“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over-
seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
- p. 53 …this department in operations over land
and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
- p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national
scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
- p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
- p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air…
- p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational
radius of aircraft. In 1920…
- p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
- p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
- p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro-
tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
- p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction…
- p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
- p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …It
is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other
air…
- p. 108 …a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
- p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can-
not but incline to…
- p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and
antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
- p. 118 …they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter…
- p. 119 …As opposed to
land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than
the…
- p. 127 …Recon-
naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations.
The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
- p. 128 …in combined
operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French
military traditions, however…
- p. 133 …Atlantic
and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved
a moderate degree…
- p. 138 …tradi-
tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern-
ment the…
- p. 154 …Such additions to a com-
bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have
imposed…
- p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit-
terly resented Air Corps…
- p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land
areas from which enemy air power…
- p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea
was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 177 …Near East,
India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical
support of these widely…
- p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica-
tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
- p. 188 …And to protect the
security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
- p. 198 …and to insure the safety of
essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
- p. 199 …Base commander, included inde-
pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land
and…
- p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis-
tributed among the military fields and installations…
- p. 204 …and
against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission
was to support…
- p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of
the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
- p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com-
munications a t a time when shipping…
- p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming
the general assumption that some major move…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese
officials interviewed after the…
- p. 257 …a fruitless
flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been
From this…
- p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the South China Sea…
- p. 268 …depots had
been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk
and other naval craft…
- p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea
blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
- p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted
on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
- p. 288 …maintenance
of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes;
forging and tightening a…
- p. 323 …This drastic shift in
the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
- p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at
sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
- p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
- p. 329 …They were enemy
planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
- p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
- p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
- p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
- p. 362 …provide for the
security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over
3…
- p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
- p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the
only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
- p. 372 …around Africa
and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
- p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter…
- p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the
South Pacific, and…
- p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move
down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 7 - 2 4
Capt. Kawakita bhihara, n.d.; 94, Comdr.
Yutaka Isawa, 1 2 Oct. 1945; 331, Capt.
Mitsugo Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945; 387, Capt.
Kameo Sonokawa, 14 Nov. 1945; 424,
Capt. Bunzo Shibata, 18 Nov. 1945.
68. Ltr., Eubank to CG FEAF, as in
n. 65.
6.T M 1-10.
70. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , p.
17; 19th Gp. Operations Record; Summary
of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941, 1430 which
records “Discussion of situation by Staff:
In view of the fact that Paratroops have
been landed in many places in the islands,
General Brereton is of the opinion that
it is highly dangerous to allow Bombard-
ment to remain in this vicinity after
dark.” Under 11 Dec. 1941, 0030, appears
“Telephonic orders to move all B-17’s
southward prior to daybreak and execute
dawn attack on targets in Linguayan
Port.” (See also 1 1 Dec. 1941, 1009.)
71. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Sheppard and Gilmore state-
ment; combat reports of Capt. William
M. Rowe, in A-2 Library. Operations of
the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the
Philippines indicates that thirty-four
fighters and twenty-seven bombers were
sent against Nielson, Nichols, and Camp
Murphy, twenty-seven bombers against
Cavite and the same number against
shipping at Manila, and eighteen fighters
against Del Carmen. Japanese pilots
claimed fifty planes shot down and
fifty-three heavily damaged or burned.
71. Memo for CIS by Acting AC/S,
G-2, 10 Dec. 1942.
73. It should be added that prior to
the attack on Cavite, American pursuits
had intercepted another formation of
Jap planes over central Luzon and shot
two down, and that later on Filipino
pilots flew their obsolete P-26’s against
an enemy formation. (Sheppard and
Gilmore statement; GO 48 and 27, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941 and 16 Feb.
74. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; msg.,
Manda to AGWAR, 1 2 Dec. 1941.
75. Msg., Manila to WD, 11 Dec.
1941;msg., Manila to AGWAR, 1 2 Dec.
1941; Hart, Narrative of Events; GO 48
and 27, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941, and
1942.)
16 Feb. 1942; msg., Arnold to C G
USAFFE, 24 Dec. 1941.
76. 19th Gp. Operations Record; msg.
$1712, Manila to TAG, 1 5 Dec. 1941;
GO 16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, I Feb.
1942; GO 2 , Hq. Southwest Pacific Com-
mand, Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 12,
Hq. Allied Air Forces, 2s May 1942.
77. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; GO 52,
Hq. USAFFE, 24 Dec. 1941.
78. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , p.
20, and statement of Col. Ray Elsmore,
Doc. 30a, App. FI. A few days after the
war began, one P-40 was dispatched to
Mindanao to serve as a personal recon-
naissance plane for General Sharp, in com-
mand on that island. On 4 January, nine
P-40’s left Bataan for Del Monte. Five
of these planes arrived; and about a week
later two P-35’s arrived. (Obert state-
ment; History, 24th Pursuit Gp.)
79. 19th Gp. Operations Record; Els-
more statement.
80. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.
81. Msgs., MacArthur to Marshall, 10
Dec. 1941; Manila to WD, 1 3 Dec. 1941;
#40, Manila to T A G , 2 2 Dec. 1941.
82. Memo for MacArthur from Brere-
ton, 14 Dec. 1941.
83. Msg. #787, T A G to C G USAFFE,
1 5 Dec. 1941; ltr. to CG AFCC, incl. to
R&R, OPD to Air Service Command, 15
Dec. 1941; ltr., T A G to CG M C C , 23
Dec. 1941; msg. #750, Adams to Mac-
Arthur, 23 Dec. 1941.
84. Msgs., Manila to W D and TAG,
19 Dec. 1941; $13, 20 Dec.; #30 and #544,
2 1 Dec.; #3 and $34, 2 2 Dec.; Brief
Chronology of the Philippine Campaign,
Col. Ray Elsmore’s personal papers, Doc.
8 2 , in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11; Sutherland interview, as cited in
n. 50.
85. 19th Gp. Operations Record; msg.
#41, Manila to TAG, 23 Dec. 1941; GO
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
GO z, Hq. SWP Command, Lembang,
15 Feb. 1942.
86. G O 2, Hq. SWP Command, Lem-
bang, 15 Feb. 1942; GO 10, Hq. Fifth
Air Force, 2 2 Sept. 1942; GO 16, Hq.
FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942; GO 38,
69 1