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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor- rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
  • p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of World W a r I…
  • p. 47 …being made up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French…
  • p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its…
  • p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force, usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
  • p. 114 …I when a British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist…
  • p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain…
  • p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
  • p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain The German bombing of Britain in World…
  • p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the…
  • p. 131 …it was hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off any German…
  • p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air over rhe…
  • p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug- gest that the…
  • p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were…
  • p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under- standing ally. It is…
  • p. 171 …British requirements amounted to 49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
  • p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
  • p. 290 …to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was…
  • p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF, magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt, rapidly went beyond the…
  • p. 341 …enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those…
  • p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
  • p. 369 …The majority of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com- mand…
  • p. 391 …of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
  • p. 398 …an initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of Germany. Questions remained regarding…
  • p. 404 …air force personnel were concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on the…
  • p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs, and cadres of American pilots and ground…
  • p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
  • p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
  • p. 557 …Even when the enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and A…
  • p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal run should be between the RAF base a…
  • p. 566 …Unable to challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF and A V…
  • p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese were using…
  • p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
  • p. 610 …Fleet Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained for sea search and…
  • p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
  • p. 615 …it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to…
  • p. 619 …On the tactical side, valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew which flew two…
  • p. 626 …bomber crews flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy airfields." During the seven…
  • p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut was contemplated; and…
  • p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
  • p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
  • p. 634 …T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as…
  • p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
  • p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
  • p. 637 …I ) allocate to Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according to an…
  • p. 647 …TRIGGER, a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
  • p. 648 …important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
  • p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be made for two chains of command-that of the…
  • p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ; and while it provided…
  • p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force…
  • p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor…
  • p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5 It is significant that this…
  • p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations in…
  • p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF bomber offensive and criticized…
  • p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined attack on Germany, the RAF…
  • p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 7 5 - 7 9
24. JCCSs-9, 1 1 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-10,
2 5 . History, Dir. of Air Transport.
2 6 . Msg. #CRO918, Adams to CG
USAF, Darwin, 31 Dec. 1941.
27. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942; Minutes of Mtg.,
Administrative Manning Comm., 5 Jan.
1942, Doc. 658, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt, I ; Sum. of Activities, 3 and 4
Jan. 1942, which provides a record of
conferences at Melbourne between key
American and Australian officials. At
these conferences Brett expressed his
conclusion “that Brisbane (Eagle Farm)
was the best location for the primary
base and construction and maintenance
depots”; he suggested “that reception
camp be located in Victoria”; and
Townsville “was designated as an ad-
vance assembly and secondary mainte-
nance depot base and the possibility of
dispersal was discussed, particularly
Chasters [sic.] Towers.” The discussion
of the problem a t Darwin included:
additional airdrome facilities, supplies, a
forward depot, dispersal facilities, and
lines of communication. The discussions
at Melbourne continued through the 7th;
on the Sth, Brereton flew w<th Sir
Charles Burnett to Darwin on the way
to Java. (See above, n. 5 . )
28. USSBS (Pacific) Interrogations
67, Capt. M. Fujita, staff of zd Fleet, 20
Oct. 1945; 74, Capt. Chihaya Takahashi,
staff of 11th Air Fleet, 20 Oct. 1945; 90,
Capt. Kawakita hhihara, staff of 3d Fleet,
n.d.; 94, Comdr. Yutaka Isawa, on
H m u , 1 2 Oct. 1945; 331, Capt. Mitsugo
Ihara, staff of 3d Fleet, 10 Nov. 194:;
387, Capt. Kameo Sonokawa, Gensan Air
Gp., 14 Nov. 1945; 601, Comdr. Ryosuke
Nomura, staff of 23d Air Flotilla, 28
Nov. 1945; Office of Naval Intel., The
Java Sea Campaign.
29. Interview with Lt. Col. E.E.
Northcutt, n.d.; T W X # I , Bandoeng to
G 2 , 13 Jan. 1942. On Brereton’s depar-
ture from Soerabaja late on 2 8 December
1941, Eubank had remained “to direct
bomber activities from there,” and on
the general’s arrival at Darwin the next
day, Maj. Cecil E. Combs informed him
that there were “14 complete combat
1 2 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-12, 14 Jan. 1942.
crews available.. . 14 B-17’s, 9 of which
can operate at once on N.E.I. mission
and three ( 3 ) of the remaining five can
probably be placed in commission, others
will require depot overhaul.” (Sum. of
Activities, 28 and 2 9 Dec. 1941.)
30. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942; FEAF Hq. Diary,
Doc. 28, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt.
I ; msg., ABDACOM to Army, Mel-
bourne, recd. 2 2 Jan. 1942, Doc. 401,
ibid. The headquarters of the ABDA
Command was established at Lembang,
approximately ten miles from Bandoeng,
on 18 January. (The Java Sea Campaign,
1 3 . ) The FEAF Summary of Activi-
$es records the following notes of a
conference between Brett and Brerecon
in Batavia on 10 January: “ I . General
Brett desires to make immediately avail-
able all ammunition and bombs for N.E.I.
z. Preparation to be made for air corps
troops (consult with Barnes). 3 . Brady,
Lamb, Hipps, Hobbs and Hampton also
Walsh to be moved to N.E.I. 4. A com-
plete survey of airdromes on Java will be
made immediately. 5. Transportation:
Trucks and Cars. 6. Secret line between
Soerabaja and Batavia will be arranged
for.”
31. 19th Gp. Opns. Record. This re-
port claims a DD sunk and a BB hit.
But there were apparently no battleships
at Davao at this time and Japanese rec-
ords do not mention the DD as having
been sunk. They do mention a cruiser as
having been severely damaged. (Ens.
Toshio Nakamura’s Notebook, Joint
Intel. Center, POA, Navy # 1 2 8 ; USSBS
Intr. 90, Capt. K. Ishihara.) The Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commirtee does
not list any war vessel as having been
sunk at this time. (Japanese Naval and
Merchant Losses during World War 11,
Feb. 1947 [hereinafter cited as JANAC,
Jap Losses].)
3 2 . 19th Gp. Opns. Record.
3 3 . The Java Sea Campaign, pp. 14-
1 5 ; Hart, Narrative of Events. In these
operations on 1 1 and 1 2 January, two
Japanese pursuits were shot down. One
American PBY, one Dutch Catalina, and
four Australian Hudsons were lost.
(Msg., Merle-Smith to MILID, 13 Jan.
1942, Doc. 770, in History, Fifth Air
709

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