
following day. Of the Allied fleet, only
four American destroyers made their
escape. (USSBS Naval Report, The Jap-
anese Invasion of the Philippines; USSBS
Intr. 90; The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
50 ff.)
103. T h e Java Sea Campaign, p. 8 1 ;
Fisher report; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.;
Gambonini diary; G O 27, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 1 1 July 1942; G O 25, GHQ, 2 7
Aug. 1942.
104. Gambonini diary; Fisher report;
Edward 0. Yerington, The Evacuation
of Java, in 435th [Bomb. Sq.] Overseas,
in History, 19th Bomb. Gp.; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.
105. Information supplied by Col.
William Hipps.
106. The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
45 ff.; msg. from Lt. William P. Acker-
man, Doc. 715, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King,
First Official Report to the Secretary of
the Navy, I Mar. 1944.
107. GO 12, Hq. Allied Air Forces,
25 May 1942; GO 58, Hq. Fifth Air
Force, 31 Dec. 1942; Rouse diary; Knud-
sen diary, as cited in n. 64; msg., Hq.
USA, Broome to USAFIA, 2 5 Feb. 1942;
rnsg., Perrin to CG USAFIA, 26 Feb.
1942; msg., Brett to Perrin, 28 Feb. 1942.
108. Gambonini diary; Fisher report;
Edward 0. Yerington, The Evacuation
of Java; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.
,109. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; ltr.,
Maj. Gen. H.L. George to CG AAF,
15 Jan. 1944; G O 30, W D , 8 Apr. 1944;
Knudsen diary; Rouse diary; Lt. Col.
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