“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 9 1 - 9 6
Feb. 1942; History, 27th Bomb. Gp.;
Sum. of Activities, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
71. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.
72. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Sum. of
Activities, 17 Feb. 1942, which places the
time of attack a t 1020.
73. Msg., ABDACOM to Barnes,
USAFIA, 4 Feb. 1942; Gen. Sir Archi-
bald Wavell, Despatch on Operations in
South-West Pacific, 15 Jam-25 Feb. 1942.
74. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I: #13, Brett to C G USAFIA, 5 Feb.
1942, Doc. 749; Batavia to Army, Mel-
bourne, 9 Feb. 1942, Doc. 748; #zr, Brett
to USAFIA, 1 3 Feb. 1942, Doc. 757. See
also msg. #14, Brett to USAFIA, 12 Feb.
1942; msg. #zo, Brett to USAFIA, 1 2
Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
75. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 3 6
37; msg., ABDA &A, ABDACOM to
USAFIA, 16 Feb. 1942.
76. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; GO 27,
Hq. Allied Air Forces, 1 1 July 1942; GO
1 1 , Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Gambonini diary; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; 19th Gp. Diary; History, 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Sum. of Activities, 19 Feb.
1942; GO 2, Hq. S W P Command, 15
Feb. 1942; GO 20, Hq. Allied Air Forces,
20 June 1942. JANAC, Jap Losses does
not list any shipping sunk by army air-
craft on these days.
77. Msg. #z6 from Java, 20 Feb. 1942;
19th Gp. Opns. Record; GO 40, GHQ,
3 Oct. 1942; GO 20 and 38, Hq. Fifth
AF, 12 Oct. and 2 Dec. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; Gambonini diary; Sum.
of Activities, 19 Feb. 1942.
78. USSBS Intrs. 479 and 113, Capts.
M. Genda and M. Fuchido.
79. T h e warning had come from
General Marshall who stated that there
were indications that enemy carrier op-
erations might be expected on the
northeast coast of Australia. (Msg. #235,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, 2 [ ? I Feb.
80. Ltr., Oestreicher to Wurtsmith,
21 July 1942, Doc. 932, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I.
81. Ibid.; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , z z Feb. 1 9 2 .
36-37.
1942.)
7 ’ 2
8 2 . GO 27 and 62, GHQ, I Sept. and
23 Dec. 1942; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , 2 2 Feb. 1942; ltr., Oestreicher to
Wurtsmith, 2 1 July 1942, Doc. 932, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ; Report
of Air Attack on Base Section No. One,
24 Feb. 1942, Doc. 799, ibid.
83. Msg. #78, Melbourne to MILID,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #293, Melbourne to
AGWAR, 20 Feb. 1942; msg. #298, Mel-
bourne to T A G , 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#308, Melbourne to T A G , 2 1 Feb. 1942;
Doc. 799, as cited in n. 82.
84. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 40-
44; 19th Gp. Opns. Record; 19th Gp.
Diary; Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942,
which records FEAF losses for the day
as “five B-I~’s, five P-40’s and two dive
bombers.. .to combat activity, anti
aircraft and straffing inflicted by enemy
action.” JANAC, Jap Losses does not
confirm the transport claimed sunk.
85. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; ltr.,
Maj, W.F. Smith to Mrs. Sprague, 14
Apr. 1942; Gambonini diary; History,
27th Bomb. Gp.; 19th Gp. Opns. Record;
Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942.
86. 19th Gp. Diary; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; Sum. of Activities, 20 and 2 2
Feb. 1942.
87. Msg. #AG 381, Brett to Arnold,
18 Feb. 1942.
88. Msg. #ABDA 448A, GHQ Java
to T A G , sgd. Brett, 18 Feb. 1942; msg.
#z, Brett to Marshall, 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#s, Java to AGWAR, 2 1 Feb. 1942.
89. Msg. #ABDA 530, Java to TAG,
sgd. Brett, 23 Feb. 1942.
90. Msg. $12, Brett to AGWAR, 2 2
Feb. 1942; GO 18, Hq. FEAF, 24 Feb.
1942; Sum. of Activities, 24 Feb. 1942;
msg., ABDA to Arnold, sgd. Naiden, 25
Feb. 1942; T h e Brereton Diaries, pp. 98-
99. Brereton states here that Brett gave
him his choice of theater, Australia or
India, and that he chose India.
91. Msg. #DBA 19, CCS to ABDA-
COM, 20 Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Cam-
paign, P. 44.
92. Memo for C/S from AAF Hq.,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #409, Arnold to Brett,
24 Feb. 1942. Actually it had been in-
tended in Washington that both Brett