“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 6 0 - 7 0
182. Ibid., pp. 1 0 - 1 1 , 13-15, 56-57.
183. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, 29 May 1941-30 June 1942,
pp. ~ r o o ;Leonard Eiserer, “Army Air
Corps Outhauls all Domestic Carriers in
Volume,” American Aviation, I Aug.
1941, p. 6; excerpt from ltr., Robert E.
Hotz to C/S ASC, 14 Feb. 1942.
184. Ltr., T A G to CG AAF et ul., 3 0
Apr. 1942.
185. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, pp. 122-23.
186. Memo for Col. George from
Gen. Arnold, 24 Mar. 1942.
187. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to C/AS, 1 2
June 1942.
188. L.W. Pogue, Memorandum Con-
cerning W a r Aviation Transport Serv-
ices, 1 5 June 1942, in AAG 210.69H.
189. 1st ind. (ltr., Gen. Arnold to
C/AS, 1 2 June 1942), C/AS to AC/AS,
A-2, 16 June 1942; ltr., AAF to Brig.
Gen. Hume Peabody, 17 June 1942.
1 9 . AAF G O 8, 2 0 June 1942.
191. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, pp. 126-126a.
192. Zbid., pp. 126-28; W D Circular
211, Sec. 111, I July 1942.
193. AAF G O 8, 2 0 June 1942, di-
rected the establishment of those two
main divisions.
194. Ltr., T A G to C G AAFFC, 1 2
June 1942.
195. Ltr., T A G to CG ATC, 5 July
‘942.
196. A T C Statistical Control Div.,
Military Personnel, Air Transport Com-
mand, 1942-44, and Summary of Opera-
tions of the Air Transport Command,
‘9431 pp. 99 11.
197. Lt. Col. Oliver LaFarge, ATC
Transport Aircraft in World War IF: A
Study of Types, Performance, and Fleet
Augmentation, pp. 3-4, in ATC Hist.
file.
198. Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the subject of relations be-
tween the Ferrying Command or the Air
Transport Command and the theaters,
see the following: Lt. Col. Oliver La-
Farge, Control of Strategic Air Trans-
port, 2 0 Oct. 1945; Administrative His-
tory, Ferrying Command, 29 May 1941-
3 0 June 1942, pp. 11g-20; Administrative
History, Air Transport Command, June
19qz-Mar. 1943, pp. 136-42; Administra-
tive History, Air Transport Command,
Mar. 1943-July 1,944, pp. 176-93; His-
tory, FC Operations, 7 Dec. 1941-30
2 0 0 . History, FC Operations, pp. 87-
90.
2 0 1 . The Air Transport Command in
the Southwest Pacific, 7 Dec. 1941-1
Aog. 1944, pp. 32-45; Northwest Air
Route to Alaska, 1942-45, pp. 3g-40; La-
Farge, Control of Strategic Air Trans-
port, 20 Oct. 1945.
202. Ltr., T A G to Commander in
Chief, Southwest Pacific Area et al., 6
June 1942.
203. Memo for Gen. Arnold from
Gen. George, 17 Aug. 1942.
June 1942, pp. 87-90.
NOTES T O CHAPTER 10
I . Ltr., Marshall to C G USAFFE, 2 1
Nov. 1941; msg. #650, Adams to C G
2 . ABC-4, JCCSs-2, 2 5 Dec. 1941,and
JCCSs-4, 27 Dec. 1941, US.-British Staff
Conferences, in AFSHO files.
3. ABC-4/MsI JPC, Minutes, 5th
Mtg., 29 Dec. 1941; ABC-4/5; Gen. Sir
Archibald Wavell, Despatch on Opera-
tions in South-West Pacific, 15 Jan-25
Feb. IOAZ.
USAFFE, 29 NOV.1941.
I .
4. Despatch on Operations in South-
West Pacific.
5. Msg. # I , sans origine to TAG, 6
Jan. 1942; msg., Barnes to MacArthur,
9 Jan. 1942; msg. #1/92, Arnold to Brett,
10 Jan. 1942; memo for T A G from Brig.
Gen. L.T. Gerow, 1 2 Jan. 1942; rnsg.,
Brett to Marshall, #ABDA 7, 17 Jan.
1942; msg. #AF 1/209, Marshall to CG
USAFIA, 1 3 Jan. 1942. The daily Sum-
mary of Activities, Headquarters, Far
East Air Force (described above, p. 206,
and hereinafter cited as Sum. of Activi-
ties) indicates that Generals Brett and
Brereton, together with Sir Charles Bur-
nett, Australian chief of air staff, flew
707