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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance…
  • p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the European and the Pacific theaters. The history…
  • p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas schools, where combat experience of the…
  • p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of Advance during the war…
  • p. 45 …Trenchard, then com- mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by his advanced…
  • p. 46 …the Zone of Advance, the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
  • p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis of the American advance. Since…
  • p. 51 …among the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but the most advanced thought…
  • p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced ideas of the Army’s…
  • p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
  • p. 70 …to have been geared closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
  • p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“ But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
  • p. 76 …who might provide advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
  • p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
  • p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
  • p. 91 …the years immediately follow- ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
  • p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
  • p. 96 …mission of coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum- stances decidedly favorable to…
  • p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
  • p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training then being…
  • p. 119 …in the organization of their air forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
  • p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
  • p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
  • p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as an advance striking force…
  • p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
  • p. 129 …supply resulting from the speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
  • p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German forces had destroyed all effective…
  • p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
  • p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis- rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
  • p. 149 …the best flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of basic and advanced Responsibility…
  • p. 161 …miles to the That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri- can…
  • p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
  • p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere, protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
  • p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division of the General Staff…
  • p. 183 …T h e British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
  • p. 198 …so far advanced as those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring and summer…
  • p. 201 …32 The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked structural advance over the force…
  • p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico presented the most advanced stage…
  • p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter- mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
  • p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same area.51These moves had not advanced…
  • p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance notice…
  • p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group, whose pilots had received advanced training…
  • p. 246 …But as the day advanced the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed in…
  • p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the Americans advance notice of…
  • p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did not indicate whether the question of an…
  • p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi- tional landings along the Luzon…
  • p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
  • p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
  • p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether- lands East Indies…
  • p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu- tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
  • p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
  • p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two theories to account for the…
  • p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments, and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
  • p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of enemy craft. Next, there…
  • p. 338 …time proved less effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little good…
  • p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide advance warning…
  • p. 358 …Prospects for completing the work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor were…
  • p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging + See below, p. 493. 34'
  • p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general service troops arrived in the waters…
  • p. 403 …T e n enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task force into southern Greenland in…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 2 1 3 - 1 6
30th Bomb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher
report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947;
Combs interview.) There is some evi-
dence that several planes had been left
in an unusually exposed position. (Ind,
Butunn, p. 1 0 1 . ) Ft should be emphasized,
however, that the bombing did little
damage, and that the low-flying enemy
pursuits picked out the B-17’s wherever
they were and riddled them. Although
this fact does not excuse a lack of pre-
caution, it is nevertheless true that unless
the B-17’s could have been completely
hidden, the widest possible dispersal
would have made little difference.
53. See sources in n. 5 1 and Summary
of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954, where
“Nichols Field reports 1 2 casualties-4
serious, 3 killed.” The enemy had
planned a full-scale attack on the fields
near Manila, but weather restricted their
effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese
Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)
54. See again sources in n. 51 and also
Fisher talk.
5 5 . Msg. #736, T A G to C G USAFFE,
7 Dec. 1941.
56. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; Obert
statement; Ind, Bataun, pp. I I 1-12.
57. Report by Lt. Col. S.M. Mellnik,
AA in the Philippines, Doc. 24, in His-
tory, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I , App. 11.
58. 19th Gp. Operations Record. But
see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941,
1100, where “C.O. Del Monte reported
that 16 B-17’s on way to Clark Field”
and in a garbled message indicated one
or more had turned back “with wounded
crew members.” The original plan for a
mission at dawn under Field Order No.
z (see Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550)
seems to have been changed by Field
Order No. 3, transmitted to “C.O.
Bomber Command, Clark Field” at 2356,
8 December.
59. Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Narrative
of Events, Asiatic Fleet.
60. Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
where under 0 2 2 0 appears this entry:
“P-40 off OZ:IOshould be in between
690
0 3 :0 ~ 3 :30. Lt. Mahoney pilot”; and
there follows under 0513: “Mahoney to
Brady-six transports off Vigan Bay-1 I
Naval vessels off Vigan.”
61. History, 24th Pursuit Gp.; 19th
Gp. Operations Record; Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, Z I Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara,
n.d.; USSBS Intr. 331, Cap! Mitsugo
Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945. According to the
officer who took Marett’s place as com-
manding officer of the 34th Squadron, a
Japanese air raid resulted in the destruc-
tion of twelve P-36’s shortly after they
landed from the Vigan mission. (Brown
statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
0530, 0625 which notes that “8 B-17’s
loaded, left Clark for attack on vessels,
priority transports and landing parties,”
and 1 2 1 1 where “Grover reports 2nd
Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .so cal.
3 P-35’s were lost in the encounter
including sqdn commander at 09: 1 5 . One
transport blew up.”
62. This is the only loss which has
been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval
and Merchant Losses during World
W a r 11, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint
Army-Navy Assessment Commission
[ JANACI.)
63. 19th Gp. Operations Record; GO
2, Hq. Southwest Pacific Command,
Lembang, 15 Feb. 1942. USSBS reports
indicate that there were no aircraft
carriers or battleships involved in the
Vigan and Aparri landings. (See also
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941,
under 0925.)
64. 19th Gp. Operations Record.
65. Ltr., Col. E.L. Eubank to CG
FEAF, 19 Feb. 1942, Narrative Report
of Flight of Capt. Colin P. Kelly, Doc.
25 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. I ,
App. 11.
66. Zbid., msg., Manila to T A G , 1 1
Dec. 1941; msg., MacArthur to T A G ,
28 Dec. 1941; msg. #s, Java to TAG,
1 5 Feb. 1942; Summary of Activities, 10
Dec. 1941, 1700.
67. USSBS Intrs. 33, Vice Adm.
Kazutaka Shiraichi, 15 Oct. 1945; 90,

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