“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 2 4 - 3 2
Hq. Fifth Air Force, z Dec. 1942; 19th
Gp. Operations Record.
87. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , pp. 2627;
G O 25, Hq. Allied Air Forces, 4 July
1942; Robb statement; Sheppard and Gil-
more statement; Ind, Batman, pp. 154-55.
88. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.; Diary
of Lt. Col. James B. McAfee, I Nov.
89. Msg., Ft. Mills to AGO, 28 Dec.
1941; T h e Brereton Diaries, .pp. 63-64;
FEAF Hq. Diary, Doc. 28, in History,
Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. 11; Elsmore
statement.
1941-5 OCt. 1942.
p Fisher report.
91. Histories, 24th Pursuit Gp., Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, pp. 27-29, and 27th
Bomb. Gp.; Robb and Obert statements;
Ind, Batman, pp. 167ff.
92. History of USAFIA, Doc. 26, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I, App. H;
memo for CNO by Gerow, 1 2 Dec. 1941;
msg., MacArthur to WD, 18 Dec. 1941;
msg. #40, Melbourne to WD, 18 Dec.
1941; G O 4, Task Force, South Pacific,
19 Dec. 1941.
93. History of USAFIA, as in n. 92;
msg. #71, AG to Brig. Gen. John Magru-
der, 15 Dec. 1941; memo for T A G by
Acting AC/S Gerow, 17 Dec. 1942; msg.
#1015, Brett to T A G from Chungking,
2 3 Dec. 1941; msg. #130, Chungking to
TAG, 27 Dec. 1941; History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. 2 , I Jan.-6 Mar. 1942, p. I .
94. History of G-4, USAFIA, Doc.
81, in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I,
App. 11; History of USAFIA.
95. History of G-4, USAFIA, as in
n. 94; History of USAFIA; memo for
Somervell by Eisenhower, recd. 17 Dec.
1941; msg., MacArthur to AGO, 18
Dec. 1941;History, 27th Gp.; T h e Brere-
ton Diaries, pp. 74-75.
96. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 2 ,
I J a n 4 Mar. 1942. See also below,
chap. 1 1 .
97. AAF Historical Study No. 45,
Development of the South Pacific Air
Route.
98. Msg., Marshall to CG USAFIA,
n.d., Doc. 48, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I, App. 11; interview with Maj. John
692
T. Trotter by author, 18 Oct. 1944; Gen.
Barnes’ Description of Australia, Doc.
5 1 a, in History, Fifth Air Force. Pt. I ,
App. 11.
99. Barnes’ Description of Australia;
msg. 81371, London (Royce) to WD,
16 Dec. 1941.
100. Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley, 28 and 29 Dec. 1941, Doc. 64,
in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App.
11; msg. #612, Adams to CG USAFFE,
27 Dec. 1941; msg. 8865, Adams to CG
USAFFE, 3 0 Dec. 1941; History, 7th
Bomb. Gp.; ltr., Clagett to C/AS, 24
Dec. 1941, Doc. 12, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I, App. IF.
1 0 1 . Notes on Conferences Held at
Amberley; msg., MacArthur to TAG,
15 Dec. 1941.
102. Msg., Marshall to [USAFIA, 2 5
Dec. 19411, Doc. 47, in History, Fifth
Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Mac-
Arthur to AGWAR, 2 s Dec. 1941;msg.,
Brereton to TAG, OPNAV 251501
CROSS, 26 Dec. 1941;msg., Brereton to
T A G (cable from Navy, #CR0369, 26
Dec. 1941); msg., Clagett to Brereton,
n.d., Doc. 76, in History, Fifth Air Force,
Pt. I , App. 11; Brereton to TAG, f300630,
cR0828, 3 1 Dec. 1941; The Brereton
Diaries, pp. 6 2 ff.
103. Msg., Clagett to CJS, 3 1 Dec.
1941, Doc. 77, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I, App. 11; msg. #54, Clagett
to C/S, 29 Dec. 1941; Arnold to Brett,
25 Dec. 1941.The original route planned
for planes with a range of approximately
500 miles: Brisbane or Townsville, Clon-
curry, [ Charleville], Daly Waters, Dar-
win, Koepang in Timor, Makassar in
Celebes, Balikpapan (or Samarinda 11)
and Tarakan in Borneo, Del Monte (or
Malabang, Zamboanga, Iwahig) . (Msg.,
MacArthur to AGWAR, 2 Dec. 1942,
in AAG 452.1, Phil.) General Brereton
indicates in his Diaries, however, that
both he and Brett attempted to carry
out their mission of supporting the de-
fense of the Philippines. ( T h e Brereton
Diaries, p. 75.)
104. Msg. #36, Brett to C/S, z Jan.
1942; Notes on Conference Held on 3
Jan. 1942, Doc. 33, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. I , App. 11; msg., Brett to Adm.