“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 7 5 - 7 9
24. JCCSs-9, 1 1 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-10,
2 5 . History, Dir. of Air Transport.
2 6 . Msg. #CRO918, Adams to CG
USAF, Darwin, 31 Dec. 1941.
27. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942; Minutes of Mtg.,
Administrative Manning Comm., 5 Jan.
1942, Doc. 658, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt, I ; Sum. of Activities, 3 and 4
Jan. 1942, which provides a record of
conferences at Melbourne between key
American and Australian officials. At
these conferences Brett expressed his
conclusion “that Brisbane (Eagle Farm)
was the best location for the primary
base and construction and maintenance
depots”; he suggested “that reception
camp be located in Victoria”; and
Townsville “was designated as an ad-
vance assembly and secondary mainte-
nance depot base and the possibility of
dispersal was discussed, particularly
Chasters [sic.] Towers.” The discussion
of the problem a t Darwin included:
additional airdrome facilities, supplies, a
forward depot, dispersal facilities, and
lines of communication. The discussions
at Melbourne continued through the 7th;
on the Sth, Brereton flew w<th Sir
Charles Burnett to Darwin on the way
to Java. (See above, n. 5 . )
28. USSBS (Pacific) Interrogations
67, Capt. M. Fujita, staff of zd Fleet, 20
Oct. 1945; 74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi,
staff of 11th Air Fleet, 20 Oct. 1945; 90,
Capt. Kawakita hhihara, staff of 3d Fleet,
n.d.; 94, Comdr. Yutaka Isawa, on
H m u , 1 2 Oct. 1945; 331, Capt. Mitsugo
Ihara, staff of 3d Fleet, 10 Nov. 194:;
387, Capt. Kameo Sonokawa, Gensan Air
Gp., 14 Nov. 1945; 601, Comdr. Ryosuke
Nomura, staff of 23d Air Flotilla, 28
Nov. 1945; Office of Naval Intel., The
Java Sea Campaign.
29. Interview with Lt. Col. E.E.
Northcutt, n.d.; T W X # I , Bandoeng to
G 2 , 13 Jan. 1942. On Brereton’s depar-
ture from Soerabaja late on 2 8 December
1941, Eubank had remained “to direct
bomber activities from there,” and on
the general’s arrival at Darwin the next
day, Maj. Cecil E. Combs informed him
that there were “14 complete combat
1 2 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-12, 14 Jan. 1942.
crews available.. . 14 B-17’s, 9 of which
can operate at once on N.E.I. mission
and three ( 3 ) of the remaining five can
probably be placed in commission, others
will require depot overhaul.” (Sum. of
Activities, 28 and 2 9 Dec. 1941.)
30. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942; FEAF Hq. Diary,
Doc. 28, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I ; msg., ABDACOM to Army, Mel-
bourne, recd. 2 2 Jan. 1942, Doc. 401,
ibid. The headquarters of the ABDA
Command was established at Lembang,
approximately ten miles from Bandoeng,
on 18 January. (The Java Sea Campaign,
1 3 . ) The FEAF Summary of Activi-
$es records the following notes of a
conference between Brett and Brerecon
in Batavia on 10 January: “ I . General
Brett desires to make immediately avail-
able all ammunition and bombs for N.E.I.
z. Preparation to be made for air corps
troops (consult with Barnes). 3 . Brady,
Lamb, Hipps, Hobbs and Hampton also
Walsh to be moved to N.E.I. 4. A com-
plete survey of airdromes on Java will be
made immediately. 5. Transportation:
Trucks and Cars. 6. Secret line between
Soerabaja and Batavia will be arranged
for.”
31. 19th Gp. Opns. Record. This re-
port claims a DD sunk and a BB hit.
But there were apparently no battleships
at Davao at this time and Japanese rec-
ords do not mention the DD as having
been sunk. They do mention a cruiser as
having been severely damaged. (Ens.
Toshio Nakamura’s Notebook, Joint
Intel. Center, POA, Navy # 1 2 8 ; USSBS
Intr. 90, Capt. K. Ishihara.) The Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commirtee does
not list any war vessel as having been
sunk at this time. (Japanese Naval and
Merchant Losses during World War 11,
Feb. 1947 [hereinafter cited as JANAC,
Jap Losses].)
3 2 . 19th Gp. Opns. Record.
3 3 . The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 14-
1 5 ; Hart, Narrative of Events. In these
operations on 1 1 and 1 2 January, two
Japanese pursuits were shot down. One
American PBY, one Dutch Catalina, and
four Australian Hudsons were lost.
(Msg., Merle-Smith to MILID, 13 Jan.
1942, Doc. 770, in History, Fifth Air
709