“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 8 0 - 8 5
7 1 . Los Angeles Times, 24 Feb. 1942.
The submarine was the 1-17, which was
sunk south of New Caledonia on 19 Au-
gust 1943. Interrogation of surviving
crewmen at that time placed the sub-
marine off San Diego on 10 February
1942 and indicated that it fired twenty-
four or twenty-five shells onto the coast
near Santa Barbara on 2 3 February. After
further operations off the California
coast, it returned to Japan in March.
(USAFISPA G-2 Periodic Report No. 39
[Z-9 OCt. 19431.)
7 2 . For details see A-2 Daily Sum.,
2 3 and 24 Feb. 1942; and History, 4th
A h Command, Jan. 19qz-July 1945, pp.
I 13-14.
73. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-2, Defense Plans and Operations
74. A-2 Daily Sum., 24 Feb. 1942.
75. Los Angeles Times, z j Feb. 1942.
76. History, 4th AA Command, Jan.
194t-July 1945, p. 116.
77. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-2, p. 31.
78. History, 4th AA Command, pp.
116-18; A-2 Daily Sum., 24 and 2 5 Feb.
1942. See also Los Angeles Times, 2 5
Feb. 1942.
79. Contemporary observations are
summarized in History, 4th A h Com-
mand, pp. I I ~ - 2 0 .
80. Report from WDC, 2 5 Feb. 1942,
in A-2 Daily Sum.
81. Los Angeles Times, 2 5 and 26
Feb. 1942.
8 2 . New York Times, 26 Feb. 1942,
reporting conference of previous day.
83. W D C report received in Wash-
ington at 1 3 1 5 hours, 2 5 Feb. 1942, quoted
in A-2 Daily Sum., 2 5 Feb. 1942.
84. History, 4th AA Command, pp.
119-20.
85. Report from WDC, 26 Feb. 1942,
quoted in A-2 Daily Sum.
86. Los Angeles Times, 2 7 Feb. 1942.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 28
(1942-45), p. 30.
Feb. 1942.
lar from Maj. Gen. J.E. Fickel, CG
Fourth Air Force), in Fourth Air Force
Historical Study 1-1, chap. ix; and Study
1-2 (1942-45), chap. ii.
54. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
111-1, chap. vii (especially pp. 2 3 2 ff.).
55. Ibid.
56. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
1-1, p. 270.
57, Along the West Coast in Feb-
ruary 1942 there was “little probability
that the air force units as now consti-
tuted could defend the vital targets
against a determined carrier based at-
tack.” (Memo for C/AAF from AWPD
[Col. George], 2 Feb. 1942.)
58. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
Notes on US-British Chiefs of Staff
Conference, 24 Dec. 1941, in AFSHO
files.
59. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
60. “The relief of Aruba and Curacao,
subject to Dutch concurrence, is to be
completed before the end of January.”
(BC-4/6.)
61. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
History, Caribbean Air Force, May 1941
-Mar. 1942, p. 512. The exact date of
the arrival of air units is not known, as
the latter source gives dates of 14 and 17
January (compare p. 5 7 2 with p. 5 1 2 , in
this regard).
62. A-2 Daily Sum., 3 1 Jan. 1942.
63. New York Times, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
64. Ibid., 17 and 18 Feb. 1942; History,
Caribbean Air Force, Vol. TI1 (A-3 Pe-
riodic Report, 16-28 Feb. 1942). See also
History, Sixth Air Force, Mar. 1942-
May 1943, pp. 119--~2.
65. New York Times, 2 0 Feb. 1942.
There is a possibility that the damage to
shore installations on 19 February was
caused by star shells fired by the USS
Window. (See A-3 Periodic Report, as
cited in n. 64.)
66. A-2 Daily Sum., 2 Mar. 1942.
67. New York Times, 2 0 Apr. 1942.
68. Ibid., 18 Feb. 1942.
69. Ibid., 20 Feb. 1942.
7 0 . lbid.
697