“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 7 - 2 4
Capt. Kawakita bhihara, n.d.; 94, Comdr.
Yutaka Isawa, 1 2 Oct. 1945; 331, Capt.
Mitsugo Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945; 387, Capt.
Kameo Sonokawa, 14 Nov. 1945; 424,
Capt. Bunzo Shibata, 18 Nov. 1945.
68. Ltr., Eubank to CG FEAF, as in
n. 65.
6.T M 1-10.
70. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , p.
17; 19th Gp. Operations Record; Summary
of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941, 1430 which
records “Discussion of situation by Staff:
In view of the fact that Paratroops have
been landed in many places in the islands,
General Brereton is of the opinion that
it is highly dangerous to allow Bombard-
ment to remain in this vicinity after
dark.” Under 11 Dec. 1941, 0030, appears
“Telephonic orders to move all B-17’s
southward prior to daybreak and execute
dawn attack on targets in Linguayan
Port.” (See also 1 1 Dec. 1941, 1009.)
71. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Sheppard and Gilmore state-
ment; combat reports of Capt. William
M. Rowe, in A-2 Library. Operations of
the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the
Philippines indicates that thirty-four
fighters and twenty-seven bombers were
sent against Nielson, Nichols, and Camp
Murphy, twenty-seven bombers against
Cavite and the same number against
shipping at Manila, and eighteen fighters
against Del Carmen. Japanese pilots
claimed fifty planes shot down and
fifty-three heavily damaged or burned.
71. Memo for CIS by Acting AC/S,
G-2, 10 Dec. 1942.
73. It should be added that prior to
the attack on Cavite, American pursuits
had intercepted another formation of
Jap planes over central Luzon and shot
two down, and that later on Filipino
pilots flew their obsolete P-26’s against
an enemy formation. (Sheppard and
Gilmore statement; GO 48 and 27, Hq.
USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941 and 16 Feb.
74. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; msg.,
Manda to AGWAR, 1 2 Dec. 1941.
75. Msg., Manila to WD, 11 Dec.
1941;msg., Manila to AGWAR, 1 2 Dec.
1941; Hart, Narrative of Events; GO 48
and 27, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941, and
1942.)
16 Feb. 1942; msg., Arnold to C G
USAFFE, 24 Dec. 1941.
76. 19th Gp. Operations Record; msg.
$1712, Manila to TAG, 1 5 Dec. 1941;
GO 16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, I Feb.
1942; GO 2 , Hq. Southwest Pacific Com-
mand, Lembang, 1 5 Feb. 1942; G O 12,
Hq. Allied Air Forces, 2s May 1942.
77. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; GO 52,
Hq. USAFFE, 24 Dec. 1941.
78. History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , p.
20, and statement of Col. Ray Elsmore,
Doc. 30a, App. FI. A few days after the
war began, one P-40 was dispatched to
Mindanao to serve as a personal recon-
naissance plane for General Sharp, in com-
mand on that island. On 4 January, nine
P-40’s left Bataan for Del Monte. Five
of these planes arrived; and about a week
later two P-35’s arrived. (Obert state-
ment; History, 24th Pursuit Gp.)
79. 19th Gp. Operations Record; Els-
more statement.
80. History, 27th Bomb. Gp.
81. Msgs., MacArthur to Marshall, 10
Dec. 1941; Manila to WD, 1 3 Dec. 1941;
#40, Manila to T A G , 2 2 Dec. 1941.
82. Memo for MacArthur from Brere-
ton, 14 Dec. 1941.
83. Msg. #787, T A G to C G USAFFE,
1 5 Dec. 1941; ltr. to CG AFCC, incl. to
R&R, OPD to Air Service Command, 15
Dec. 1941; ltr., T A G to CG M C C , 23
Dec. 1941; msg. #750, Adams to Mac-
Arthur, 23 Dec. 1941.
84. Msgs., Manila to W D and TAG,
19 Dec. 1941; $13, 20 Dec.; #30 and #544,
2 1 Dec.; #3 and $34, 2 2 Dec.; Brief
Chronology of the Philippine Campaign,
Col. Ray Elsmore’s personal papers, Doc.
8 2 , in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11; Sutherland interview, as cited in
n. 50.
85. 19th Gp. Operations Record; msg.
#41, Manila to TAG, 23 Dec. 1941; GO
16, Hq. FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942;
GO z, Hq. SWP Command, Lembang,
15 Feb. 1942.
86. G O 2, Hq. SWP Command, Lem-
bang, 15 Feb. 1942; GO 10, Hq. Fifth
Air Force, 2 2 Sept. 1942; GO 16, Hq.
FEAF, Bandoeng, 1 2 Feb. 1942; GO 38,
69 1