“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 3 - 1 6
30th Bomb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher
report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947;
Combs interview.) There is some evi-
dence that several planes had been left
in an unusually exposed position. (Ind,
Butunn, p. 1 0 1 . ) Ft should be emphasized,
however, that the bombing did little
damage, and that the low-flying enemy
pursuits picked out the B-17’s wherever
they were and riddled them. Although
this fact does not excuse a lack of pre-
caution, it is nevertheless true that unless
the B-17’s could have been completely
hidden, the widest possible dispersal
would have made little difference.
53. See sources in n. 5 1 and Summary
of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954, where
“Nichols Field reports 1 2 casualties-4
serious, 3 killed.” The enemy had
planned a full-scale attack on the fields
near Manila, but weather restricted their
effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese
Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
54. See again sources in n. 51 and also
Fisher talk.
5 5 . Msg. #736, T A G to C G USAFFE,
7 Dec. 1941.
56. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Ind, Bataun, pp. I I 1-12.
57. Report by Lt. Col. S.M. Mellnik,
AA in the Philippines, Doc. 24, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11.
58. 19th Gp. Operations Record. But
see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941,
1100, where “C.O. Del Monte reported
that 16 B-17’s on way to Clark Field”
and in a garbled message indicated one
or more had turned back “with wounded
crew members.” The original plan for a
mission at dawn under Field Order No.
z (see Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550)
seems to have been changed by Field
Order No. 3, transmitted to “C.O.
Bomber Command, Clark Field” at 2356,
8 December.
59. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet.
60. Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
where under 0 2 2 0 appears this entry:
“P-40 off OZ:IOshould be in between
690
0 3 :0 ~ 3 :30. Lt. Mahoney pilot”; and
there follows under 0513: “Mahoney to
Brady-six transports off Vigan Bay-1 I
Naval vessels off Vigan.”
61. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; 19th
Gp. Operations Record; Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, Z I Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara,
n.d.; USSBS Intr. 331, Cap! Mitsugo
Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945. According to the
officer who took Marett’s place as com-
manding officer of the 34th Squadron, a
Japanese air raid resulted in the destruc-
tion of twelve P-36’s shortly after they
landed from the Vigan mission. (Brown
statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
0530, 0625 which notes that “8 B-17’s
loaded, left Clark for attack on vessels,
priority transports and landing parties,”
and 1 2 1 1 where “Grover reports 2nd
Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .so cal.
3 P-35’s were lost in the encounter
including sqdn commander at 09: 1 5 . One
transport blew up.”
62. This is the only loss which has
been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval
and Merchant Losses during World
W a r 11, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commission
[ JANACI.)
63. 19th Gp. Operations Record; GO
2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 15 Feb. 1942. USSBS reports
indicate that there were no aircraft
carriers or battleships involved in the
Vigan and Aparri landings. (See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
under 0925.)
64. 19th Gp. Operations Record.
65. Ltr., Col. E.L. Eubank to CG
FEAF, 19 Feb. 1942, Narrative Report
of Flight of Capt. Colin P. Kelly, Doc.
25 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11.
66. Zbid., msg., Manila to T A G , 1 1
Dec. 1941; msg., MacArthur to T A G ,
28 Dec. 1941; msg. #s, Java to TAG,
1 5 Feb. 1942; Summary of Activities, 10
Dec. 1941, 1700.
67. USSBS Intrs. 33, Vice Adm.
Kazutaka Shiraichi, 15 Oct. 1945; 90,