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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 8 5 - 9 2
90. Editorial, N e w York Times, 28
Feb. 1942.
91. Los Angeles Times, I Nov. 1945;
Oakland Tribune, 2 Nov. 1945, quoted in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study 111-2,
p. 3 2 . It should be noted, however, that
the 1-17 which shelled oil installations
near Santa Barbara on the night of 23
February normally carried a plane. (See
USAFISPA G-2 Periodic Report No. 39
92. USSBS (Pacific), Interrogation 97,
Comdr. Masatake Okumiya, at Tokyo,
93. History, 4th AA Command, p.
94. Ibid., p. 121.
95. Ibid., p. 119.
96. Los Angeles Times: Bill Henry
on 26 Feb. 1942; Ernie Pyle on 5 Mar.
‘942.
97. Richard L. Neuberger, “Reveille
in the Northwest,” Nation, 2 0 Dec. 1941.
98. Notes on Orientation Concerning
Controlled Interception, in docs. for His-
tory, Fighter Command School, Mar.-
l2-9 Oct. 19431.)
I 0 OCt. 1945.
I 19.
NOV.1942.
99. lbid.
100. History, AAF Proving Ground
Command, Pt. 16, Radar, chap. i.
101. AAF Historical Study No. 58,
The Use of Radio and Radar Equipment
by the AAF, 1939-45, chap. ii, quoting
Radar, A Report on Science at War, a
press release by the Joint Board on Scien-
tific Information Policy, 14 Aug. 1945.
102. Notes on Interception, as cited
in n. 98.
103. Edgar McInnis, T h e War: Sec-
ond Year, pp. 6ff.
104. Ibid., pp. 218ff.
105. Characteristics of British Radar
Equipment, in docs. for History, Fighter
Command School, Mar.-Nov. 1942.
106. Ibid.
107. See p. 6 of Notes on Intercep-
tion, as cited in n. 98; cf. AAFHS-58,
chap. iii.
108. Maj. Gordon P. Saville, Air De-
fense Doctrine, 27 Oct. 1941. See n. 118,
this chapter.
698
109. AAF Historical Study No. 66,
Development of Radio and Radar Equip-
ment for Air Operations, 1 9 3 ~ 4 4 .
1 1 0 . See “Radar-A Most Decisive
Instrument,” US. Air Services, Mar.
1946, p. 2 1 .
I I I . Brig. Gen. H.H. McClelland
said: “We simply did not have the funds
or manpower in our military commu-
nications set-up to fool” with radar.
(AAFHS-66.)
1 1 2 . Ibid.
1 1 3 . Memo for C/S from Arnold, 24
I 14. History, Air Defense Command,
115. AAFHS-66.
116. Ibid.
117. A G 320.2 (2-16-41) M-C-M, Air
Defense, 7 Mar. 1941, Doc. I , in Fourth
Air Force Historical Study 111-1.
118. The plan of air defense was
officially summarized in the manual Air
Defense Doctrine, as cited in n. 108.
119. For limitations of radar, see p.
2 3 , Report by R. A. Watson-Watt on
the Air Defense System of the Pacific
Coast of the US., Jan. 1942, Doc. 40, in
Fourth Air Force Historical Study HI-I.
1 2 0 . Ibid., p. 21.
121. History, I Fighter Command,
1941-44, 1, 104ff.
1 2 2 . Fourth Air Force Historical
Study 111-2, pp. 146 ff.
123. History, I Fighter Command,
1941-44, I, 67; Fourth Air Force His-
torical Study 111-2, p. 74.
NOV.1939.
P. 7-
124. Air Defense Doctrine.
125. Ibid.
126. See p. 3 of Watson-Watt report,
as cited in n. 119.
127. Ltr., Air Marshal A.T. Harris,
RAF Delegation, Washington, D.C. to
Hon. R.A. Lovett, AS/W for Air, 12
Dec. 1941.
128. Ibid.
129. All quotes are from Watson-
Watt report.
130. Memo for Arnold from Saville,
3 0 Jan. 1942; ltr., C/AAF to CSigO, 8
Feb. 1942.

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