“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 9 6 - 4 0 0
and Brereton should go to Australia.
(Msg., Arnold to Brett, 2 2 Feb. 1942.)
93. Memo for T A G by Eisenhower,
23 Feb. 1942, draft msg., Marshall to
Brett.
94. Msg. #DBA 28, CCS to ABDA-
COM, 25 Feb. 1942. The Dutch opposed
the change in the ABDA Command.
Wavell argued that ABDACOM should
be dissolved rather than withdrawn. The
American viewpoint was expressed in a
memorandum by General Eisenhower
that the CCS were not abandoning the
fight in the ABDA area, that Wavell
was ordered to dissolve his own head-
quarters in consideration of the fact that
the area of battle was almost exclusively
Dutch and it was consequently necessary
to place direction and control in Dutch
hands. (Msg., Lt. Gov. H.J. Van Mook
to Marshall, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg. #02076,
Wavell to Britman for CCS, 22 Feb.
1942, in CPS 19/D, 24 Feb. 1942; memo
for T A G from Eisenhower, 24 Feb. 1942,
draft msg., Marshall to U.S. MA,
Batavia.)
95. Msg. #ABDA 233, ABDACOM to
USAFIA, 7 Feb. 1942.
96. Msg., Barnes to ABDACOM, 9
Feb. 1942, Doc. 708; msg. from Lt. Wil-
liam B. Ackerman, Doc. 714; Roster of
pilots on Lungley, 19 Feb. 1942, Doc. 937,
all in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I .
97. Msg. BABDA 403, ABDACOM
to USAFIA, 17 Feb. 1942; msg., ABDA-
COM to USAFIA, 17 Feb. 1942; msg.,
Barnes to Brett, 20 Feb. 1942. There
was some confusion as to the proper
destination of this convoy since, in addi-
tion to the NEI and Burma, the defense
of Koepang and Darwin still was con-
sidered of great importance.
98. Msg., Barnes to ABDACOM, 19
Feb. 1942; msg. #CCOS 17, ABDACOM
to CCS, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg. #ozo47, sgd.
Wavell, 2 2 Feb. 1942; msg., Barnes to
Brett, z j Feb. 1942; msg., Brett to
ABDACOM, 25 Feb. 1942.
99. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Gam-
bonini diary. On 26 February, six
Brewsters and six Hurricanes arrived at
Blimbing to fly with the 17th Squadron.
100. 19th Gp. Diary; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; Sum. of Activities, 2 2 Feb. 1942.
It should be noted that there has been
no confirmation from enemy sources of
the shipping claims. (See JANAC, Jap
Losses.)
101. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 49-
5 0 ; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; 19th Gp.
Opns. Record; Gambonini diary; USSBS
Naval Report, The Japanese Invasion of
the Philippines. See also USSBS Intr. p.
1 0 2 . In this naval battle, two Japanese
destroyers were damaged. T w o Allied
cruisers and three destroyers were sunk
on 27/28 February; three more destroyers
and three cruisers went down on the
following day. Of the Allied fleet, only
four American destroyers made their
escape. (USSBS Naval Report, The Jap-
anese Invasion of the Philippines; USSBS
Intr. 90; The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
50 ff.)
103. T h e Java Sea Campaign, p. 8 1 ;
Fisher report; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.;
Gambonini diary; G O 27, Hq. Allied Air
Forces, 1 1 July 1942; G O 25, GHQ, 2 7
Aug. 1942.
104. Gambonini diary; Fisher report;
Edward 0. Yerington, The Evacuation
of Java, in 435th [Bomb. Sq.] Overseas,
in History, 19th Bomb. Gp.; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.
105. Information supplied by Col.
William Hipps.
106. The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
45 ff.; msg. from Lt. William P. Acker-
man, Doc. 715, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King,
First Official Report to the Secretary of
the Navy, I Mar. 1944.
107. GO 12, Hq. Allied Air Forces,
25 May 1942; GO 58, Hq. Fifth Air
Force, 31 Dec. 1942; Rouse diary; Knud-
sen diary, as cited in n. 64; msg., Hq.
USA, Broome to USAFIA, 2 5 Feb. 1942;
rnsg., Perrin to CG USAFIA, 26 Feb.
1942; msg., Brett to Perrin, 28 Feb. 1942.
108. Gambonini diary; Fisher report;
Edward 0. Yerington, The Evacuation
of Java; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.
,109. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; ltr.,
Maj. Gen. H.L. George to CG AAF,
15 Jan. 1944; G O 30, W D , 8 Apr. 1944;
Knudsen diary; Rouse diary; Lt. Col.
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