“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 8 5 - 9 0
tance. The flight leader took off with
the 8 P-40’s already serviced, preparing
for an attack. The flight of 8 was at-
tacked by 16 ‘0 type fighters and the
ensuing battle lasted from 15-20 minutes.
The flight of 8 P-40’s landed later at
Soerabaja. Word was received that after
the take off, the field was attacked by 31
twin-engined bombers which dropped
bombs on the field destroying the 5 re-
maining P-40’s.” (Sum. of Activities, 5
Feb. 1942.)
64. Capt. Cecil C. Knudsen’s diary, I
Jan-27 Dec. 1942; 19th Gp. Opns. Rec-
ord; History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Gam-
bonini diary; ltr., Maj. John H. Davies
to CO, 91st Bomb. Sq., 3 Feb. 1942, in
History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; msg. #7, Brett
to AGWAR, 11 Feb. 1942; Fisher report,
as cited in n. 5 0 ; msg., Barnes to CO,
Base #3, Brisbane, 26 Jan. 1942.
65. Fisher report; Lane interview;
History, 17th Pursuit Sq.
66. Msg. # I , Brett to TAG, 2 Feb.
1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb.
IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T A G , 10 Feb.
1942; msg., Brett to AGWAR, 7 Feb.
1942; msg. #ABDA 181, ABDACOM to
Magruder, z Feb. 1942; Brady interview.
67. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg.
#231, Brett to Marshall, 7 Feb. 1942; Lt.
Col. John A. Rouse’s diary, 7 Dec. 1941-
2 s Nov. 1942. Entries in the FEAF
Summary of Activities through February
provide chiefly an incomplete record of
combat operations. An entry for 3 Feb-
ruary shows an aircraft status of 10 B-
17’s and 3 LB-~o’s, of which “all but one
B-17 and one LB-30 were on missions as
scheduled,” and for 4 February, the
notation reads as follows: “Available:
seven P-~o’s, eight B-17’s (undergoing
routine maintenance) and one LB-30.”
68. 19th Gp. Opns. Record; msg. $ 2 ,
from Bandoeng, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. $ 2 5 ,
Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; G O 2 7 and
35, GHQ SWPA, I and 16 Sept. 1942;
GO 4, 1 1 , 20, 26, 37, 38, and 5 2 , Fifth
Air Force, 6, 30 Sept., 1 2 , 31 Oct., 2 7
Nov., z and 16 Dec. 1942.
69. Brady interview; 19th Gp. Opns.
Record; 19th Gp. Diary.
70. Msg., ABDACOM #o135, 17 Feb.
1 9 4 2 ; msg. #IO, Java to AGWAR, 18
7 1 1
ABDACOM, 10 Feb. 1942. T h e W a r
Department replied to one complaint
that unit loading had been studied and
was not considered practicable in view of
the shipping situation. (Msg. #1/249,
Adams to C G USAFIA, 1 5 Jan. 1942.)
55. History, 7th Bomb. Gp.
56. Msg., Melbourne to TAG, sgd.
Clagett, 9 Jan. 1942; ltr., Lt. Robert H.
Ode11 to AC/S, G--2, 27 Jan. 1942.
57. Brady interview; msg., Wagner,
Mahoney, Strauss to [WD], I Feb. 1942,
Doc. 65, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I ; msg., Lee to US. MA, 4 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 805, ibid.
58. Weller, “Luck to the Fighters,”
pp. 269, 280; History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. 2 , I Jan.4 Mar. 1942.
59. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; msg.,
Hq. USAFIA, Melbourne to CO Hq.
USA, Brisbane, 1 2 Jan. 1942, Doc. 958,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I .
60. History, 17th Pursuit Sq.; Lt. Col.
W.A. Sheppard and Maj. E.B. Gilmore
statement, I Feb. 1945; Weller, “Luck to
the Fighters,” pp. 281-83; interview with
Maj. Alan D. Moore, 2 0 Jan. 1944.
61. Msgs. in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I : Brereton to Wavell, z z Jan. 1942,
Doc. 159; Brereton to CO, Base #3, 24
Jan. 1942, Doc. 975; Brereton to CO,
RAAF, Station Amberley, 24 Jan. 1942,
Doc. 978; Brereton to CO, Base # z ,
Townsville, 26 Jan. 1942, Doc. 980; Brett
to Hq. USAFIA, 27 Jan. 1942, Doc. 983;
Brett to AGWAR, I Feb. 1942, Doc. 165.
See also interview with Lt. Col. William
Lane, Jr., 15 May 1944.
62. Lane interview; diary of Maj.
Paul B. Garnbonini, 29 Jan. to I Mar.
1942.
63. See sources in n. 62 and also msg.
#25, Java to TAG, 9 Feb. 1942; msg. # I ,
from Bandoeng, 6 Feb. 1942; GO 12, Hq.
Allied Air Forces, 2 5 May 1942; GO 2 5 ,
GHQ SWPA, 27 Aug. 1942; History,
17th Pursuit Sq.; msg. #ABDA 256, 9
Feb. 1942, ABDACOM to Arnold. Early
reports to FEAF headquarters indicated:
“A flight of 13 P-40’s took off from
Koepang and landed at Den Passar.
While servicing was in progress at Den
Passar a plane was sighted in the dis-