“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 9 2 - 3 0 3
131. Memo for Arnold from Saville,
3 1 Jan. rgqt.
132. 1st ind. (ltr., C/AAF to CSigO,
8 Feb. 1942)~OCSigO to C/AAF, 1 1
Feb. 1942.
1 3 3 . Memo for C/AAF from AWPD
(Col. George), z Feb. 1942.
134. Ltr., CG I Interceptor Command
to CG First Air Force, 18 Feb. 1942.
1 3 5 . Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower ( W D OPD), 1 5 Apr. 1942.
136. For a detailed account of estab-
lishment of a V H F net, see Fourth Air
Force Historical Study 111-2, pp. 234-50.
137. “Longhairs and Short Waves,”
Fortune, Nov. 1945.
138. Ibid.
139. A G 371 (12-19-41) MSC-E-M,
Creation of Eastern Theater of Opera-
tions, 20 Dec. 1941.See also GO I , East-
ern Theater of Operations, 21 Dec. 1941,
Doc. 10, in History, First Air Force,
Vol. I.
140. A G 320.2 (12-30-41) MSC-C-M,
Allocation of AAF Units and Associated
Services, and the Assignment of Air
Bases and Observation Airdromes may
be found as Doc. I, in Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, or as Doc. 1 1 , in
History, First Air Force, Vol. I.
141. See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, pp. 208 ff.
142. A G 381 (3-11-42) MC-E-M,
Defense of Continental US., 18 Mar.
1942.
143. For the initial organization of
AAF, see AAF Reg. 2 0 - 1 , 3 1 Mar. 1942.
144. H i s t o r y , F i g h t e r C o m m a n d
School, Mar.-Nov. 1942, pp. 24ff.
145. On the effects that dispersion
would have had, see History, Third Air
Force, to June 1944, pp. 135-37.
146. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. i.
147. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. iii.
148. Ibid., pp. ~wff.
149. Ibid., pp. 25 ff.
150. zzd Recommendation of Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense, as sum-
marized in ltr., T A G to C/AAF and
others, I Feb. 1942.
1 5 1 . Quoted on title page of National
Service Handbook, Committee on Public
Information (Washington, 1917).
1 5 2 . See p. 2 2 of Watson-Watt re-
port, as cited in n. 119.
1 5 3 . See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study I1I-2, chap. ii.
154. New York Times, 20 Apr. 1942.
155. Minutes of S / W Conference, 18
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., meeting of 2 5 May 1942.
158. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, p. 61.
159. Minutes of S / W Conference, 8
June 1942. See also Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, p. 62.
160. AAF Historical Study No. 42,
Air Defense of the Panama Canal, I Jan.
1939-7 Dec. 1941.
161. No complete transcript of the
report by Watson-Watt was available,
but a digest, with many direct quotations,
is in History, Sixth Air Force, Mar. 1942
-May 1943, pp. 26ff.
162. Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force, p. 219.
165. Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower (OPD), received at AAF Hq., 29
Apr. 1942.
166. History, Sixth Air Force, pp.
‘94-97.
167. Minutes of S / W Conference, zy
June 1942. General Arnold announced
that “we are equipping [bombers] with
ASV at the rate of two per day.”
168. Watson-Watt report, as quoted
in History, Sixth Air Force, pp. 26ff.
1%. Ibid.
170. AAF Historical Study No. 4,
Alaskan Air Defense and the Japanese
Invasion of the Aleutians, pp. 22-27.
May 1942.
171. Ibid., p. 28.
172. The reinforcement preparations
are described in Fourth Air Force His-
torical Study IV-2, Processing Functions
699