“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 4 5 - 5 2
140. Ltr., Col. Milton W. Arnold to
141. Ibid.
142. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz to
CG VIII Fighter Command, 7 May 194:;
ltr., Col. Charles A. Hoek, Acting Dir.
of War Organization & Movement, to
CG Eighth Air Force et al., 17 May 1942.
143. Memo for C G AAF from Brig.
Gen. H.L. George, 3 June 1942.
144. R&R, Maj. Gen. H.L. George to
AFACT, 18 Sept. 1942; ltr., Col. Milton
W. Arnold to C G ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
145. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I, 41-42, 44-41; ltr., Col. C.R. Smith
to C G 23d Ferrying Wing, 19 June 1942;
directive memo for C G A T C from Maj.
Gen. M.F. Harmon, C/AS, 22 June 1942.
146. Memo for C/AC from Col. Olds,
4 Dec. 1941;ACFC Daily Diary, 9, 10
Dec. 1941; minutes of meeting in Gen.
Arnold's office, 9 Dec. 1941, in A T C
337; History, FC Operations, pp. 3-5,
183-88.
147. For an excellent discussion of the
basic advantages of initially using the
airlines, see ltr., Gen. George to C G
AAF, 26 Apr. 1944. See also History, FC
Operations, pp. 8, 188-92; Reginald M.
Cleveland, Air Transport at W a r (New
York, 19461, pp. 42-56.
148. Cleveland, Air Transport at
W a r , pp. 14-20.
r49. History, FC Operations, pp.
2 22-23.
150. Executive Order f8974, 1 3 Dec.
194'.
1 5 1 . Minutes of meeting of Special
Aviation Committee, 14 Dec, 1941, in
ATC Hist. file.
1 5 2 . These figures were supplied by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 20 Jan. 1947,
and include all aircraft except those of
Panagra, which operated over Latin-
American routes exclusively. A larger
number, 434, is given in Air Transporta-
tion, I1 (June 1943)~16, which number
is divided as follows: domestic, 358;
transoceanic, 10; to Latin America, 53;
Hawaii, 6; Alaska, 7.
153. Minutes cited in n. 1 5 1 ; ACFC
Daily Diary, 16 Dec. 1941;ltr., S/W to
C G ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
705
126. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
127. History, 8th Weather Sq. in
128. Ibid., pp. 8, 10.
129. Ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to
TAG, 15 July 1941;memo for C/S from
Gen. Amold, 28 July 1941; ltr., Capt.
Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report #4).
130. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
1 3 1 . Ibid., 85-91; ltr., Lt. Col. J.K.
Gerhart, Inspecting Officer, to CG
Eighth Air Force, I June 1942, and 3d
ind., Lt. Col. Robert M. Love to Dir. of
Air Base Services, z July 1942; memo for
CG AAF from Brig. Gen. H.L. George,
3 June 1942.
132. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 103-16; Annex #4, Opns. Orders
$7-A, Hq. VIll Fighter Command, 18
June 1942.
133. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 486-591.
134. Ibid., 2 2 , 86-88, 290-94.
135. Ibid., 294-303, 318; contract DA
w 535 ac-1476, 3 1 Jan. 1942; ltr., Lt.
Col. Robert M. Love to Northeast Air-
lines, 3 Feb. 1942; Chronology of Inau-
gural Routes and Flights, North Atlantic
Div., 1 5 Feb. 194s.
136. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 311-15; contract DA W 535 ac-
1062, 24 Dec. 1941, and directive No. 9
thereto, 4 Apr. 1942; Pilot's Report,
T W A Survey Trip, 13-24 Apr. 1942;
memo to Col. Mosley from M/Sgt.
Joseph H. Walsh, 8 May 1942.
137. American Airlines Survey Flight,
North Atlantic Route, 24 A p r . 9 May
1942, incl. to ltr., Lt. Col. Robert J.
Smith to Capt. Crocker Snow, 3 June
1942.
138. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. 1, 323-24, 332-34.
139. lbid., 192-94, 196200;R&R, Gen.
Arnold to ACFC, 26 Mar. 1942;ltr,, Gen.
Arnold to Lt. Col. Milton W. Arnold,
9 May 1942; ltr., Col. Milton W. Arnold
to CG ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
Pt. I , 93, 401-2.
Greenland, pp. 2-7.
Pt. I, 131-33, 410-12.