“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 3 0 4 - 1 6
and Relations with Alaska, 1942-45,
chap. i.
173. Ibid.
174. Minutes of the Joint Board, 26
175. History, Eleventh Air Force,
176. Ibid., pp. 90ff.
177. History, Fort Glenn Army Air
Base, Aug. 1941-July 1944, pp. 1-8.
178. History, Eleventh Air Force, pp.
91 ff.
179. Ibid., pp. 118, 128-29, 132, 134-
35, 141; AAFHs4, pp. 50-51.
180. Memo for Chief, Radar Div.
from Maj. E.J. Atkinson, 26 Aug. 1942.
181. Memo for Dir. of Mil. Require-
ments from Col. G.P. Saville, I Sept.
‘942.
182. Ltrs., Hq. WDC to CG Field
Forces, 2 7 and 28 Jan. 1942.
183. R&R, Col. G.P. Saville to
AWPD, 25 Feb. 1942; 2d ind. (basic un-
known), Hq. AAF to Chief of Engineers,
14 Apr. 1942, both in AAG 676-A,
Alaska.
184. Memo for CG AAF from Brig.
Gen. Wm. 0. Butler, CG Eleventh Air
Force, 16 June 1942.
185. History, Eleventh Air Force, p.
116.
NOV. 1941.
Aug. 1940-Sept. 1942, p. 89.
NOTES T O CHAPTER 9
I . Maj. Oliver LaFarge, “Strategic
Air Supply,” Air Transport, I1 (Sept.
1944), 2@25.
2 . J C C ~ I ,Annex I.
3 . See chapters on early operations
over the various routes in History,
Ferrying Command Operations, 7 Dec.
1941-30 June 1942.
4. Ministry of hformation, Atlantic
Bridge, T h e Official Account of R.A.F.
Transport Cornand‘s Ocean Ferry
(London, 1945), pp. 5-19; Summary of
Information covering the organization of
the Atlantic ferry bomber service by the
Canadian Pacific, 25 Mar. 1942, incl. with
ltr., C.H. Dickens, Canadian Pacific Air
Lines, Ltd., to Lt. Col. Fred C. Morgan,
700
2 1 Mar. 1944. The transoceanic ferrying
of aircraft for the Eritish was first under-
taken by the Canadian Pacific Railway’s
Air Services Department, under contract
with the British Ministry of Aircraft
Production. The first delivery by the
Air Services Department was completed
on 1 1 November 1940. In the spring of
1y41 it was determined to transfer direct
control of the operation to the Ministry
of Aircraft Production. ATFERO, the
agency of the ministry for this job, ac-
tudly assumed control as early as March
1y41, although the official notice to the
Canadian Pacific of the proposed can-
cellation of that organization’s contract
was not sent until 27 May 1941. The
formal transfer was made on 15 July. On
I August 1941the RAF Ferry Command,
organized in July, in turn took over the
operation from ATFERO.
5 . Memo for Gen. Arnold from Maj.
E.H. Alexander, 2 1 Mar. 1941;report of
conference in office of Mr. Lovett, 14
Apr. 1941,in AAG 353; memo for Gen.
Brett from H.T. Lewis and Q.W. Coyle,
I 5 Apr. 1941; History, Ferrying Command
Operations, 29 May-7 Dec. 1941, p. 17.
6 . CM-IN, London to T A G (Arnold
for Lovett), #1051, 2 1 Apr. 1941.
7. Ltr., Air Marshal H.C.T. Dowding
to AS/W Robert A. Lovett, 28 Apr.
1941; ltr., British Minister Sir Gerald
Campbell to Sec. of State, 8 May 1941;
memo for C/AC from US/W Robert
P. Patterson, 1 2 May 1941.
8. Memo for Gen. Spaatz from Gen.
Arnold, 26 May 1941; memo for Gen.
Arnold from Gen. Spaatz, 27 May 1941.
9. Ltr., President to S / W , 28 May
‘94’.
10. Administrative History, Ferrying
Command, 29 May 1941-20 June 1942,
pp. 9-10.
1 1 . Ltr., T A G to C G s All Armies
et al., 5 June 1941.
12. When the Ferrying Command
was established the term “ferrying” was
used in a broad sense to include both
the flight delivery of aircraft and the
operation of a back-and-forth service for
the transportation of cargo and pas-
sengers. In time the term came to mean
only the former type of operation in