“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 8 5 - 9 0
tance. The flight leader took off with
the 8 P-40’s already serviced, preparing
for an attack. The flight of 8 was at-
tacked by 16 ‘0 type fighters and the
ensuing battle lasted from 15-20 minutes.
The flight of 8 P-40’s landed later at
Soerabaja. Word was received that after
the take off, the field was attacked by 31
twin-engined bombers which dropped
bombs on the field destroying the 5 re-
maining P-40’s.” (Sum. of Activities, 5
Feb. 1942.)
64. Capt. Cecil C. Knudsen’s diary, I
Jan-27 Dec. 1942; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Gam-
bonini diary; ltr., Maj. John H. Davies
to CO, 91st Bomb. Sq., 3 Feb. 1942, in
History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; msg. #7, Brett
to AGWAR, 11 Feb. 1942; Fisher report,
as cited in n. 5 0 ; msg., Barnes to CO,
Base #3, Brisbane, 26 Jan. 1942.
65. Fisher report; Lane interview;
History, 17th Pursuit Sq.
66. Msg. # I , Brett to TAG, 2 Feb.
1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb.
IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T A G , 10 Feb.
1942; msg., Brett to AGWAR, 7 Feb.
1942; msg. #ABDA 181, ABDACOM to
Magruder, z Feb. 1942; Brady interview.
67. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg.
#231, Brett to Marshall, 7 Feb. 1942; Lt.
Col. John A. Rouse’s diary, 7 Dec. 1941-
2 s Nov. 1942. Entries in the FEAF
Summary of Activities through February
provide chiefly an incomplete record of
combat operations. An entry for 3 Feb-
ruary shows an aircraft status of 10 B-
17’s and 3 LB-~o’s, of which “all but one
B-17 and one LB-30 were on missions as
scheduled,” and for 4 February, the
notation reads as follows: “Available:
seven P-~o’s, eight B-17’s (undergoing
routine maintenance) and one LB-30.”
68. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg. $ 2 ,
from Bandoeng, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. $ 2 5 ,
Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; G O 2 7 and
35, GHQ SWPA, I and 16 Sept. 1942;
GO 4, 1 1 , 20, 26, 37, 38, and 5 2 , Fifth
Air Force, 6, 30 Sept., 1 2 , 31 Oct., 2 7
Nov., z and 16 Dec. 1942.
69. Brady interview; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; 19th Gp. Diary.
70. Msg., ABDACOM #o135, 17 Feb.
1 9 4 2 ; msg. #IO, Java to AGWAR, 18
7 1 1
ABDACOM, 10 Feb. 1942. T h e W a r
Department replied to one complaint
that unit loading had been studied and
was not considered practicable in view of
the shipping situation. (Msg. #1/249,
Adams to C G USAFIA, 1 5 Jan. 1942.)
55. History, 7th Bomb. Gp.
56. Msg., Melbourne to TAG, sgd.
Clagett, 9 Jan. 1942; ltr., Lt. Robert H.
Ode11 to AC/S, G--2, 27 Jan. 1942.
57. Brady interview; msg., Wagner,
Mahoney, Strauss to [WD], I Feb. 1942,
Doc. 65, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I ; msg., Lee to US. MA, 4 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 805, ibid.
58. Weller, “Luck to the Fighters,”
pp. 269, 280; History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. 2 , I Jan.4 Mar. 1942.
59. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; msg.,
Hq. USAFIA, Melbourne to CO Hq.
USA, Brisbane, 1 2 Jan. 1942, Doc. 958,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I .
60. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Lt. Col.
W.A. Sheppard and Maj. E.B. Gilmore
statement, I Feb. 1945; Weller, “Luck to
the Fighters,” pp. 281-83; interview with
Maj. Alan D. Moore, 2 0 Jan. 1944.
61. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I : Brereton to Wavell, z z Jan. 1942,
Doc. 159; Brereton to CO, Base #3, 24
Jan. 1942, Doc. 975; Brereton to CO,
RAAF, Station Amberley, 24 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 978; Brereton to CO, Base # z ,
Townsville, 26 Jan. 1942, Doc. 980; Brett
to Hq. USAFIA, 27 Jan. 1942, Doc. 983;
Brett to AGWAR, I Feb. 1942, Doc. 165.
See also interview with Lt. Col. William
Lane, Jr., 15 May 1944.
62. Lane interview; diary of Maj.
Paul B. Garnbonini, 29 Jan. to I Mar.
1942.
63. See sources in n. 62 and also msg.
#25, Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. # I ,
from Bandoeng, 6 Feb. 1942; GO 12, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, 2 5 May 1942; GO 2 5 ,
GHQ SWPA, 27 Aug. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; msg. #ABDA 256, 9
Feb. 1942, ABDACOM to Arnold. Early
reports to FEAF headquarters indicated:
“A flight of 13 P-40’s took off from
Koepang and landed at Den Passar.
While servicing was in progress at Den
Passar a plane was sighted in the dis-