“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 6 0 - 7 0
182. Ibid., pp. 1 0 - 1 1 , 13-15, 56-57.
183. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, 29 May 1941-30 June 1942,
pp. ~ r o o ;Leonard Eiserer, “Army Air
Corps Outhauls all Domestic Carriers in
Volume,” American Aviation, I Aug.
1941, p. 6; excerpt from ltr., Robert E.
Hotz to C/S ASC, 14 Feb. 1942.
184. Ltr., T A G to CG AAF et ul., 3 0
Apr. 1942.
185. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, pp. 122-23.
186. Memo for Col. George from
Gen. Arnold, 24 Mar. 1942.
187. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to C/AS, 1 2
June 1942.
188. L.W. Pogue, Memorandum Con-
cerning W a r Aviation Transport Serv-
ices, 1 5 June 1942, in AAG 210.69H.
189. 1st ind. (ltr., Gen. Arnold to
C/AS, 1 2 June 1942), C/AS to AC/AS,
A-2, 16 June 1942; ltr., AAF to Brig.
Gen. Hume Peabody, 17 June 1942.
1 9 . AAF G O 8, 2 0 June 1942.
191. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, pp. 126-126a.
192. Zbid., pp. 126-28; W D Circular
211, Sec. 111, I July 1942.
193. AAF G O 8, 2 0 June 1942, di-
rected the establishment of those two
main divisions.
194. Ltr., T A G to C G AAFFC, 1 2
June 1942.
195. Ltr., T A G to CG ATC, 5 July
‘942.
196. A T C Statistical Control Div.,
Military Personnel, Air Transport Com-
mand, 1942-44, and Summary of Opera-
tions of the Air Transport Command,
‘9431 pp. 99 11.
197. Lt. Col. Oliver LaFarge, ATC
Transport Aircraft in World War IF: A
Study of Types, Performance, and Fleet
Augmentation, pp. 3-4, in ATC Hist.
file.
198. Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the subject of relations be-
tween the Ferrying Command or the Air
Transport Command and the theaters,
see the following: Lt. Col. Oliver La-
Farge, Control of Strategic Air Trans-
port, 2 0 Oct. 1945; Administrative His-
tory, Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-
3 0 June 1942, pp. 11g-20; Administrative
History, Air Transport Command, June
19qz-Mar. 1943, pp. 136-42; Administra-
tive History, Air Transport Command,
Mar. 1943-July 1,944, pp. 176-93; His-
tory, FC Operations, 7 Dec. 1941-30
2 0 0 . History, FC Operations, pp. 87-
90.
2 0 1 . The Air Transport Command in
the Southwest Pacific, 7 Dec. 1941-1
Aog. 1944, pp. 32-45; Northwest Air
Route to Alaska, 1942-45, pp. 3g-40; La-
Farge, Control of Strategic Air Trans-
port, 20 Oct. 1945.
202. Ltr., T A G to Commander in
Chief, Southwest Pacific Area et al., 6
June 1942.
203. Memo for Gen. Arnold from
Gen. George, 17 Aug. 1942.
June 1942, pp. 87-90.
NOTES T O CHAPTER 10
I . Ltr., Marshall to C G USAFFE, 2 1
Nov. 1941; msg. #650, Adams to C G
2 . ABC-4, JCCSs-2, 2 5 Dec. 1941,and
JCCSs-4, 27 Dec. 1941, US.-British Staff
Conferences, in AFSHO files.
3. ABC-4/MsI JPC, Minutes, 5th
Mtg., 29 Dec. 1941; ABC-4/5; Gen. Sir
Archibald Wavell, Despatch on Opera-
tions in South-West Pacific, 15 Jan-25
Feb. IOAZ.
USAFFE, 29 NOV.1941.
I .
4. Despatch on Operations in South-
West Pacific.
5. Msg. # I , sans origine to TAG, 6
Jan. 1942; msg., Barnes to MacArthur,
9 Jan. 1942; msg. #1/92, Arnold to Brett,
10 Jan. 1942; memo for T A G from Brig.
Gen. L.T. Gerow, 1 2 Jan. 1942; rnsg.,
Brett to Marshall, #ABDA 7, 17 Jan.
1942; msg. #AF 1/209, Marshall to CG
USAFIA, 1 3 Jan. 1942. The daily Sum-
mary of Activities, Headquarters, Far
East Air Force (described above, p. 206,
and hereinafter cited as Sum. of Activi-
ties) indicates that Generals Brett and
Brereton, together with Sir Charles Bur-
nett, Australian chief of air staff, flew
707