“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 9 2 - 3 0 3
131. Memo for Arnold from Saville,
3 1 Jan. rgqt.
132. 1st ind. (ltr., C/AAF to CSigO,
8 Feb. 1942)~OCSigO to C/AAF, 1 1
Feb. 1942.
1 3 3 . Memo for C/AAF from AWPD
(Col. George), z Feb. 1942.
134. Ltr., CG I Interceptor Command
to CG First Air Force, 18 Feb. 1942.
1 3 5 . Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower ( W D OPD), 1 5 Apr. 1942.
136. For a detailed account of estab-
lishment of a V H F net, see Fourth Air
Force Historical Study 111-2, pp. 234-50.
137. “Longhairs and Short Waves,”
Fortune, Nov. 1945.
138. Ibid.
139. A G 371 (12-19-41) MSC-E-M,
Creation of Eastern Theater of Opera-
tions, 20 Dec. 1941.See also GO I , East-
ern Theater of Operations, 21 Dec. 1941,
Doc. 10, in History, First Air Force,
Vol. I.
140. A G 320.2 (12-30-41) MSC-C-M,
Allocation of AAF Units and Associated
Services, and the Assignment of Air
Bases and Observation Airdromes may
be found as Doc. I, in Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, or as Doc. 1 1 , in
History, First Air Force, Vol. I.
141. See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, pp. 208 ff.
142. A G 381 (3-11-42) MC-E-M,
Defense of Continental US., 18 Mar.
1942.
143. For the initial organization of
AAF, see AAF Reg. 2 0 - 1 , 3 1 Mar. 1942.
144. H i s t o r y , F i g h t e r C o m m a n d
School, Mar.-Nov. 1942, pp. 24ff.
145. On the effects that dispersion
would have had, see History, Third Air
Force, to June 1944, pp. 135-37.
146. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. i.
147. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, chap. iii.
148. Ibid., pp. ~wff.
149. Ibid., pp. 25 ff.
150. zzd Recommendation of Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense, as sum-
marized in ltr., T A G to C/AAF and
others, I Feb. 1942.
1 5 1 . Quoted on title page of National
Service Handbook, Committee on Public
Information (Washington, 1917).
1 5 2 . See p. 2 2 of Watson-Watt re-
port, as cited in n. 119.
1 5 3 . See Fourth Air Force Historical
Study I1I-2, chap. ii.
154. New York Times, 20 Apr. 1942.
155. Minutes of S / W Conference, 18
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., meeting of 2 5 May 1942.
158. Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 1-2, p. 61.
159. Minutes of S / W Conference, 8
June 1942. See also Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-2, p. 62.
160. AAF Historical Study No. 42,
Air Defense of the Panama Canal, I Jan.
1939-7 Dec. 1941.
161. No complete transcript of the
report by Watson-Watt was available,
but a digest, with many direct quotations,
is in History, Sixth Air Force, Mar. 1942
-May 1943, pp. 26ff.
162. Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force, p. 219.
165. Memo for Arnold from Eisen-
hower (OPD), received at AAF Hq., 29
Apr. 1942.
166. History, Sixth Air Force, pp.
‘94-97.
167. Minutes of S / W Conference, zy
June 1942. General Arnold announced
that “we are equipping [bombers] with
ASV at the rate of two per day.”
168. Watson-Watt report, as quoted
in History, Sixth Air Force, pp. 26ff.
1%. Ibid.
170. AAF Historical Study No. 4,
Alaskan Air Defense and the Japanese
Invasion of the Aleutians, pp. 22-27.
May 1942.
171. Ibid., p. 28.
172. The reinforcement preparations
are described in Fourth Air Force His-
torical Study IV-2, Processing Functions
699