“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 4 5 - 5 2
140. Ltr., Col. Milton W. Arnold to
141. Ibid.
142. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz to
CG VIII Fighter Command, 7 May 194:;
ltr., Col. Charles A. Hoek, Acting Dir.
of War Organization & Movement, to
CG Eighth Air Force et al., 17 May 1942.
143. Memo for C G AAF from Brig.
Gen. H.L. George, 3 June 1942.
144. R&R, Maj. Gen. H.L. George to
AFACT, 18 Sept. 1942; ltr., Col. Milton
W. Arnold to C G ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
145. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I, 41-42, 44-41; ltr., Col. C.R. Smith
to C G 23d Ferrying Wing, 19 June 1942;
directive memo for C G A T C from Maj.
Gen. M.F. Harmon, C/AS, 22 June 1942.
146. Memo for C/AC from Col. Olds,
4 Dec. 1941;ACFC Daily Diary, 9, 10
Dec. 1941; minutes of meeting in Gen.
Arnold's office, 9 Dec. 1941, in A T C
337; History, FC Operations, pp. 3-5,
183-88.
147. For an excellent discussion of the
basic advantages of initially using the
airlines, see ltr., Gen. George to C G
AAF, 26 Apr. 1944. See also History, FC
Operations, pp. 8, 188-92; Reginald M.
Cleveland, Air Transport at W a r (New
York, 19461, pp. 42-56.
148. Cleveland, Air Transport at
W a r , pp. 14-20.
r49. History, FC Operations, pp.
2 22-23.
150. Executive Order f8974, 1 3 Dec.
194'.
1 5 1 . Minutes of meeting of Special
Aviation Committee, 14 Dec, 1941, in
ATC Hist. file.
1 5 2 . These figures were supplied by
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 20 Jan. 1947,
and include all aircraft except those of
Panagra, which operated over Latin-
American routes exclusively. A larger
number, 434, is given in Air Transporta-
tion, I1 (June 1943)~16, which number
is divided as follows: domestic, 358;
transoceanic, 10; to Latin America, 53;
Hawaii, 6; Alaska, 7.
153. Minutes cited in n. 1 5 1 ; ACFC
Daily Diary, 16 Dec. 1941;ltr., S/W to
C G ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
705
126. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
127. History, 8th Weather Sq. in
128. Ibid., pp. 8, 10.
129. Ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt to
TAG, 15 July 1941;memo for C/S from
Gen. Amold, 28 July 1941; ltr., Capt.
Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941 (Report #4).
130. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
1 3 1 . Ibid., 85-91; ltr., Lt. Col. J.K.
Gerhart, Inspecting Officer, to CG
Eighth Air Force, I June 1942, and 3d
ind., Lt. Col. Robert M. Love to Dir. of
Air Base Services, z July 1942; memo for
CG AAF from Brig. Gen. H.L. George,
3 June 1942.
132. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 103-16; Annex #4, Opns. Orders
$7-A, Hq. VIll Fighter Command, 18
June 1942.
133. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 486-591.
134. Ibid., 2 2 , 86-88, 290-94.
135. Ibid., 294-303, 318; contract DA
w 535 ac-1476, 3 1 Jan. 1942; ltr., Lt.
Col. Robert M. Love to Northeast Air-
lines, 3 Feb. 1942; Chronology of Inau-
gural Routes and Flights, North Atlantic
Div., 1 5 Feb. 194s.
136. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. I , 311-15; contract DA W 535 ac-
1062, 24 Dec. 1941, and directive No. 9
thereto, 4 Apr. 1942; Pilot's Report,
T W A Survey Trip, 13-24 Apr. 1942;
memo to Col. Mosley from M/Sgt.
Joseph H. Walsh, 8 May 1942.
137. American Airlines Survey Flight,
North Atlantic Route, 24 A p r . 9 May
1942, incl. to ltr., Lt. Col. Robert J.
Smith to Capt. Crocker Snow, 3 June
1942.
138. History, North Atlantic Div., I,
Pt. 1, 323-24, 332-34.
139. lbid., 192-94, 196200;R&R, Gen.
Arnold to ACFC, 26 Mar. 1942;ltr,, Gen.
Arnold to Lt. Col. Milton W. Arnold,
9 May 1942; ltr., Col. Milton W. Arnold
to CG ATC, 6 Aug. 1943.
Pt. I , 93, 401-2.
Greenland, pp. 2-7.
Pt. I, 131-33, 410-12.