“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 8 0 - 8 5
7 1 . Los Angeles Times, 24 Feb. 1942.
The submarine was the 1-17, which was
sunk south of New Caledonia on 19 Au-
gust 1943. Interrogation of surviving
crewmen at that time placed the sub-
marine off San Diego on 10 February
1942 and indicated that it fired twenty-
four or twenty-five shells onto the coast
near Santa Barbara on 2 3 February. After
further operations off the California
coast, it returned to Japan in March.
(USAFISPA G-2 Periodic Report No. 39
[Z-9 OCt. 19431.)
7 2 . For details see A-2 Daily Sum.,
2 3 and 24 Feb. 1942; and History, 4th
A h Command, Jan. 19qz-July 1945, pp.
I 13-14.
73. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-2, Defense Plans and Operations
74. A-2 Daily Sum., 24 Feb. 1942.
75. Los Angeles Times, z j Feb. 1942.
76. History, 4th AA Command, Jan.
194t-July 1945, p. 116.
77. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-2, p. 31.
78. History, 4th AA Command, pp.
116-18; A-2 Daily Sum., 24 and 2 5 Feb.
1942. See also Los Angeles Times, 2 5
Feb. 1942.
79. Contemporary observations are
summarized in History, 4th A h Com-
mand, pp. I I ~ - 2 0 .
80. Report from WDC, 2 5 Feb. 1942,
in A-2 Daily Sum.
81. Los Angeles Times, 2 5 and 26
Feb. 1942.
8 2 . New York Times, 26 Feb. 1942,
reporting conference of previous day.
83. W D C report received in Wash-
ington at 1 3 1 5 hours, 2 5 Feb. 1942, quoted
in A-2 Daily Sum., 2 5 Feb. 1942.
84. History, 4th AA Command, pp.
119-20.
85. Report from WDC, 26 Feb. 1942,
quoted in A-2 Daily Sum.
86. Los Angeles Times, 2 7 Feb. 1942.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 28
(1942-45), p. 30.
Feb. 1942.
lar from Maj. Gen. J.E. Fickel, CG
Fourth Air Force), in Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-1, chap. ix; and Study
1-2 (1942-45), chap. ii.
54. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-1, chap. vii (especially pp. 2 3 2 ff.).
55. Ibid.
56. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
1-1, p. 270.
57, Along the West Coast in Feb-
ruary 1942 there was “little probability
that the air force units as now consti-
tuted could defend the vital targets
against a determined carrier based at-
tack.” (Memo for C/AAF from AWPD
[Col. George], 2 Feb. 1942.)
58. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
Notes on US-British Chiefs of Staff
Conference, 24 Dec. 1941, in AFSHO
files.
59. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
60. “The relief of Aruba and Curacao,
subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be
completed before the end of January.”
(BC-4/6.)
61. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
History, Caribbean Air Force, May 1941
-Mar. 1942, p. 512. The exact date of
the arrival of air units is not known, as
the latter source gives dates of 14 and 17
January (compare p. 5 7 2 with p. 5 1 2 , in
this regard).
62. A-2 Daily Sum., 3 1 Jan. 1942.
63. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
64. Ibid., 17 and 18 Feb. 1942; History,
Caribbean Air Force, Vol. TI1 (A-3 Pe-
riodic Report, 16-28 Feb. 1942). See also
History, Sixth Air Force, Mar. 1942-
May 1943, pp. 119--~2.
65. New York Times, 2 0 Feb. 1942.
There is a possibility that the damage to
shore installations on 19 February was
caused by star shells fired by the USS
Window. (See A-3 Periodic Report, as
cited in n. 64.)
66. A-2 Daily Sum., 2 Mar. 1942.
67. New York Times, 2 0 Apr. 1942.
68. Ibid., 18 Feb. 1942.
69. Ibid., 20 Feb. 1942.
7 0 . lbid.
697