“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 4 - 3 2
Hq. Fifth Air Force, z Dec. 1942; 19th
Gp. Operations Record.
87. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 2627;
G O 25, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 4 July
1942; Robb statement; Sheppard and Gil-
more statement; Ind, Batman, pp. 154-55.
88. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; Diary
of Lt. Col. James B. McAfee, I Nov.
89. Msg., Ft. Mills to AGO, 28 Dec.
1941; T h e Brereton Diaries, .pp. 63-64;
FEAF Hq. Diary, Doc. 28, in History,
Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. 11; Elsmore
statement.
1941-5 OCt. 1942.
p Fisher report.
91. Histories, 24th Pursuit Gp., Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, pp. 27-29, and 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Robb and Obert statements;
Ind, Batman, pp. 167ff.
92. History of USAFIA, Doc. 26, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. H;
memo for CNO by Gerow, 1 2 Dec. 1941;
msg., MacArthur to WD, 18 Dec. 1941;
msg. #40, Melbourne to WD, 18 Dec.
1941; G O 4, Task Force, South Pacific,
19 Dec. 1941.
93. History of USAFIA, as in n. 92;
msg. #71, AG to Brig. Gen. John Magru-
der, 15 Dec. 1941; memo for T A G by
Acting AC/S Gerow, 17 Dec. 1942; msg.
#1015, Brett to T A G from Chungking,
2 3 Dec. 1941; msg. #130, Chungking to
TAG, 27 Dec. 1941; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. 2 , I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942, p. I .
94. History of G-4, USAFIA, Doc.
81, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I,
App. 11; History of USAFIA.
95. History of G-4, USAFIA, as in
n. 94; History of USAFIA; memo for
Somervell by Eisenhower, recd. 17 Dec.
1941; msg., MacArthur to AGO, 18
Dec. 1941;History, 27th Gp.; T h e Brere-
ton Diaries, pp. 74-75.
96. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I J a n 4 Mar. 1942. See also below,
chap. 1 1 .
97. AAF Historical Study No. 45,
Development of the South Pacific Air
Route.
98. Msg., Marshall to CG USAFIA,
n.d., Doc. 48, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. 11; interview with Maj. John
692
T. Trotter by author, 18 Oct. 1944; Gen.
Barnes’ Description of Australia, Doc.
5 1 a, in History, Fifth Air Force. Pt. I ,
App. 11.
99. Barnes’ Description of Australia;
msg. 81371, London (Royce) to WD,
16 Dec. 1941.
100. Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley, 28 and 29 Dec. 1941, Doc. 64,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11; msg. #612, Adams to CG USAFFE,
27 Dec. 1941; msg. 8865, Adams to CG
USAFFE, 3 0 Dec. 1941; History, 7th
Bomb. Gp.; ltr., Clagett to C/AS, 24
Dec. 1941, Doc. 12, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, App. IF.
1 0 1 . Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley; msg., MacArthur to TAG,
15 Dec. 1941.
102. Msg., Marshall to [USAFIA, 2 5
Dec. 19411, Doc. 47, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Mac-
Arthur to AGWAR, 2 s Dec. 1941;msg.,
Brereton to TAG, OPNAV 251501
CROSS, 26 Dec. 1941;msg., Brereton to
T A G (cable from Navy, #CR0369, 26
Dec. 1941); msg., Clagett to Brereton,
n.d., Doc. 76, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I , App. 11; Brereton to TAG, f300630,
cR0828, 3 1 Dec. 1941; The Brereton
Diaries, pp. 6 2 ff.
103. Msg., Clagett to CJS, 3 1 Dec.
1941, Doc. 77, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I, App. 11; msg. #54, Clagett
to C/S, 29 Dec. 1941; Arnold to Brett,
25 Dec. 1941.The original route planned
for planes with a range of approximately
500 miles: Brisbane or Townsville, Clon-
curry, [ Charleville], Daly Waters, Dar-
win, Koepang in Timor, Makassar in
Celebes, Balikpapan (or Samarinda 11)
and Tarakan in Borneo, Del Monte (or
Malabang, Zamboanga, Iwahig) . (Msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 2 Dec. 1942,
in AAG 452.1, Phil.) General Brereton
indicates in his Diaries, however, that
both he and Brett attempted to carry
out their mission of supporting the de-
fense of the Philippines. ( T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 75.)
104. Msg. #36, Brett to C/S, z Jan.
1942; Notes on Conference Held on 3
Jan. 1942, Doc. 33, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Brett to Adm.