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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 8 5 - 9 2
90. Editorial, N e w York Times, 28
Feb. 1942.
91. Los Angeles Times, I Nov. 1945;
Oakland Tribune, 2 Nov. 1945, quoted in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study 111-2,
p. 3 2 . It should be noted, however, that
the 1-17 which shelled oil installations
near Santa Barbara on the night of 23
February normally carried a plane. (See
USAFISPA G-2 Periodic Report No. 39
92. USSBS (Pacific), Interrogation 97,
Comdr. Masatake Okumiya, at Tokyo,
93. History, 4th AA Command, p.
94. Ibid., p. 121.
95. Ibid., p. 119.
96. Los Angeles Times: Bill Henry
on 26 Feb. 1942; Ernie Pyle on 5 Mar.
‘942.
97. Richard L. Neuberger, “Reveille
in the Northwest,” Nation, 2 0 Dec. 1941.
98. Notes on Orientation Concerning
Controlled Interception, in docs. for His-
tory, Fighter Command School, Mar.-
l2-9 Oct. 19431.)
I 0 OCt. 1945.
I 19.
NOV.1942.
99. lbid.
100. History, AAF Proving Ground
Command, Pt. 16, Radar, chap. i.
101. AAF Historical Study No. 58,
The Use of Radio and Radar Equipment
by the AAF, 1939-45, chap. ii, quoting
Radar, A Report on Science at War, a
press release by the Joint Board on Scien-
tific Information Policy, 14 Aug. 1945.
102. Notes on Interception, as cited
in n. 98.
103. Edgar McInnis, T h e War: Sec-
ond Year, pp. 6ff.
104. Ibid., pp. 218ff.
105. Characteristics of British Radar
Equipment, in docs. for History, Fighter
Command School, Mar.-Nov. 1942.
106. Ibid.
107. See p. 6 of Notes on Intercep-
tion, as cited in n. 98; cf. AAFHS-58,
chap. iii.
108. Maj. Gordon P. Saville, Air De-
fense Doctrine, 27 Oct. 1941. See n. 118,
this chapter.
698
109. AAF Historical Study No. 66,
Development of Radio and Radar Equip-
ment for Air Operations, 1 9 3 ~ 4 4 .
1 1 0 . See “Radar-A Most Decisive
Instrument,” US. Air Services, Mar.
1946, p. 2 1 .
I I I . Brig. Gen. H.H. McClelland
said: “We simply did not have the funds
or manpower in our military commu-
nications set-up to fool” with radar.
(AAFHS-66.)
1 1 2 . Ibid.
1 1 3 . Memo for C/S from Arnold, 24
I 14. History, Air Defense Command,
115. AAFHS-66.
116. Ibid.
117. A G 320.2 (2-16-41) M-C-M, Air
Defense, 7 Mar. 1941, Doc. I , in Fourth
Air Force Historical Study 111-1.
118. The plan of air defense was
officially summarized in the manual Air
Defense Doctrine, as cited in n. 108.
119. For limitations of radar, see p.
2 3 , Report by R. A. Watson-Watt on
the Air Defense System of the Pacific
Coast of the US., Jan. 1942, Doc. 40, in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study HI-I.
1 2 0 . Ibid., p. 21.
121. History, I Fighter Command,
1941-44, 1, 104ff.
1 2 2 . Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, pp. 146 ff.
123. History, I Fighter Command,
1941-44, I, 67; Fourth Air Force His-
torical Study 111-2, p. 74.
NOV.1939.
P. 7-
124. Air Defense Doctrine.
125. Ibid.
126. See p. 3 of Watson-Watt report,
as cited in n. 119.
127. Ltr., Air Marshal A.T. Harris,
RAF Delegation, Washington, D.C. to
Hon. R.A. Lovett, AS/W for Air, 12
Dec. 1941.
128. Ibid.
129. All quotes are from Watson-
Watt report.
130. Memo for Arnold from Saville,
3 0 Jan. 1942; ltr., C/AAF to CSigO, 8
Feb. 1942.

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