“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 9 1 - 9 6
Feb. 1942; History, 27th Bomb. Gp.;
Sum. of Activities, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
71. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.
72. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Sum. of
Activities, 17 Feb. 1942, which places the
time of attack a t 1020.
73. Msg., ABDACOM to Barnes,
USAFIA, 4 Feb. 1942; Gen. Sir Archi-
bald Wavell, Despatch on Operations in
South-West Pacific, 15 Jam-25 Feb. 1942.
74. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I: #13, Brett to C G USAFIA, 5 Feb.
1942, Doc. 749; Batavia to Army, Mel-
bourne, 9 Feb. 1942, Doc. 748; #zr, Brett
to USAFIA, 1 3 Feb. 1942, Doc. 757. See
also msg. #14, Brett to USAFIA, 12 Feb.
1942; msg. #zo, Brett to USAFIA, 1 2
Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Campaign, pp.
75. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 3 6
37; msg., ABDA &A, ABDACOM to
USAFIA, 16 Feb. 1942.
76. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; GO 27,
Hq. Allied Air Forces, 1 1 July 1942; GO
1 1 , Hq. Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942;
Gambonini diary; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; 19th Gp. Diary; History, 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Sum. of Activities, 19 Feb.
1942; GO 2, Hq. S W P Command, 15
Feb. 1942; GO 20, Hq. Allied Air Forces,
20 June 1942. JANAC, Jap Losses does
not list any shipping sunk by army air-
craft on these days.
77. Msg. #z6 from Java, 20 Feb. 1942;
19th Gp. Opns. Record; GO 40, GHQ,
3 Oct. 1942; GO 20 and 38, Hq. Fifth
AF, 12 Oct. and 2 Dec. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; Gambonini diary; Sum.
of Activities, 19 Feb. 1942.
78. USSBS Intrs. 479 and 113, Capts.
M. Genda and M. Fuchido.
79. T h e warning had come from
General Marshall who stated that there
were indications that enemy carrier op-
erations might be expected on the
northeast coast of Australia. (Msg. #235,
Marshall to C G USAFIA, 2 [ ? I Feb.
80. Ltr., Oestreicher to Wurtsmith,
21 July 1942, Doc. 932, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I.
81. Ibid.; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , z z Feb. 1 9 2 .
36-37.
1942.)
7 ’ 2
8 2 . GO 27 and 62, GHQ, I Sept. and
23 Dec. 1942; msg. #309, Melbourne to
T A G , 2 2 Feb. 1942; ltr., Oestreicher to
Wurtsmith, 2 1 July 1942, Doc. 932, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ; Report
of Air Attack on Base Section No. One,
24 Feb. 1942, Doc. 799, ibid.
83. Msg. #78, Melbourne to MILID,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #293, Melbourne to
AGWAR, 20 Feb. 1942; msg. #298, Mel-
bourne to T A G , 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#308, Melbourne to T A G , 2 1 Feb. 1942;
Doc. 799, as cited in n. 82.
84. The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 40-
44; 19th Gp. Opns. Record; 19th Gp.
Diary; Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942,
which records FEAF losses for the day
as “five B-I~’s, five P-40’s and two dive
bombers.. .to combat activity, anti
aircraft and straffing inflicted by enemy
action.” JANAC, Jap Losses does not
confirm the transport claimed sunk.
85. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; ltr.,
Maj, W.F. Smith to Mrs. Sprague, 14
Apr. 1942; Gambonini diary; History,
27th Bomb. Gp.; 19th Gp. Opns. Record;
Sum. of Activities, 20 Feb. 1942.
86. 19th Gp. Diary; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; Sum. of Activities, 20 and 2 2
Feb. 1942.
87. Msg. #AG 381, Brett to Arnold,
18 Feb. 1942.
88. Msg. #ABDA 448A, GHQ Java
to T A G , sgd. Brett, 18 Feb. 1942; msg.
#z, Brett to Marshall, 20 Feb. 1942; msg.
#s, Java to AGWAR, 2 1 Feb. 1942.
89. Msg. #ABDA 530, Java to TAG,
sgd. Brett, 23 Feb. 1942.
90. Msg. $12, Brett to AGWAR, 2 2
Feb. 1942; GO 18, Hq. FEAF, 24 Feb.
1942; Sum. of Activities, 24 Feb. 1942;
msg., ABDA to Arnold, sgd. Naiden, 25
Feb. 1942; T h e Brereton Diaries, pp. 98-
99. Brereton states here that Brett gave
him his choice of theater, Australia or
India, and that he chose India.
91. Msg. #DBA 19, CCS to ABDA-
COM, 20 Feb. 1942; The Java Sea Cam-
paign, P. 44.
92. Memo for C/S from AAF Hq.,
20 Feb. 1942; msg. #409, Arnold to Brett,
24 Feb. 1942. Actually it had been in-
tended in Washington that both Brett