“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 9 2 - 3 0 3
131. Memo for Arnold from Saville,
3 1 Jan. rgqt.
132. 1st ind. (ltr., C/AAF to CSigO,
8 Feb. 1942)~OCSigO to C/AAF, 1 1
Feb. 1942.
1 3 3 . Memo for C/AAF from AWPD
(Col. George), z Feb. 1942.
134. Ltr., CG I Interceptor Command
to CG First Air Force, 18 Feb. 1942.
1 3 5 . Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower ( W D OPD), 1 5 Apr. 1942.
136. For a detailed account of estab-
lishment of a V H F net, see Fourth Air
Force Historical Study 111-2, pp. 234-50.
137. “Longhairs and Short Waves,”
Fortune, Nov. 1945.
138. Ibid.
139. A G 371 (12-19-41) MSC-E-M,
Creation of Eastern Theater of Opera-
tions, 20 Dec. 1941.See also GO I , East-
ern Theater of Operations, 21 Dec. 1941,
Doc. 10, in History, First Air Force,
Vol. I.
140. A G 320.2 (12-30-41) MSC-C-M,
Allocation of AAF Units and Associated
Services, and the Assignment of Air
Bases and Observation Airdromes may
be found as Doc. I, in Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, or as Doc. 1 1 , in
History, First Air Force, Vol. I.
141. See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, pp. 208 ff.
142. A G 381 (3-11-42) MC-E-M,
Defense of Continental US., 18 Mar.
1942.
143. For the initial organization of
AAF, see AAF Reg. 2 0 - 1 , 3 1 Mar. 1942.
144. H i s t o r y , F i g h t e r C o m m a n d
School, Mar.-Nov. 1942, pp. 24ff.
145. On the effects that dispersion
would have had, see History, Third Air
Force, to June 1944, pp. 135-37.
146. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. i.
147. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. iii.
148. Ibid., pp. ~wff.
149. Ibid., pp. 25 ff.
150. zzd Recommendation of Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense, as sum-
marized in ltr., T A G to C/AAF and
others, I Feb. 1942.
1 5 1 . Quoted on title page of National
Service Handbook, Committee on Public
Information (Washington, 1917).
1 5 2 . See p. 2 2 of Watson-Watt re-
port, as cited in n. 119.
1 5 3 . See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study I1I-2, chap. ii.
154. New York Times, 20 Apr. 1942.
155. Minutes of S / W Conference, 18
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., meeting of 2 5 May 1942.
158. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, p. 61.
159. Minutes of S / W Conference, 8
June 1942. See also Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, p. 62.
160. AAF Historical Study No. 42,
Air Defense of the Panama Canal, I Jan.
1939-7 Dec. 1941.
161. No complete transcript of the
report by Watson-Watt was available,
but a digest, with many direct quotations,
is in History, Sixth Air Force, Mar. 1942
-May 1943, pp. 26ff.
162. Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force, p. 219.
165. Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower (OPD), received at AAF Hq., 29
Apr. 1942.
166. History, Sixth Air Force, pp.
‘94-97.
167. Minutes of S / W Conference, zy
June 1942. General Arnold announced
that “we are equipping [bombers] with
ASV at the rate of two per day.”
168. Watson-Watt report, as quoted
in History, Sixth Air Force, pp. 26ff.
1%. Ibid.
170. AAF Historical Study No. 4,
Alaskan Air Defense and the Japanese
Invasion of the Aleutians, pp. 22-27.
May 1942.
171. Ibid., p. 28.
172. The reinforcement preparations
are described in Fourth Air Force His-
torical Study IV-2, Processing Functions
699