“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 4 - 3 2
Hq. Fifth Air Force, z Dec. 1942; 19th
Gp. Operations Record.
87. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 2627;
G O 25, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 4 July
1942; Robb statement; Sheppard and Gil-
more statement; Ind, Batman, pp. 154-55.
88. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; Diary
of Lt. Col. James B. McAfee, I Nov.
89. Msg., Ft. Mills to AGO, 28 Dec.
1941; T h e Brereton Diaries, .pp. 63-64;
FEAF Hq. Diary, Doc. 28, in History,
Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. 11; Elsmore
statement.
1941-5 OCt. 1942.
p Fisher report.
91. Histories, 24th Pursuit Gp., Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, pp. 27-29, and 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Robb and Obert statements;
Ind, Batman, pp. 167ff.
92. History of USAFIA, Doc. 26, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. H;
memo for CNO by Gerow, 1 2 Dec. 1941;
msg., MacArthur to WD, 18 Dec. 1941;
msg. #40, Melbourne to WD, 18 Dec.
1941; G O 4, Task Force, South Pacific,
19 Dec. 1941.
93. History of USAFIA, as in n. 92;
msg. #71, AG to Brig. Gen. John Magru-
der, 15 Dec. 1941; memo for T A G by
Acting AC/S Gerow, 17 Dec. 1942; msg.
#1015, Brett to T A G from Chungking,
2 3 Dec. 1941; msg. #130, Chungking to
TAG, 27 Dec. 1941; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. 2 , I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942, p. I .
94. History of G-4, USAFIA, Doc.
81, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I,
App. 11; History of USAFIA.
95. History of G-4, USAFIA, as in
n. 94; History of USAFIA; memo for
Somervell by Eisenhower, recd. 17 Dec.
1941; msg., MacArthur to AGO, 18
Dec. 1941;History, 27th Gp.; T h e Brere-
ton Diaries, pp. 74-75.
96. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I J a n 4 Mar. 1942. See also below,
chap. 1 1 .
97. AAF Historical Study No. 45,
Development of the South Pacific Air
Route.
98. Msg., Marshall to CG USAFIA,
n.d., Doc. 48, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. 11; interview with Maj. John
692
T. Trotter by author, 18 Oct. 1944; Gen.
Barnes’ Description of Australia, Doc.
5 1 a, in History, Fifth Air Force. Pt. I ,
App. 11.
99. Barnes’ Description of Australia;
msg. 81371, London (Royce) to WD,
16 Dec. 1941.
100. Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley, 28 and 29 Dec. 1941, Doc. 64,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11; msg. #612, Adams to CG USAFFE,
27 Dec. 1941; msg. 8865, Adams to CG
USAFFE, 3 0 Dec. 1941; History, 7th
Bomb. Gp.; ltr., Clagett to C/AS, 24
Dec. 1941, Doc. 12, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, App. IF.
1 0 1 . Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley; msg., MacArthur to TAG,
15 Dec. 1941.
102. Msg., Marshall to [USAFIA, 2 5
Dec. 19411, Doc. 47, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Mac-
Arthur to AGWAR, 2 s Dec. 1941;msg.,
Brereton to TAG, OPNAV 251501
CROSS, 26 Dec. 1941;msg., Brereton to
T A G (cable from Navy, #CR0369, 26
Dec. 1941); msg., Clagett to Brereton,
n.d., Doc. 76, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I , App. 11; Brereton to TAG, f300630,
cR0828, 3 1 Dec. 1941; The Brereton
Diaries, pp. 6 2 ff.
103. Msg., Clagett to CJS, 3 1 Dec.
1941, Doc. 77, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I, App. 11; msg. #54, Clagett
to C/S, 29 Dec. 1941; Arnold to Brett,
25 Dec. 1941.The original route planned
for planes with a range of approximately
500 miles: Brisbane or Townsville, Clon-
curry, [ Charleville], Daly Waters, Dar-
win, Koepang in Timor, Makassar in
Celebes, Balikpapan (or Samarinda 11)
and Tarakan in Borneo, Del Monte (or
Malabang, Zamboanga, Iwahig) . (Msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 2 Dec. 1942,
in AAG 452.1, Phil.) General Brereton
indicates in his Diaries, however, that
both he and Brett attempted to carry
out their mission of supporting the de-
fense of the Philippines. ( T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 75.)
104. Msg. #36, Brett to C/S, z Jan.
1942; Notes on Conference Held on 3
Jan. 1942, Doc. 33, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Brett to Adm.