“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 9 1 - 9 6
Feb. 1942; History, 27th Bomb. Gp.;
Sum. of Activities, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
71. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.
72. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Sum. of
Activities, 17 Feb. 1942, which places the
time of attack a t 1020.
73. Msg., ABDACOM to Barnes,
USAFIA, 4 Feb. 1942; Gen. Sir Archi-
bald Wavell, Despatch on Operations in
South-West Pacific, 15 Jam-25 Feb. 1942.
74. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I: #13, Brett to C G USAFIA, 5 Feb.
1942, Doc. 749; Batavia to Army, Mel-
bourne, 9 Feb. 1942, Doc. 748; #zr, Brett
to USAFIA, 1 3 Feb. 1942, Doc. 757. See
also msg. #14, Brett to USAFIA, 12 Feb.
1942; msg. #zo, Brett to USAFIA, 1 2
Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
75. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 3 6
37; msg., ABDA &A, ABDACOM to
USAFIA, 16 Feb. 1942.
76. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; GO 27,
Hq. Allied Air Forces, 1 1 July 1942; GO
1 1 , Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Gambonini diary; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; 19th Gp. Diary; History, 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Sum. of Activities, 19 Feb.
1942; GO 2, Hq. S W P Command, 15
Feb. 1942; GO 20, Hq. Allied Air Forces,
20 June 1942. JANAC, Jap Losses does
not list any shipping sunk by army air-
craft on these days.
77. Msg. #z6 from Java, 20 Feb. 1942;
19th Gp. Opns. Record; GO 40, GHQ,
3 Oct. 1942; GO 20 and 38, Hq. Fifth
AF, 12 Oct. and 2 Dec. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; Gambonini diary; Sum.
of Activities, 19 Feb. 1942.
78. USSBS Intrs. 479 and 113, Capts.
M. Genda and M. Fuchido.
79. T h e warning had come from
General Marshall who stated that there
were indications that enemy carrier op-
erations might be expected on the
northeast coast of Australia. (Msg. #235,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, 2 [ ? I Feb.
80. Ltr., Oestreicher to Wurtsmith,
21 July 1942, Doc. 932, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I.
81. Ibid.; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , z z Feb. 1 9 2 .
36-37.
1942.)
7 ’ 2
8 2 . GO 27 and 62, GHQ, I Sept. and
23 Dec. 1942; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , 2 2 Feb. 1942; ltr., Oestreicher to
Wurtsmith, 2 1 July 1942, Doc. 932, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ; Report
of Air Attack on Base Section No. One,
24 Feb. 1942, Doc. 799, ibid.
83. Msg. #78, Melbourne to MILID,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #293, Melbourne to
AGWAR, 20 Feb. 1942; msg. #298, Mel-
bourne to T A G , 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#308, Melbourne to T A G , 2 1 Feb. 1942;
Doc. 799, as cited in n. 82.
84. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 40-
44; 19th Gp. Opns. Record; 19th Gp.
Diary; Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942,
which records FEAF losses for the day
as “five B-I~’s, five P-40’s and two dive
bombers.. .to combat activity, anti
aircraft and straffing inflicted by enemy
action.” JANAC, Jap Losses does not
confirm the transport claimed sunk.
85. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; ltr.,
Maj, W.F. Smith to Mrs. Sprague, 14
Apr. 1942; Gambonini diary; History,
27th Bomb. Gp.; 19th Gp. Opns. Record;
Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942.
86. 19th Gp. Diary; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; Sum. of Activities, 20 and 2 2
Feb. 1942.
87. Msg. #AG 381, Brett to Arnold,
18 Feb. 1942.
88. Msg. #ABDA 448A, GHQ Java
to T A G , sgd. Brett, 18 Feb. 1942; msg.
#z, Brett to Marshall, 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#s, Java to AGWAR, 2 1 Feb. 1942.
89. Msg. #ABDA 530, Java to TAG,
sgd. Brett, 23 Feb. 1942.
90. Msg. $12, Brett to AGWAR, 2 2
Feb. 1942; GO 18, Hq. FEAF, 24 Feb.
1942; Sum. of Activities, 24 Feb. 1942;
msg., ABDA to Arnold, sgd. Naiden, 25
Feb. 1942; T h e Brereton Diaries, pp. 98-
99. Brereton states here that Brett gave
him his choice of theater, Australia or
India, and that he chose India.
91. Msg. #DBA 19, CCS to ABDA-
COM, 20 Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Cam-
paign, P. 44.
92. Memo for C/S from AAF Hq.,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #409, Arnold to Brett,
24 Feb. 1942. Actually it had been in-
tended in Washington that both Brett