“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 8 5 - 9 0
tance. The flight leader took off with
the 8 P-40’s already serviced, preparing
for an attack. The flight of 8 was at-
tacked by 16 ‘0 type fighters and the
ensuing battle lasted from 15-20 minutes.
The flight of 8 P-40’s landed later at
Soerabaja. Word was received that after
the take off, the field was attacked by 31
twin-engined bombers which dropped
bombs on the field destroying the 5 re-
maining P-40’s.” (Sum. of Activities, 5
Feb. 1942.)
64. Capt. Cecil C. Knudsen’s diary, I
Jan-27 Dec. 1942; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Gam-
bonini diary; ltr., Maj. John H. Davies
to CO, 91st Bomb. Sq., 3 Feb. 1942, in
History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; msg. #7, Brett
to AGWAR, 11 Feb. 1942; Fisher report,
as cited in n. 5 0 ; msg., Barnes to CO,
Base #3, Brisbane, 26 Jan. 1942.
65. Fisher report; Lane interview;
History, 17th Pursuit Sq.
66. Msg. # I , Brett to TAG, 2 Feb.
1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb.
IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T A G , 10 Feb.
1942; msg., Brett to AGWAR, 7 Feb.
1942; msg. #ABDA 181, ABDACOM to
Magruder, z Feb. 1942; Brady interview.
67. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg.
#231, Brett to Marshall, 7 Feb. 1942; Lt.
Col. John A. Rouse’s diary, 7 Dec. 1941-
2 s Nov. 1942. Entries in the FEAF
Summary of Activities through February
provide chiefly an incomplete record of
combat operations. An entry for 3 Feb-
ruary shows an aircraft status of 10 B-
17’s and 3 LB-~o’s, of which “all but one
B-17 and one LB-30 were on missions as
scheduled,” and for 4 February, the
notation reads as follows: “Available:
seven P-~o’s, eight B-17’s (undergoing
routine maintenance) and one LB-30.”
68. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg. $ 2 ,
from Bandoeng, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. $ 2 5 ,
Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; G O 2 7 and
35, GHQ SWPA, I and 16 Sept. 1942;
GO 4, 1 1 , 20, 26, 37, 38, and 5 2 , Fifth
Air Force, 6, 30 Sept., 1 2 , 31 Oct., 2 7
Nov., z and 16 Dec. 1942.
69. Brady interview; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; 19th Gp. Diary.
70. Msg., ABDACOM #o135, 17 Feb.
1 9 4 2 ; msg. #IO, Java to AGWAR, 18
7 1 1
ABDACOM, 10 Feb. 1942. T h e W a r
Department replied to one complaint
that unit loading had been studied and
was not considered practicable in view of
the shipping situation. (Msg. #1/249,
Adams to C G USAFIA, 1 5 Jan. 1942.)
55. History, 7th Bomb. Gp.
56. Msg., Melbourne to TAG, sgd.
Clagett, 9 Jan. 1942; ltr., Lt. Robert H.
Ode11 to AC/S, G--2, 27 Jan. 1942.
57. Brady interview; msg., Wagner,
Mahoney, Strauss to [WD], I Feb. 1942,
Doc. 65, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I ; msg., Lee to US. MA, 4 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 805, ibid.
58. Weller, “Luck to the Fighters,”
pp. 269, 280; History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. 2 , I Jan.4 Mar. 1942.
59. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; msg.,
Hq. USAFIA, Melbourne to CO Hq.
USA, Brisbane, 1 2 Jan. 1942, Doc. 958,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I .
60. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Lt. Col.
W.A. Sheppard and Maj. E.B. Gilmore
statement, I Feb. 1945; Weller, “Luck to
the Fighters,” pp. 281-83; interview with
Maj. Alan D. Moore, 2 0 Jan. 1944.
61. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I : Brereton to Wavell, z z Jan. 1942,
Doc. 159; Brereton to CO, Base #3, 24
Jan. 1942, Doc. 975; Brereton to CO,
RAAF, Station Amberley, 24 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 978; Brereton to CO, Base # z ,
Townsville, 26 Jan. 1942, Doc. 980; Brett
to Hq. USAFIA, 27 Jan. 1942, Doc. 983;
Brett to AGWAR, I Feb. 1942, Doc. 165.
See also interview with Lt. Col. William
Lane, Jr., 15 May 1944.
62. Lane interview; diary of Maj.
Paul B. Garnbonini, 29 Jan. to I Mar.
1942.
63. See sources in n. 62 and also msg.
#25, Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. # I ,
from Bandoeng, 6 Feb. 1942; GO 12, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, 2 5 May 1942; GO 2 5 ,
GHQ SWPA, 27 Aug. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; msg. #ABDA 256, 9
Feb. 1942, ABDACOM to Arnold. Early
reports to FEAF headquarters indicated:
“A flight of 13 P-40’s took off from
Koepang and landed at Den Passar.
While servicing was in progress at Den
Passar a plane was sighted in the dis-