“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 7 4 - 8 0
General Marshall was so disturbed about 30. Buckner, quoted in History, Elev-
the “investigative complex” after Pearl enth Air Force, pp. 86-87.
Harbor that he twice called attention to 3 1 . cola E.W. ill, Observations, on
it in War Council meetings. (See Min- flight Alaska, c14Oct. 1941.
Of Set* Of War’s Conference [war 3 2 . Ltr., Col. E.S. Davis to Lt. Col.
E.S. Kiel, 5 Dec. 1941, quoted in His-Councill, 16 Mar. 1942.)
11. “Since the Japanese attacks on the tory, Eleventh Air Force, pp. 84-85.
3 3 . Radg., Marshall to DeWitt, 1 1
Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had uncovered
the entire west coast of North America, Dee. 1941, quoted in Fourth Air Force
the reinforcement of garrisons along the Historical Study I-I, p. 284.
West Coast, Panama, Hawaii, and in
Alaska was given first priority.” Biennial 34. The order became effective 24
Report, C/S to Sec. of War, July 1941- December I94I. First Air
Force, I, Organizational Development,
Northeast Air District and First Air
30 June 19439 P. 7 .
Force, 19 Nov. 1940-31 Dec. 1943, p. IS.)
35. See History, Third Air Force,
Defense Activities, 1941-44, p. 10.
1-1, pp. 244-46.
37. Detailed account in Fourth Air
Force Historical Study Ill-I, Defense
Plans and Operations, 1941, pp. 153-65,
38. For full treatment see Fourth Air
Force Historical Study 1-1, chap. ix, and
15 Dec. 1941. Fourth Air Force Historical Study 111-1,
chap. vii.
39. History, 4th AA Command, Jan.
194z-July 1945, p. 87 et passim.
4 4 6 5 0 .
Dec. 1941. 40. A-2 Daily Summary of War
News, 8 Dcc. 1941.
460-65.
Hiaory’ Caribbean Air Force’
May 1941-Mar. 1942, pp. 450,467.
13. Ibid., pp. 450, 464.
Arnold’s Office, 9 Dec. 1941.
‘4. Minutes Of Meeting in 36. Fourth Air Force Historical Study
15. History, Caribbean Air Force, p.
16. Ibid., p. 458.
18. Ibid., pp. 446-50.
19. panamacanal ~h Traffic R ~ ~ . ,
20. History, Caribbean Air Force, pp.
21. Minutes of the Joint Board, 10
22. History, Caribbean Air Force, pp.
23. Ibid., pp. #off.
24. For the general background see
AAF Historical Study No. 4, Alaskan
Air Defense and the Japanese Invasion of
2 5 . History, Eleventh Air Force, Aug.
194o-Sept. 1942, pp. 8687.
26. For a summary of status, see 1%
Hq. Alaska Defense Command to CG
WDC, 14 Jan. 1942.
27. Ltr., Lt. Col. Dale Gafhey, Ladd
Field, Alaska to Col. E-W. Hill, OCAG
20 Dec. 1941.
28. “Unless Alaska is provided with
detector equipment.. .it is subject to
possible and probable surprise attack.”
(Ltr., Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt, CG WDC
to CG Field Forces, 27 Jan. 1942.)
456.
17. Ibid., p. 554. 2 5 0 .
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 8 and 9 Dec. 1941.
43. Sun FrQflcifcoNews, 10 Dee. 1941.
44. Ibid., 9 Dec. 1941.For a full dis-
cussion, see Fourth Air Force Historical
the Aleutians. Study 111-1, pp. 296-97.
45. A-2 Daily Sum., 8 Dec. 1941.
46. Ibid., 9 Dec. 1941.
47. F o m h A h Force Historical Study
I - ~ ,pp, 2 ~ 2 .
48. Ibid.
49. Based on A-2 Daily Sum., 9 Dec.
IwI,and New York Times, I. Dee.
194’.
5” New
51. Ibid., 10 Dee. 1941-
5 2 . A--2 Daily Sum., 9 Dec. 1941.
53. See the repeated warnings from
Western Defense Command (in particu-
” Feb* ‘94”
29. Lu., as cited in n. 27.
696